Keralam passes resolution for CEC’s removal

1. At a Glance

• The Keralam Legislative Assembly passed a resolution seeking the removal of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar. It also asked for steps to improve transparency in the functioning of the Election Commission of India (ECI) [1].
• Such a resolution has no legal force. Under the Constitution, removing a CEC is solely for Parliament [2].
• It matters for UPSC because it touches independence of constitutional bodies, Centre–State friction (federalism), and the integrity of elections.

2. Why in the News

• On Monday, 12 October 2026, the Keralam Assembly passed the resolution. It was reported on 13 October 2026 (The Hindu, Chennai edition, p. 9) [1].
• The ruling UDF and the Opposition LDF both supported it. The BJP objected to its contents [1].
• Broader context: Opposition parties have criticised the ECI since 2025, including over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and the 2023 appointment law [2].

3. Background & Evolution

• 1950: The ECI was set up under Article 324. It was a single-member body (only the CEC) until 1989 [2].
• 1989 / 1993: Additional Election Commissioners were appointed. The ECI has been a three-member body since 1993 [2].
• 1991: The Election Commission (Conditions of Service of Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act was passed [2].
• 1995: In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the multi-member ECI and decision-making by majority [2].
• 2 March 2023: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench ruled that, until Parliament made a law, appointments would be made on the advice of a committee of the PM, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in the Lok Sabha and the CJI [2].
• December 2023: The CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was enacted. It replaced the CJI on the committee with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [2].
• February 2025: Gyanesh Kumar became CEC, succeeding Rajiv Kumar. He was the first CEC appointed under the 2023 Act [2].
• October 2026: The Keralam Assembly passed its removal resolution [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Constitutional body	Election Commission of India, Art. 324 [2]
Removal of CEC	Art. 324(5): only "in like manner and on the like grounds" as a Supreme Court judge [2]
Removal of other ECs	Only on the recommendation of the CEC (Art. 324(5) proviso) [2]
Judge-removal procedure	Art. 124(4) plus the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The motion needs 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members' signatures. It must pass by special majority in each House, then the President issues the order [2]
Grounds for removal	Proved misbehaviour or incapacity [2]
Selection committee (2023 Act)	PM (chair), LoP / leader of the largest Opposition party in the Lok Sabha, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [2]
Tenure	6 years or age 65, whichever comes first [2]
Role of a state legislature	None in removal. Its resolution is only an expression of opinion [2]
Current CEC	Gyanesh Kumar [1]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The Constitution protects the CEC from removal so that the office is independent of the executive. A state resolution cannot start the Art. 324(5) process [2].
• The resolution is a political signal. Any actual removal needs a motion in Parliament [2].
• The fact that the 2023 Act moved away from the CJI-inclusive model of Anoop Baranwal feeds the debate about how independent the ECI is [2].

Federalism / Centre–State

• A state legislature taking a formal position on a Union-level constitutional office reflects wider Centre–State tensions [1].
• Elections to state assemblies are also run by the ECI under Art. 324, so states have a direct stake in its credibility [2].

Ethical / Governance

• The resolution's call for transparency in ECI functioning [1] raises public-trust issues: how electoral rolls are revised, how complaints are handled, and access to data.
• Rival coalitions agreeing: the UDF and LDF both supported the resolution while the BJP opposed it [1]. This shows the issue cuts across the state's usual party lines.

Political / Electoral

• If the referee's neutrality is publicly doubted, the result is legitimacy costs for electoral outcomes.
• There is a risk that attacks on constitutional bodies become politicised and partisan.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 12 October 2026: The Keralam Assembly passed the resolution seeking CEC Gyanesh Kumar's removal and greater ECI transparency. The UDF and LDF supported it; the BJP objected [1].
• 2025–26: The ECI rolled out the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, starting in Bihar (2025) and then extending to other states. It drew Opposition criticism [2].
• 2026: Assembly elections were held in Assam, Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal (listed in The Hindu's Elections section [1]). The UDF is now the ruling front in Keralam [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge, under Art. 324(5) [2].
• Other ECs can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• Removal needs a special majority in both Houses of Parliament plus a Presidential order [2].
• Grounds for removal: proved misbehaviour or incapacity [2].
• State legislatures have no constitutional role in removing the CEC [2].
• Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023): proposed a committee of PM, LoP and CJI as an interim arrangement [2].
• The 2023 Act's committee is PM, LoP and a Union Cabinet Minister. No CJI [2].
• CEC tenure: 6 years or age 65, whichever is earlier [2].
• ECI multi-member since 1993; T.N. Seshan (1995) upheld it [2].
• Gyanesh Kumar is the CEC who was the subject of the Keralam resolution [1].
• The Keralam resolution was backed by both the UDF and the LDF; the BJP objected [1].

