Suggest reforms to make the Election Commission of India more transparent and accountable without compromising its autonomy.

The Election Commission of India (ECI), set up under Article 324, referees Indian democracy. Its credibility needs both independence from the executive and visible accountability to citizens. The Keralam Assembly's resolution seeking greater ECI transparency [1] shows that trust in the referee is now contested. Reforms must strengthen the institution rather than target individuals.

A. Securing autonomy (the base for credible accountability)

• Neutral selection panel: under the 2023 Act, two of the three selectors belong to the government [2]. The Law Commission (2015) model of PM, LoP and CJI should be adopted [2].
• Equal removal protection: Article 324(5) should be amended so that Election Commissioners, like the CEC, can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge. This ends the current "lack of parity" [2].
• Independent secretariat, as recommended by the Goswami Committee and the ECI itself [2].
• Pay fixed by law at Supreme Court judge level, not linked to the Cabinet Secretary scale that the executive sets [2].
• Wider eligibility, open to judges and experts beyond Secretary-rank officers [2].

B. Transparency measures

• Publish reasoned orders on Model Code complaints, with fixed timelines for disposal.
• Release booth-wise additions and deletions to electoral rolls in machine-readable form during revisions such as the SIR.
• Record dissent in multi-member decisions, since the Commission decides by majority.
• Proactively disclose EVM–VVPAT verification results.

C. Accountability without executive control

• An annual report to Parliament, examined by a standing committee. This gives answerability without executive direction.
• A statutory grievance mechanism with time-bound replies to parties and voters.
• Structured consultation with parties before nationwide exercises.
• Draw on global practice. In the UK, a Speaker's Committee of Parliament, not the government, runs recruitment [2].

Safeguard: accountability should run to Parliament, the courts and the public, never to the government of the day. Removal should stay confined to the Article 324(5) process.

An ECI that is protected in appointment and tenure yet open in its decisions can be both independent and trusted. Implementing the long-pending Goswami and Law Commission recommendations, along with a habit of reasoned public decisions, would restore its legitimacy. This would protect free and fair elections, part of the Constitution's basic structure, and advance SDG 16 on accountable institutions.