·PIB·15 marks·250–350 wordsIRDefence

The proliferation of low-cost drones has transformed sub-conventional warfare. Discuss India's counter-UAS preparedness and the role of joint exercises in building it.

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In this answer
  1. How drones have transformed sub-conventional warfare
  2. India's counter-UAS preparedness
  3. Role of joint exercises

Low-cost commercial drones have given non-state actors their own aerial surveillance and strike capability. A cheap drone can now threaten a costly asset. India is responding with indigenous counter-UAS (C-UAS) technology and with joint training. HARIMAU SHAKTI–VI with Malaysia shows the training side [1].

How drones have transformed sub-conventional warfare

  • Asymmetry: cheap drones give insurgents reconnaissance and the ability to drop payloads.
  • Detection problem: they are small and fly low, so radars built for aircraft often miss them.
  • Technology race: C-UAS (detecting and neutralising hostile drones) is now a core counter-terrorism skill [1].

India's counter-UAS preparedness

  • Indigenous capability: DRDO's anti-drone system offers detection, soft kill (jamming) and hard kill (laser). Its technology has been transferred to BEL [2].
  • Doctrinal integration: the Army now trains with UAS for reconnaissance alongside C-UAS in counter-terrorism drills [1].
  • Gaps: many agencies guard India's long borders, and a fully networked sensor grid is still being built. Official releases describe activities, not measured gains in interoperability [1].

Role of joint exercises

  • Tech-centric drills: HARIMAU SHAKTI–VI (Ipoh, 19–30 November 2026) runs a Joint Command Post and Surveillance Centre with UAS and C-UAS. It ends in a joint validation exercise [1].
  • Terrain realism: its jungle and semi-urban settings mirror India's North-East and Left-Wing Extremism theatres [1].
  • UN readiness: it rehearses Chapter VII-type scenarios (Articles 39–51) [1][3]. This gives two potential troop contributors common rules on drone use and on the use of force. UN peacekeeping was also an outcome of the February 2026 visit [4].
  • Industry linkage: 12 Indian and 35 Malaysian firms took part in the 2026 Mini Defence Expo [4]. HAL's Kuala Lumpur office [5] opens a route for exporting C-UAS systems.
  • Limitation: 120 troops per side is a small scale, so these exercises build trust more than they build capacity [1].

Low-cost drones have redrawn sub-conventional warfare, and joint exercises add field-tested know-how to India's laboratory solutions. MIDCOM [5] should set measurable C-UAS goals for each edition. This would link shared drone procedures to Atmanirbhar Bharat and Act East, making India a provider of security in the region.

Sources

  1. 1PIB, "India-Malaysia Joint Military Exercise HARIMAU SHAKTI–VI Commences in Malaysia" (2026)venue, dates, 120 personnel, UAS/C-UAS, Joint Command Post, terrain, phases, Chapter VII framing *(exact release page not verified; links to the PIB root)*
  2. 2PIB, Ministry of Defence, "Anti-Drone System" (2021)DRDO system with detection, soft kill and hard kill; technology transferred to BEL *(exact release page not verified; links to the PIB root)*
  3. 3UN, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII (Articles 39–51)what Chapter VII covers
  4. 4MEA, India–Malaysia Bilateral Relations (2026 brief)UN peacekeeping outcome of the February 2026 visit; Mini Defence Expo participation
  5. 5MEA, India–Malaysia Bilateral Relations 2025HAL's Kuala Lumpur office; MIDCOM mechanism
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