The proliferation of low-cost drones has altered the air-defence calculus on India's borders. Discuss India's layered counter-UAS response and its gaps.

Small, low-flying drones are hard for conventional air-defence radars to spot, because those radars were built to track aircraft [2]. Cheap drones now force the use of costly sensors and weapons, so India is building a layered counter-UAS (C-UAS) grid. The grid is taking shape but is still uneven.

How drones changed the calculus

• Cost asymmetry: a cheap drone can tie down expensive air-defence assets.
• Saturation: many small targets arriving at once call for target prioritisation, which the new LLLR-I provides [1].

India's layered response

• Detection ("eyes"): a ₹770-crore contract with BEL for the Improved Low Level Light Weight Radar (LLLR-I), which tracks fighter-sized targets and mini- and micro-drones for the Army [1].
• Fire control: a contract worth about ₹2,000 crore for Air Defence Fire Control Radars, placed under the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category [3].
• Wider air picture: the Ashwini Low-Level Transportable Radar [4] and Mountain Radars [5] for the IAF.
• Interdiction ("shooter"): in December 2025 the DAC granted Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for IDDIS Mk-II, which protects assets in the tactical battle area and hinterland, along with loiter munitions [2].

Detect (LLLR-I, LLTR) → Track/Prioritise (ADFCR) → Neutralise (IDDIS Mk-II)

Fig: India's counter-UAS kill chain

Gaps

• Sensor–shooter mismatch: LLLR-I has a signed contract, but IDDIS Mk-II has only an AoN [1][2]. Units may be able to see drones they cannot yet stop.
• Slow cycles versus fast-changing technology: it took about 10 months to go from AoN to contract, and delivery has not yet begun [1][2]. DAP 2020 brought in single-stage AoN and integrated trials [6]. Even so, the Standing Committee on Defence has pressed for time-bound procurement reform [7].
• Thin disclosure: the contract value is public, but the number of units, the delivery schedule and the indigenous content are not [1].
• Supplier concentration: four major radar orders have gone to one DPSU, BEL [1][3][4][5]. A delay at one firm could hold up several programmes at once, and the private supplier base stays thin.

India has moved counter-drone capability from ad hoc buying to planned, indigenous procurement. The way forward is to:

• buy the sensor and the shooter as one package;
• create a fast-track DAP window for C-UAS systems;
• report delivery dates to Parliament, not just signing dates;
• widen private-sector participation.

Together these steps would turn Aatmanirbhar Bharat into a credible shield for India's borders.