·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsGeographyPolityEconomy

Oil chokepoint crises have turned strategic petroleum reserves into instruments of regional diplomacy. Examine with reference to Japan's offer to ASEAN, and suggest lessons for India's SPR policy.

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In this answer
  1. SPRs as instruments of regional diplomacy
  2. Limits of the model
  3. Lessons for India's SPR policy

A strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is crude oil a country keeps for emergencies to absorb supply shocks. The Strait of Hormuz was closed after U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran. In November 2026, Japan responded by offering ASEAN its unused crude stockpiling facilities under POWERR Asia. This shows SPRs moving from national insurance to regional diplomacy [1].

SPRs as instruments of regional diplomacy

  • Crisis-driven outreach: ASEAN faces fuel shortages and rising prices and has demanded "unimpeded" passage through Hormuz. At the Manila summit, Japan opened its "hydro-tanks" to ASEAN members [1].
  • Soft power from spare infrastructure: Japan turned idle capacity into goodwill. It made the offer in the same week as the ASEAN–India Summit and expected Quad talks [1].
  • Stockpiling-as-a-service: a country can hold its reserves on a partner's territory. India already hosts 5.86 million barrels of ADNOC crude at Mangaluru [2].

Limits of the model

  • Space, not oil: ASEAN states must still buy the crude. Filling tanks during a shortage pushes prices up, so the scheme guards against the next shock, not this one [1].
  • Access in a crisis: the oil would sit in Japan, which faces the same supply shock. Binding release rules are therefore needed, and the initiative is still only "proposed" [1].
  • Distance: oil stored in Japan must be shipped south by tanker, which delays relief.

Lessons for India's SPR policy

  • Build own cover first: Phase I (5.33 MMT at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur) covers only about 9.5 days of demand. Phase II (Chandikhol and Padur-II, 6.5 MMT, PPP mode, approved July 2021) lifts this to about 21 days [3]. India should fast-track Phase II.
  • Calibrate leasing: ISPRL may lease up to 30% of cavern capacity to Indian or foreign firms [3]. Leasing recovers costs but uses up the national buffer, so leases should give India priority access in emergencies.
  • Codify access rules: ADNOC's Padur storage was worked out through a separate MoU [4]. A standard framework with clear release triggers would let this model grow.
  • Counter-cyclical filling: fill the reserves when prices are low, not during shocks.
  • Regional public good: once it has spare capacity, India could offer SPR space to Indian Ocean and ASEAN partners. This would give Act East an energy-security pillar.

Japan's offer shows that, when chokepoints are at risk, stockpile capacity is diplomatic currency as well as insurance. India should go step by step: complete Phase II, fill strategically and write clear access rules. Its reserves would first secure national energy security and then serve Act East diplomacy, alongside Quad partners for a stable Indo-Pacific and in line with SDG 7.

Sources

  1. 1Japan offers ASEAN nations access to energy storage, The Hindu (AFP news report), 17 Nov 2026POWERR Asia offer, Hormuz closure, ASEAN shortages and "unimpeded" passage demand, "proposed" status, summit-week context
  2. 2International Cooperation – ISPRL, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural GasADNOC's 5.86 million barrels in Mangaluru Cavern-A
  3. 3Government steps to Strengthen Strategic Petroleum Reserves, PIB (PRID 2113233)Phase I/II capacities, days of cover, PPP mode, 30% leasing rule
  4. 4ISPRL signs MoU with ADNOC to explore storage of crude oil at Padur underground facility in Karnataka, PIBMoU for ADNOC storage at Padur
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