From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: assess the evolution of India's maritime outlook and its relevance to ASEAN-India maritime cooperation.

India's maritime thinking has moved from SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) [1]. This widens India's focus from its immediate neighbourhood to a connected Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN sits at the centre of that larger space. It is a real step forward, though some gaps remain.

Evolution: SAGAR to MAHASAGAR

• Geographic scope: SAGAR (2015) focused on Indian Ocean island states. MAHASAGAR treats the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters as one connected maritime space for trade, energy and essential goods [1].
• Threat agenda: The focus has widened from naval security to "borderless challenges": piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing, climate disasters and supply-chain risks [1].
• Policy linkage: India now presents Act East, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR as one approach, with ASEAN-led mechanisms at its centre [1].
• Normative core: India wants a multipolar, rules-based order in which states are not "forced to choose sides" [1].

Relevance to ASEAN-India maritime cooperation

• Operational: India is prioritising maritime domain awareness, navy and coast-guard interoperability, and underwater domain awareness. 2026 is the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation [1].
• Legal: India and ASEAN jointly back the DOC and an early Code of Conduct consistent with UNCLOS [3].
• Industrial: India has offered to co-produce patrol vessels, radars and drones, provide MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) support, and carry out joint research on counter-drone and surveillance systems [1].
• Disaster response: The NDMA's 2024 Memorandum of Intent with ASEAN's AHA Centre, its disaster-coordination body, gives a base for joint emergency response [2].

Limitations

• Economic imbalance: India ran a $45.20 billion trade deficit with ASEAN in 2024-25, and the AITIGA (ASEAN-India goods trade agreement) review is still under way. This weakens the "equal partner" claim [2].
• Strategic hedging: Smaller ASEAN states may keep defence ties shallow to avoid upsetting China. India's own mention of pressure from "actions at sea" shows that tension [1].
• Forum overlap: The ASEAN-India think-tank network (AINTT) and ADMM-Plus expert working groups already exist, so new forums risk duplicating them [2].

Overall, MAHASAGAR moves India from being a regional security provider to an Indo-Pacific partner, and it fits well with ASEAN-led mechanisms. Its credibility will depend on closing the AITIGA review, reliable after-sales support, and turning forum ideas into ADMM-Plus work plans. Done well, it can turn the Year of Maritime Cooperation into lasting partnerships that serve SDG 14 and a free, open, rules-based Indo-Pacific.