8. Why the Real Fight Is Over Who Picks the CEC

• The government side has a built-in majority on the selection panel
• The 2023 Act's committee has three members: the PM, a Cabinet Minister chosen by the PM, and the Leader of Opposition (LoP) [3].
• Two of the three come from the government of the day. PRS says this 'may undermine the independence' of the ECI [3].

• The LoP can be outvoted 2–1 on every choice. In practice, the government decides who sits on the referee's chair.

• The panel can work with no Opposition member at all

• The Act says the committee's choice stays valid even if one seat is vacant [3].
• When the Lok Sabha is dissolved there is no LoP. In that period the committee is made up only of ruling-party members [3].

• That gap falls just before a general election, when an appointment matters most.

• The shortlist does not bind the final choice

• A search committee prepares a panel of five names. The selection committee may still pick someone who is not on that list [3].

• So the step meant to screen candidates can simply be skipped.

• Only senior civil servants can apply

• Only a person who is or was of Secretary rank in government can become CEC or EC [3].

• ECs also act in a quasi-judicial way (they decide disputes, such as party symbol cases, like a court). PRS warns that the rule 'may exclude other qualified individuals', such as judges or experts [3].

• Pay was moved from the judges' scale to the bureaucrats' scale

• Under the 1991 Act, CEC pay matched a Supreme Court judge's pay. The 2023 Act links it to the Cabinet Secretary's pay instead [3].
• A judge's salary must be fixed by an Act of Parliament (Article 125). A Cabinet Secretary's pay is set by the government, based on the Pay Commission [3].

• PRS says this may give the executive (the government) more control over the ECI [3].

• The courts are still examining the Act

• Challenges to the 2023 Act, including the removal of the CJI from the panel, came before the Supreme Court. A judgment is listed for 23 September 2026 (2026 INSC 1040) [4].
• Its outcome could not be checked here. Read it before you write on this topic.

9. The Case Against the Keralam Resolution — and How Far It Holds

• The strongest objection: an Assembly is putting one official on trial by majority vote
• Article 324(5) makes removal hard on purpose. It needs 'proved misbehaviour or incapacity', a formal inquiry, and a special majority (a large two-thirds-type majority) in both Houses of Parliament.
• A state Assembly voting to name and remove one person skips all of that. No charge is framed, no inquiry is held, and the CEC gets no hearing.
• If every state where the Opposition rules did this, the CEC would face constant political pressure. That is the same pressure the Constitution tries to block.

• This is roughly why the BJP objected to the resolution's contents [1].

• What the objection gets right

• Naming one person is weaker than naming the system. Remove this CEC, and the next one is still chosen by the same 2–1 government panel [3].

• So the removal demand does not fix the problem the resolution complains about.

• What the objection misses

• The second demand, more transparency in how the ECI works [1], is about the institution, not about one person. That demand is fair.
• States have a real stake: the ECI also runs their Assembly elections. A resolution is one of the few formal ways a state can put its view on record.

• Both rival fronts in Keralam, the UDF and the LDF, backed it [1]. That makes it harder to call it the move of just one party.

• A fair conclusion for your answer

• The removal demand has no legal force and runs against the logic of security of tenure (protection from being removed at will).
• The concern behind it, about how the CEC is appointed and how open the ECI is, has support from PRS, earlier committees and the Supreme Court [3].

10. The Gaps the Removal Rules Leave Open

• The other two Commissioners are much less protected than the CEC
• The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge. The other ECs can be removed simply on the CEC's recommendation [3].
• PRS points to this 'lack of parity' (unequal protection) [3].
• Why it matters: decisions are taken by majority of the three members. If two ECs can be removed more easily, a CEC, or a government working through a CEC, can put pressure on them.

• In 2023 the Supreme Court said giving ECs equal protection 'is a matter for Parliament to consider'. It would need a constitutional amendment [3].

• The ECI has no staff of its own

• The Goswami Committee and the ECI itself asked for an independent secretariat (its own permanent office staff, not lent by the government) [3].
• The Supreme Court (2023) also noted this was important. The 2023 Act does not deal with it [3].
• Without its own staff, the ECI depends on officers whose careers are run by the government. This weakens it even if the CEC's own job is secure.

11. How Other Democracies Choose Their Election Chiefs

• South Africa: a judge leads the selection
• Its election body has five members, and one must be a judge [3].
• The selection committee is chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court [3].

• The judiciary, not the ruling party, controls the shortlist.

• United Kingdom: Parliament as a whole approves

• A Speaker's Committee runs recruitment. The House of Commons approves the candidates, and the monarch appoints them [3].

• United States: the Senate must confirm

• The President appoints members of the Federal Election Commission, but the Senate must confirm them. Members cannot be elected or appointed officials [3].

• Canada: the whole House decides

• The Chief Electoral Officer is appointed by a resolution of the House of Commons [3].

• What India does differently

• In all four, someone outside the executive (a judge or the full legislature) checks the choice.
• In India, the executive holds two of the three seats, and Parliament has no vote on the name [3].

