India's Indo-Pacific vision stresses ASEAN centrality and refusal to 'force countries to choose sides.' Critically examine how this approach serves India's strategic interests amid great-power competition.
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At the first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum (October 2026), the Raksha Mantri described an Indo-Pacific where all countries, "large and small", make their own choices [1]. Built on ASEAN centrality, this approach serves India's strategic autonomy well. Its credibility still depends on what India does, not only on what it says.
How the approach serves India's interests
- Strategic autonomy: India avoids getting locked into a bloc. Act East, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR are tied together through ASEAN-led mechanisms [1].
- Legitimacy and access: Working through ASEAN platforms makes India an insider rather than an outside rival. India co-chairs the ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Expert Working Group with Malaysia (2024–27) [2].
- Rules over power: India backs the DOC and a Code of Conduct consistent with UNCLOS [3]. ASEAN ministers praised India's UNCLOS adherence [4]. This lets India push back on coercion "at sea" without naming any country [1].
- Defence-industrial gains: The BrahMos contract with the Philippines (January 2022, $375 million) [5] and the offer of co-production and MRO [1] help Aatmanirbhar Bharat grow through partners.
- Non-traditional security: Piracy, illegal fishing and disasters are "borderless challenges" [1]. They give India low-friction ways to cooperate.
Limitations
- Credibility gap: Selling anti-ship missiles to a South China Sea claimant [5] can look like taking sides, whatever the stated position.
- Weak centrality: ASEAN works by consensus and its members disagree among themselves. Overlapping forums risk turning into talk shops, a danger the minister himself flagged [1].
- Economic asymmetry: India ran a $45.20 billion trade deficit with ASEAN in 2024–25, and the AITIGA review is still open [2]. This weakens Act East's "equal partner" claim [1].
- Capacity limits: Promises of after-sales support and MRO require reliable delivery over many years.
ASEAN centrality and the refusal to force choices give India influence without having to join a bloc. The approach holds only if India's actions match its message. The way forward is to:
- feed the new forum's research into the ADMM-Plus work cycle
- conclude the AITIGA review
- fund joint research through AISTDF [2]
Done together, these would make India a trusted partner, in line with the spirit of SAGAR of "security and growth for all."
Sources
- 1PIB: "India seeks an Indo-Pacific where all countries make their own choices…: Raksha Mantri at 1st ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum" (14 Oct 2026)vision, ASEAN-led mechanisms, "actions at sea", borderless challenges, co-production/MRO offer, forum-overlap caution
- 2MEA: Brief on India-ASEAN Relations (15 July 2025)ADMM-Plus CT EWG co-chair, trade deficit, AITIGA review, AISTDF
- 3MEA: ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation (2023)DOC, Code of Conduct consistent with UNCLOS
- 4PIB: Raksha Mantri meets ASEAN Defence Ministers during Informal Meeting in Kuala Lumpur (2025)ASEAN praise for India's UNCLOS adherence
- 5PIB: BrahMos signs contract with Philippines for export of Shore Based Anti-Ship Missile System (2022)BrahMos-Philippines deal