Recent friction within the Election Commission raises questions about its functional independence. Suggest reforms for its internal decision-making.

In S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India (1991), the Supreme Court warned that the Election Commission's "exclusive and uncontrolled" powers must not rest with one person. Otherwise the Election Commissioners (ECs) would become "non-functional or ornamental" [1]. Recent allegations of unilateral conduct against the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) [1] suggest this risk persists. The Commission's internal decision-making therefore needs structural reform.

Why the friction questions functional independence

• Unequal security of tenure: The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge. An EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2]. A dissenting EC may therefore fall in line, and the Commission becomes multi-member only on paper.
• Executive-dominated selection: Under the 2023 Act, the selection committee is the Prime Minister, a Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition. This gives the government a 2:1 majority [2]. If every member owes their post to one side, the internal check weakens.
• Executive-linked pay: Salary is now pegged to the Cabinet Secretary's, whereas the 1991 Act pegged it to a Supreme Court judge's [2].
• Opaque procedure: There are no public rules on voting, dissent or tie-breaking. Disagreements therefore spill into public friction instead of being settled within the institution.

Reforms for internal decision-making

• Codified collegial rules: Major decisions should be taken by majority vote, with a set quorum and dissent recorded in writing. This would put into practice the T.N. Seshan Constitution Bench's endorsement of a multi-member Commission [1].
• Time-bound decisions: Deadlines for decisions on Model Code violations and poll schedules would answer the "speed" argument for a dominant CEC without removing the check.
• Equal removal protection for ECs: Article 324 should be amended so that ECs have the same protection as the CEC. The Supreme Court left this to Parliament in 2023 [2].
• Neutral selection panel: The Chief Justice should sit on the selection committee, as the Law Commission (2015) recommended. The Goswami Committee (1990) had also backed consulting the CJI and the Leader of Opposition [2].
• Insulated service conditions: Pay parity with Supreme Court judges should be restored [2].
• Transparency: Minutes of full-Commission meetings should be published and work allocated among members by rotation.

The friction reflects gaps in the Commission's design, not a failure of collegiality itself. Codified majority procedures, equal security of tenure and a neutral appointment process would let the Commission act quickly but still collectively. That would realise the Dhanoa–Seshan vision [1] and Article 324's promise of free and fair elections, which are the foundation of India's democracy.