"The independence of the Election Commission depends as much on the manner of appointment as on security of tenure." Discuss in light of the 2023 Act and *Anoop Baranwal*.

Article 324 makes the Election Commission of India (ECI) the guardian of free and fair elections. Article 324(5) gives the CEC strong security of tenure. However, tenure protects a Commissioner only after appointment. Who is chosen, and by whom, decides independence at the entry point. Anoop Baranwal (2023) and the 2023 Act brought this question to the centre of the debate.

Security of tenure: necessary but not sufficient

• Judge-like removal: the CEC can be removed only for proved misbehaviour or incapacity, by a special majority in both Houses. This guards against executive retaliation.
• No parity for ECs: Election Commissioners can be removed on the CEC's recommendation. The Supreme Court in 2023 left parity to Parliament [1].
• Service conditions also matter: the 2023 Act moves CEC pay from parity with Supreme Court judges, fixed by an Act of Parliament, to the Cabinet Secretary's scale, which the executive sets [1].

Manner of appointment: the Anoop Baranwal logic

• The Constitution Bench held that the ECI "should be independent of Executive control". It ordered a PM–LoP–CJI panel until Parliament made a law [1].
• A friendly appointee never needs the threat of removal. Independence must therefore be built in at the selection stage.

The 2023 Act: does it meet the test?

• Positive: it gives appointments a statutory basis, as Article 324(2) contemplates. It also adds the LoP and a search committee [1].
• The government holds a 2:1 majority: a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM replaces the CJI, so the LoP can always be outvoted [1].
• Vacancy clause: the panel's choice stays valid even if a seat is vacant. With no LoP, for example when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, only ruling-party members would select [1].
• The shortlist can be bypassed: the selection committee may pick candidates outside the five names the search committee proposes [1].
• Narrow eligibility: only Secretary-rank officials qualify. This excludes judges and experts, even though the ECI performs quasi-judicial functions [1].
• No independent secretariat, although the Goswami Committee and the Supreme Court stressed its importance [1].

Security of tenure and a neutral appointment process work together; either one alone leaves the ECI open to executive influence. Parliament should add a neutral member to the selection panel, as the Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission (2015) recommended [1]. It should also protect all Commissioners equally and give the ECI its own secretariat. These steps would match appointment safeguards to tenure safeguards and secure the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.