The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was designed for a world of state-owned rockets. Examine its adequacy in governing dual-use commercial satellites in contemporary armed conflicts.

Q. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was designed for a world of state-owned rockets. Examine its adequacy in governing dual-use commercial satellites in contemporary armed conflicts. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

A dual-use satellite serves civilian and military functions from the same hardware — broadband, imagery or navigation that also carries battlefield traffic. The Outer Space Treaty (OST), 1967 supplies the constitutional core of space law [1], but its wartime application to privately-owned constellations is only partial.

Where the OST still holds - Article VI makes states internationally responsible for national activities including those of non-governmental entities, requiring authorisation and continuing supervision — commercial operators are not a legal vacuum [1]. - Article VII and the Liability Convention, 1972 fix liability for damage on the launching state, retaining a route to accountability [1]. - The ban on WMD in orbit and the "peaceful purposes" mandate for celestial bodies remain uncontested norms [1].

Where it falls short - The "peaceful purposes" clause is read permissively to allow non-aggressive military use; reconnaissance, milcomms and ISR were never prohibited, so dual-use growth is lawful but ungoverned. - The OST is silent on conduct of hostilities. Applying International Humanitarian Law's principle of distinction to a satellite that "effectively contributes to military action" is contested, and proportionality must weigh civilian navigation, aviation and financial services riding the same asset [2]. - Non-kinetic attack — jamming, spoofing, cyber intrusion — falls outside the treaty entirely. The Viasat KA-SAT cyberattack, attributed by the EU to Russia and launched hours before the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, disrupted users across several member states without a single debris fragment [3]. - Attribution and corporate liability are unresolved; the Woomera and Tallinn manuals are expert opinion, not treaty.

India's stake India, the fourth nation to demonstrate ASAT capability through Mission Shakti (2019) [4], has opened space to private players via the Indian Space Policy 2023 and IN-SPACe [5], making domestic authorisation standards a live obligation.

The OST remains an adequate framework of responsibility but an inadequate code of conduct. India should enact its pending space activities legislation and champion binding norms on non-kinetic interference at the UN COPUOS, converting the treaty's "province of all mankind" ideal into enforceable wartime restraint.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The Outer Space Treaty — UN Office for Outer Space Affairs — WMD ban, peaceful use, Article VI state responsibility for non-governmental entities, Article VII liability 2. How would IHL apply to hostilities in outer space? — ICRC Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, 2 November 2023 — distinction and proportionality for dual-use satellites 3. Russian cyber operations against Ukraine: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, 10 May 2022 — KA-SAT/Viasat cyberattack, timing and spillover across member states 4. India Joins Select Group of Nations, Destroys Live Satellite in Low Earth Orbit — PIB, 27 March 2019 — Mission Shakti; India as fourth ASAT-capable nation 5. Indian Space Policy 2023 — ISRO/Department of Space — private participation and IN-SPACe authorisation architecture