India seeks an Indo-Pacific where all countries make their own choices, protect their interests & pursue development in peace: Raksha Mantri at 1st ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum

1. At a Glance

• What it is: The Raksha Mantri gave the keynote at the first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum. He set out India's idea of an Indo-Pacific where "all countries – large and small – make their own choices, protect their interests and pursue development in peace" [1].
• Core message: Security comes from building trust, respecting sovereignty, following international law and keeping dialogue open. The aim is a regional order where countries are not forced to choose sides [1].
• Policy frame: Ties together Act East Policy, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR, with ASEAN-led mechanisms placed at the centre of India's Indo-Pacific vision [1].
• UPSC value: Covers several Prelims terms (SAGAR/MAHASAGAR expansions, iDEX, TDF, Year of Maritime Cooperation) and links to GS-II (IR) and GS-III (security, defence technology).

2. Why in the News

• 14 October 2026: Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh spoke at the maiden ASEAN–India Defence Think Tank Forum, held at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi [1].
• It took place during the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation (2026), which he called a chance to "turn shared interest into practical action" [1].
• He offered defence industrial cooperation with ASEAN in patrol vessels, radars, air-defence systems, helicopters and drones [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Civilisational base: He spoke of centuries-old ties between India and Southeast Asia built on shared history, culture, trade and ideas [1].
• Act East Policy: He described it as a long-term commitment to work with the region as an equal partner [1].
• SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) has been extended into MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions). Both are framed as supporting open and multipolar cooperation [1].
• Milestones ⚠ (verify, no whitelisted source retrieved):
• SAGAR was announced in 2015 (Mauritius). MAHASAGAR was announced during the PM's March 2025 visit to Mauritius.
• At the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (Kuala Lumpur, Oct 2025), 2026 was declared the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation.
• At the 2nd ASEAN-India Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, 31 Oct 2025), India proposed an "ASEAN-India Defence Think-Tank Interaction" and an ASEAN-India Initiative on Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations. This proposal appears to be the origin of the forum.
• The 12th ADMM-Plus was held on 1 Nov 2025.

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Event	1st (maiden) ASEAN–India Defence Think Tank Forum [1]
Date / Venue	14 Oct 2026; MP-IDSA, New Delhi [1]
Speaker	Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh (Ministry of Defence) [1]
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations [1]
SAGAR	Security and Growth for All in the Region [1]
MAHASAGAR	Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions [1]
2026 theme year	ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation [1]
Defence innovation tools named	iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence), TDF (Technology Development Fund) [1]
Self-reliance frame	Aatmanirbhar Bharat; "self-reliance does not mean working in isolation" [1]
"Borderless challenges" listed	Terrorism, cybercrime, piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing, climate-related disasters, risks to supply chains [1]
Maritime priorities	Maritime domain awareness (MDA), interoperability, underwater domain awareness [1]
Industrial cooperation areas	Patrol vessels, radars, air-defence systems, helicopters, drones [1]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• India positions itself as an alternative to bloc politics: a regional order where states work together "without being forced to choose sides" [1].
• He referred indirectly to coercion, noting "pressure & uncertainty created at times through actions at sea" amid growing strategic competition [1].
• He backed ASEAN centrality: "strengthen cooperation, not create competition between regional forums." He also said India's approach and ASEAN's Indo-Pacific outlook are complementary [1].
• He treated the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters as one connected maritime space for trade, energy, people and essential goods [1].

Security (Maritime / Non-traditional)

• He called for better sharing of maritime information, navy and coast-guard cooperation and the ability to respond together to emergencies [1].
• He called for action against piracy, trafficking and illegal fishing "in accordance with international law" [1].
• He urged early, peaceful discussion of differences "before they become disputes," a preventive-diplomacy approach [1].

Scientific / Technological

• He named AI, drones, cyber and space-based systems as key areas. He noted that low-cost drones can challenge expensive defence systems and called for "practical, affordable and adaptable" responses [1].
• He proposed joint work on counter-drone systems, cyber defence, maritime surveillance and disaster response, through joint research, shared testing, young-researcher exchanges and innovation challenges [1].
• He set safeguards: protect sensitive information, respect intellectual property, and share technology responsibly [1].

Economic / Defence-Industrial

• He offered co-development, co-production, MRO (maintenance, repair & overhaul), training and long-term technical support, to build local skills and make supply chains more reliable [1].
• He listed what makes such partnerships work: clear requirements, reliable after-sales support, technology safeguards, fair sharing of benefits, and opportunities for local firms. The goal is "lasting partnerships, not one-time transactions" [1].

Governance / Track-1.5 Diplomacy

• A think-tank forum hosted at MP-IDSA gives the relationship an expert-led, track-1.5 channel alongside official ones. He asked researchers to study what makes partnerships succeed [1].
• He extended innovation beyond large organisations to start-ups, universities, research institutions and smaller companies [1].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 2026: Designated ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation [1].
• 14 Oct 2026: 1st ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum held at MP-IDSA [1].
• ⚠ (verify): 26 Oct 2025, 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (Kuala Lumpur) declared 2026 the Year of Maritime Cooperation; a 2nd ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise was proposed.
• ⚠ (verify): 31 Oct 2025, 2nd ASEAN-India Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting proposed the Defence Think-Tank Interaction and the Women in UN Peacekeeping initiative. 1 Nov 2025, 12th ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur.
• ⚠ (verify): ASEAN-India Plan of Action 2026–2030.