12. Reforms India Has Already Been Told to Make

• Parliament should add a neutral member to the selection panel
• Goswami Committee (1990): the President should appoint the CEC after consulting the CJI and the LoP [3].
• National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002): a wide panel of the PM, the LoPs of both Houses, the Speaker and the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha [3].
• Law Commission (2015): the PM, the LoP of the Lok Sabha and the CJI [3].

• All three reports put at least one non-government member on the panel. The 2023 Act does not [3].

• This has been tried before and dropped

• The Constitution (Seventieth Amendment) Bill, 1990 proposed a panel of the Rajya Sabha Chairman, the Speaker and the LoP. It was withdrawn in 1994 [3].

• For over 30 years, governments of every party have chosen not to give up control of this choice.

• Parliament should amend Article 324(5) to protect all three Commissioners equally

• This would end the gap where ECs can be removed on the CEC's word. The Supreme Court has said this is for Parliament to decide [3].

• The government should give the ECI its own secretariat

• This was asked for by the Goswami Committee and by the ECI's 'Proposed Election Reforms' (2018) [3].

• Restore the judge-level pay link

• Tie CEC pay to a Supreme Court judge's pay again, fixed by law, so the government cannot change it through pay orders [3].

• What states like Keralam could do instead

• Use the Inter-State Council or their MPs to push these system-level changes in Parliament.
• A removal motion can only start in Parliament, with 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatures.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 2 of 3 members of the CEC selection committee come from the government of the day; the panel can run with only ruling-party members when the Lok Sabha is dissolved [3]
• Report/Committee: Goswami Committee (1990) — CJI and LoP to be consulted, and an independent ECI secretariat [3]; NCRWC (2002); Law Commission (2015) — PM + LoP + CJI [3]; ECI 'Proposed Election Reforms' (2018) [3]
• Law/Case: Art. 324(5); CEC & Other ECs Act, 2023 (pay linked to Cabinet Secretary, Art. 125 contrast) [3]; Anoop Baranwal (2023); Supreme Court judgment on challenges to the 2023 Act, 23 Sept 2026 (2026 INSC 1040) — check the outcome [4]; Constitution (Seventieth Amendment) Bill, 1990, withdrawn 1994 [3]
• Comparison: South Africa — selection panel chaired by the Constitutional Court President; UK — House of Commons approves candidates; USA — Senate confirms; Canada — appointed by a House of Commons resolution [3]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: Appointment to various constitutional posts, and the powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies. Also: federalism, and issues and challenges in Centre–State relations.
• GS-II: Salient features of the Representation of People's Act and electoral reforms.
• GS-IV (link): Public trust, institutional integrity, and transparency in governance.
• Possible question stems: 1. "The independence of the Election Commission depends as much on the manner of appointment as on security of tenure." Discuss in light of the 2023 Act and Anoop Baranwal. 2. What is the constitutional significance of state legislatures passing resolutions on matters in the Union's domain? Examine with recent examples. 3. Suggest reforms to make the Election Commission of India more transparent and accountable without compromising its autonomy.

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Art. 324 and ECI structure: the base for the removal and appointment provisions.
• The 2023 CEC & ECs Act: the current law on appointments, and why it is contested.
• Anoop Baranwal (2023) and T.N. Seshan (1995): the key judgments on ECI independence.
• Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 / impeachment of judges: the removal procedure the CEC's removal mirrors.
• Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls: the current flashpoint in Opposition–ECI ties.
• State Assembly resolutions (CAA, NEET, delimitation): a pattern of states using non-binding resolutions as federal protest.
• Kerala → Keralam renaming (Art. 3/4): explains the nomenclature in the news item.
• State Election Commissions (Art. 243K/243ZA): often confused with the ECI.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Chief Election Commissioner (Polity): The resolution targets the CEC; this covers appointment, tenure and the judge-like removal protection.
• Removal of judges (Polity): The CEC can be removed only 'like a Supreme Court judge', so this procedure decides whether the resolution has any effect.
• Special majority (Polity): Removal needs a special majority in both Houses of Parliament, not a state assembly vote.
• Election Commission of India (Polity): The body whose independence and transparency the resolution questions; Article 324 is its constitutional base.
• Resolution (Polity): Explains what a House resolution is and why it only expresses opinion without binding force.
• Centre-state relations (Polity): A state assembly acting on a Union-level office reflects wider Centre–State tensions the note discusses.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• "State assembly resolution can remove the CEC" is false. Only Parliament can remove the CEC; the resolution is not binding [2].
• The CEC and the ECs are protected differently. The CEC has judge-like protection. ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• The CJI is not on the 2023 Act's committee. The CJI was part of the Anoop Baranwal interim arrangement only [2].
• The ECI is not the State Election Commission. SECs conduct panchayat and municipal polls. An SEC is removed like a High Court judge (Art. 243K) [2].
• The resolution was not a party-line vote. Both the UDF and the LDF supported it; only the BJP objected [1].