SC had warned against leaving EC’s powers in the hands of one person

1. At a Glance

• Core idea: The Supreme Court held that the Election Commission of India (EC) should work as a collegial, multi-member body. Its "exclusive and uncontrolled" powers should not sit with one person, the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). [1]
• Key precedent: In S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India (1991) the Court warned that a CEC who treats his own word as final would make the other Election Commissioners "non-functional or ornamental". [1]
• Why it matters for UPSC: The topic links an SC ruling (Dhanoa, then T.N. Seshan) to the current law (CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, Section 18) and to a live dispute inside the poll panel in 2026. [1]
• GS-II themes: independence of constitutional bodies, internal checks and balances, and electoral integrity. [1]

2. Why in the News

• 27 September 2026: The Hindu (Chennai print edition, p. 11; by Krishnadas Rajagopal) revisited the SC's warnings about concentrating EC powers in one person. [1]
• Trigger: CEC Gyanesh Kumar faces allegations of unilateral conduct, authoritarianism and subversion, which point to friction within the poll panel. [1]

3. Background & Evolution

• The rationale (in the Court's words): "vast discretionary powers, with virtually no checks and balances, should not be left in the hands of a single individual", so it is "desirable that more than one person should be associated with the exercise of such discretionary powers." [1]
• 1991 – S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India:
• Stressed that a collegial, multi-member EC is important to democracy. [1]

• Held that leaving the EC's "exclusive and uncontrolled" powers in one person's hands would violate democratic rule. [1]

• After Dhanoa – T.N. Seshan case (Constitution Bench):

• Upheld a multi-member EC. [1]

• Quoted Dhanoa's reasoning with approval. [1]

• 2023 – Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023:

• The "spirit" of these judgments is reflected in Section 18 of the Act. [1]
• The article text available was cut off, so what Section 18 actually says could not be confirmed. Verify it from the bare Act.

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The Court read the EC as a collective body, not one headed by a single supreme individual. [1]
• The Constitution Bench in the Seshan case confirmed Dhanoa's reasoning. It is now binding precedent on the EC's multi-member structure. [1]
• The 2023 Act reportedly carries this collegial principle into law through Section 18. [1]

Ethical / Governance

• Accountability gap: The EC is "armed with vast powers and is accountable to none", so the Court said internal checks among its members are needed. [1]
• Person vs institution: The Court accepted that "a single and wise individual may be able to withstand all the pulls and pressures which many may not." It still held that spreading power across more than one person is the prudent choice. [1]

Political / Democratic

• The 2026 allegations against the CEC test whether the collegial model works in practice. [1]
• Public perception of fairness inside the EC affects trust in election outcomes. (analytical)

Administrative

• Disputes inside a multi-member commission raise practical questions. How are disagreements resolved? Is there a majority rule? Is there any duty to record dissent? (analytical; check the 2023 Act for how decisions are made)

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 2026: Allegations of unilateral conduct, authoritarianism and subversion against CEC Gyanesh Kumar; friction reported within the EC. [1]
• 27 September 2026: The Hindu recalled the Dhanoa (1991) and Seshan rulings in the context of this dispute. [1]
• No other developments could be confirmed from whitelisted sources in this retrieval.

7. Prelims Hooks

• S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India was decided in 1991. [1]
• Dhanoa warned that a CEC acting as superior would make the Election Commissioners "non-functional or ornamental". [1]
• Dhanoa held that leaving the EC's "exclusive and uncontrolled" powers with one person violates democratic rule. [1]
• The T.N. Seshan case was decided by a Constitution Bench, which upheld the multi-member EC. [1]
• The Seshan Bench quoted Dhanoa: vast discretionary powers "with virtually no checks and balances" should not rest with a single individual. [1]
• The Court described the EC as "accountable to none", and said that is why power should be shared among more than one person. [1]
• The collegial principle is reflected in Section 18 of the CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023. [1]
• The CEC in 2026 is Gyanesh Kumar. [1]

8. Why Majority Rule Means Little If One Member Can End Another's Job

• The CEC and the other Election Commissioners are not equally protected
• The CEC can be removed only the way a Supreme Court judge is removed: both Houses of Parliament must pass a motion in the same session [2].