7. Prelims Hooks

• The 1st ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum was held on 14 October 2026 [1].
• Venue: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi [1].
• 2026 = ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation [1].
• SAGAR = Security and Growth for All in the Region [1].
• MAHASAGAR = Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions [1].
• iDEX = Innovations for Defence Excellence [1].
• TDF = Technology Development Fund [1].
• India links Act East, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR through ASEAN-led mechanisms, which it describes as central to its Indo-Pacific vision [1].
• The Raksha Mantri called terrorism, cybercrime, piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing and climate disasters "borderless challenges" [1].
• Underwater domain awareness was named as a priority alongside MDA and interoperability [1].
• Aatmanirbhar Bharat was framed as "not working in isolation" but as an opening for trusted partners to co-design and co-produce [1].

8. Why the Arms Offer Needs a Track Record to Back It

• India's defence exports are growing, but ASEAN is a small part of them
• India's defence exports reached a record Rs 23,622 crore in FY 2024-25. That is 12.04% more than the year before [4].
• These sales go to more than 100 countries, including the US, France and Armenia [4]. No figure for ASEAN alone has been published.

• The best-known ASEAN deal is still the BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile contract with the Philippines. It was signed in January 2022 and is worth $375 million [5].

• The minister's own checklist shows what ASEAN buyers worry about

• He named the conditions for a lasting partnership: clear requirements, reliable after-sales support, technology safeguards and fair sharing of benefits [1].
• After-sales support means spare parts, repair and training for years after the sale. A buyer whose patrol boat or radar is waiting for parts cannot use it.

• So the offer of MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) and local co-production [1] is the real test. A catalogue of products is not enough.

• "Lasting partnerships, not one-time transactions" [1] has to be measured

• The test is whether more ASEAN states sign follow-on deals with support built in, not only single purchases like the 2022 BrahMos contract [5].

9. Can India Really Avoid Taking Sides at Sea?

• The strongest objection: India's words and India's actions point in different directions
• India says no country should be "forced to choose sides" [1].
• Yet India sold anti-ship missiles to the Philippines [5]. The Philippines has active sea disputes with China in the South China Sea.
• India also spoke of "pressure & uncertainty created at times through actions at sea" [1]. That is a clear, though unnamed, reference to one country's behaviour.

• So a critic can say India is not neutral. It is arming one side while claiming to stand outside the contest.

• The honest answer: India takes the side of rules, not of a bloc

• India and ASEAN jointly support the DOC (2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea). They also want an early, effective Code of Conduct, a binding rulebook for behaviour at sea, consistent with UNCLOS [6].
• UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) is the treaty that decides who owns which waters. India ratified it on 29 June 1995 [7].

• India's position is therefore "follow international law", which ASEAN has itself signed up to [6]. It is not "join our alliance".

• What the critic gets right

• Beijing will not see the difference between backing rules and backing the claimants.
• Smaller ASEAN states that trade heavily with China may stay cautious about deep defence-industrial ties with India, however the offer is worded.

10. The Trade Gap Behind the Security Partnership

• India buys far more from ASEAN than it sells
• In 2024-25 India exported $38.96 billion to ASEAN and imported $84.16 billion. That is a trade deficit (imports greater than exports) of $45.20 billion [3].
• In 1996-97 the gap was only $0.03 billion [3]. It has grown almost every decade since.

• ASEAN is India's 2nd-largest trading partner [3], but the relationship is lopsided.

• Why this matters for defence ties

• A defence partner needs economic weight to be taken seriously over the long term.
• India's main complaint is AITIGA, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (signed 2009, in force from 2010). Its review is now the main agenda of the economic ministers' meetings [3].

• If the AITIGA review drags on, it becomes a source of friction alongside the security offer.

• Investment flows through one door

• Of $156 billion in ASEAN FDI into India (2000-2023), most came from Singapore [3].
• India's own outbound investment of $56 billion is also mostly in Singapore [3].
• So co-production plans with Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines would start with very little Indian industrial presence on the ground.

11. A New Forum Must Not Become One More Talk Shop

• India already has many ASEAN channels
• The ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT) had held 8 editions by 2024 [3].
• The ASEAN-India Centre has worked inside RIS, New Delhi, since 2013 [3].

• ADMM-Plus (the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting with 8 partner countries) runs seven Expert Working Groups (EWGs), which are standing technical teams. India co-chairs the Counter-Terrorism EWG with Malaysia for 2024-2027 [3].

• The risk is overlap, and the minister said so himself

• He asked that forums "strengthen cooperation, not create competition" between them [1].

• A defence think-tank forum that reports to no one will repeat AINTT's discussions without changing policy.

