India's Mission Shakti and the establishment of the Defence Space Agency signal a doctrinal shift in India's space posture. Critically evaluate India's space security architecture and the challenges it faces.

Q. India's Mission Shakti and the establishment of the Defence Space Agency signal a doctrinal shift in India's space posture. Critically evaluate India's space security architecture and the challenges it faces. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Mission Shakti (27 March 2019) destroyed a live satellite in Low Earth Orbit, making India the fourth nation with the capability to defend its assets in space [1]. Coupled with the tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), it marks India's transition from a purely civilian space programme to treating space as a warfighting domain — though capability still outpaces doctrine and law.

Markers of the shift - Kinetic deterrence demonstrated: an indigenous DRDO three-stage interceptor neutralised a target in LEO, signalling counter-space credibility [1]. - Institutional integration: the DSA hosted Exercise Antariksha Abhyas–2024, India's first space warfare exercise, drawing in the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Defence Cyber and Intelligence Agencies [2]. - Civil-military convergence: NavIC navigation and RISAT synthetic-aperture radar deliver all-weather ISR, while the Indian Space Policy 2023 routes private space activity through IN-SPACe authorisation [3].

Strengths - Strategic autonomy in PNT and imagery, reducing dependence on foreign GNSS during conflict. - A single-window regulator gives private innovators regulatory certainty without ceding state oversight [3]. - India paired the ASAT test with a low-altitude, debris-minimising choice, preserving normative credibility.

Challenges - Legal vacuum: the Outer Space Treaty makes states responsible for non-governmental activities (Article VI) but bans only WMD in orbit; no binding rule covers jamming, spoofing or cyber-intrusion [4]. - Dual-use ambiguity: the ICRC notes that widespread dual use and civilian operators of military systems strain IHL's distinction principle — India's commercial satellites could become lawful targets [5]. - Statutory gap: the Space Activities Bill remains unenacted, leaving private operators under executive orders rather than law [6]. - Capability gaps: limited space situational awareness, directed-energy and on-orbit servicing capacity against better-resourced adversaries.

India's architecture is therefore credible in deterrence but thin in law and resilience. Enacting the Space Activities Bill, expanding indigenous space situational awareness, hardening satellites against non-kinetic attack, and championing binding norms at the UN would convert a demonstrated capability into durable, rules-respecting space security consistent with India's treaty commitments.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. PIB — "India Joins Select Group of Nations, Destroys Live Satellite in Low Earth Orbit" (2019) — Mission Shakti date, LEO target, fourth nation, DRDO interceptor 2. PIB — "First Ever Space Exercise 'Antariksha Abhyas – 2024' hosted by Defence Space Agency" (2024) — DSA's tri-service space warfare exercise 3. Indian Space Policy 2023, Department of Space/ISRO — IN-SPACe authorisation and roles of stakeholders 4. Outer Space Treaty, 1967 — UNOOSA — Article VI state responsibility; WMD-only prohibition 5. ICRC Law and Policy Blog — "How would IHL apply to hostilities in outer space?" (Nov 2023) — dual-use systems straining the distinction principle 6. PRS Legislative Research — Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017 — bill still not enacted