• What would give it teeth

• The forum's research should feed the ADMM-Plus EWG cycle, where officials actually set work plans [3].
• Its proposals should also be written into the next 5-year Plan of Action, since the 2021-2025 plan has ended [3]. Activities listed there get funding approval through the Jakarta-based AIJCC (ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee) [3].

12. Who Should Do What Next

• MEA and DST: pay for the joint research from an existing fund
• The minister proposed joint work on counter-drone systems, cyber defence and maritime surveillance [1].

• The ASEAN-India Science and Technology Development Fund (AISTDF) already exists [3]. Using it would avoid waiting for a new budget line.

• NDMA: make the 2024 agreement the base for joint emergency response

• NDMA signed an MoI (Memorandum of Intent) with ASEAN's AHA Centre, its disaster-coordination body, on 24 October 2024 [3].

• The minister wants navies and coast guards able to "respond together to emergencies" [1]. Joint drills under this MoI are the practical first step.

• MoD: begin defence-industrial work with the countries that buy most from India

• Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are India's largest ASEAN export markets [3]. Existing trade links make co-production easier there.

• The Philippines BrahMos contract [5] shows that the after-sales and training model can be built on a live deal.

• Commerce Ministry: close the AITIGA review

• A $45.20 billion deficit [3] weakens the "equal partner" claim of Act East [1]. A fairer goods agreement supports the security agenda.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: India-ASEAN trade of $123.12 billion in 2024-25, with a trade deficit of $45.20 billion (up from $0.03 billion in 1996-97) [3]
• Data: Record defence exports of Rs 23,622 crore in FY 2024-25, to over 100 countries [4]
• Data: BrahMos shore-based anti-ship missile contract with the Philippines, $375 million, January 2022 [5]
• Report/Committee: ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation, 2023, which backs the DOC and an early Code of Conduct consistent with UNCLOS [6]
• Law/Case: UNCLOS 1982, ratified by India on 29 June 1995 [7]
• Scheme: ASEAN-India Science and Technology Development Fund (AISTDF), a ready funding channel for joint defence-technology research [3]
• Scheme: ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Expert Working Group, co-chaired by India and Malaysia for 2024-2027 [3]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India (ASEAN, Indo-Pacific, Act East).
• GS-III: Security challenges and their management in border areas (maritime security, non-traditional threats); science and technology (defence technology, indigenisation); disaster management (HADR).
• Question stems: 1. India's Indo-Pacific vision stresses ASEAN centrality and refusal to 'force countries to choose sides.' Critically examine how this approach serves India's strategic interests amid great-power competition. (15 marks) 2. From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: assess the evolution of India's maritime outlook and its relevance to ASEAN-India maritime cooperation. (10 marks) 3. 'Self-reliance does not mean working in isolation.' Discuss the potential of defence-industrial co-development with ASEAN partners for Aatmanirbhar Bharat. (15 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): the ASEAN document India says its approach complements.
• Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI): India's own Indo-Pacific framework and how it fits with AOIP.
• ADMM-Plus and its Experts' Working Groups: the main ASEAN-led defence platform India works through.
• UNCLOS and the South China Sea disputes: what "international law at sea" and "actions at sea" refer to.
• Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR): India's main tool for maritime domain awareness.
• iDEX / TDF / Positive Indigenisation Lists: India's defence-innovation and indigenisation system.
• India-Philippines BrahMos deal: an example of defence exports to ASEAN.
• HADR and Operation Brahma-type responses: India as a first responder in the region.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Geography): UNCLOS is the 'international law at sea' India cites; India ratified it in 1995 and backs it in the South China Sea.
• South China Sea (Geography): The 'actions at sea' and the Philippines BrahMos deal both relate to rival claims here, which tests India's no-sides stance.
• Trade deficit (Economy): India imports far more from ASEAN than it exports, which weakens the equal-partner claim behind the security ties.
• Self-reliance (Economy): Aatmanirbhar Bharat is the frame for the defence-industrial offer; the minister says self-reliance does not mean isolation.
• Indian Ocean (Geography): India treats the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters as one connected maritime space for trade and security.
• National Disaster Management Authority (Geography): NDMA's 2024 agreement with ASEAN's AHA Centre is the base for joint disaster response (HADR) between the navies and coast guards.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• MAHASAGAR expansion: It is "Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions", not "…for All in the Region" (that is SAGAR) [1].
• Venue: The institute is MP-IDSA (Manohar Parrikar IDSA), not the old "IDSA" name and not the National Defence College [1].
• Theme year: 2026 is the Year of Maritime Cooperation. Don't confuse it with the ASEAN-India Year of Tourism (2025) ⚠ (verify) [1].
• iDEX vs TDF: iDEX is the start-up/innovator challenge platform. TDF is a funding scheme (executed through DRDO ⚠ verify). Both are under MoD [1].
• "Maiden" forum: This is the 1st Defence Think Tank Forum. Don't confuse it with the ASEAN-India Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (2nd edition held in 2025 ⚠ verify) or with ADMM-Plus.