• The other Election Commissioners (ECs) can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone [2].

• This is where Dhanoa's fear becomes real

• Dhanoa warned that a CEC who acts as a superior would make the ECs "non-functional or ornamental" [1].
• An EC who disagrees with the CEC knows that the same CEC can start the process of removing them. The EC may then vote with the CEC to stay safe.

• So a multi-member EC can exist on paper while one person decides in practice.

• The Supreme Court saw the gap but did not close it

• In 2023 the Court accepted that the protection is unequal. It said giving ECs the same protection "is a matter for Parliament to consider" [2].
• That would need a Constitutional Amendment, because the removal rule sits in Article 324 itself [2].
• The 2023 Act did not change it. The internal check the Seshan Bench upheld [1] still rests on members whose jobs are not secure.

9. How the Choice of Commissioners Weakens Their Freedom to Disagree

• The government holds two of the three votes on who becomes CEC or EC
• Under the 2023 law, the Selection Committee is the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition [2].
• In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (March 2023) the Supreme Court had put the Chief Justice of India on this committee in place of the Minister [2].

• With a 2:1 government majority, every member of the EC can be chosen by the ruling side. If every member owes their post to the same side, the internal check the Court wanted gets weaker.

• A vacancy can leave only ruling-party members on the committee

• PRS points out that the committee can still act when a seat on it is empty. If this happens before a general election, the committee may have only ruling-party members [2].

• Salary now depends on a decision the government makes

• Under the old 1991 Act, EC members were paid the same as a Supreme Court judge, and Parliament fixes that pay [2].
• The 2023 law matches their pay and service conditions to the Cabinet Secretary's. The government fixes that pay on the Pay Commission's advice [2].

• A body the Court called "accountable to none" [1] is now tied to the executive (the government of the day) on its own pay.

• Only a narrow group can be chosen

• Only people who have served at the rank of Secretary to the Government can be appointed [2].
• The EC also does quasi-judicial work, meaning it decides disputes almost like a court. PRS notes that the rule leaves out other qualified people, such as those with a legal background [2].

10. The Case for a Strong CEC — and Why the Court Still Said No

• The strongest argument for one strong head
• Elections need fast decisions: poll dates, Model Code of Conduct action, moving officers. A commission that argues inside itself can be slow or stuck.
• The 2026 friction inside the poll panel [1] could be read as proof that more members means more conflict.

• The Court itself accepted that "a single and wise individual may be able to withstand all the pulls and pressures which many may not" [1].

• What is right about it

• Disagreement does have a cost. Without clear voting and tie-breaking rules, a three-member body can freeze at the worst moment, in the middle of an election.

• Why it still fails

• The Court judged the system by the risk it carries, not by how good one person might be. A wise CEC is not guaranteed. The "vast discretionary powers, with virtually no checks" [1] stay the same whoever holds the post.
• Slow decisions can be fixed with clear rules on majority voting and deadlines. That keeps the check in place. Giving one person all the power removes the check completely.
• The allegations in 2026 are of unilateral conduct by the CEC, meaning acting alone without the other members [1]. That is the danger Dhanoa named, not a failure of collegiality (shared decision-making).

11. What Committees and Other Democracies Did Differently

• Indian committees wanted someone outside the government in the room
• Goswami Committee (1990): appoint the CEC after consulting the Chief Justice and the Leader of Opposition [2].
• Law Commission (2015): a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the Chief Justice [2].
• 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC): a five-member committee. It includes the Speaker, the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha and the Leaders of Opposition of both Houses [2].

• None of them proposed a committee where the government holds the majority, as the 2023 law does.

• Other democracies

• South Africa: the panel that picks election commissioners is chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court. A judge sits at the centre of the choice [2].
• Canada: the chief electoral officer is appointed by a resolution of the House of Commons. Parliament chooses, not the executive [2].

• United States: the President nominates, but the Senate must confirm the choice [2].

• What should follow

• Parliament should give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC. This means amending Article 324. The Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider exactly this in 2023 [2]. Without it, Dhanoa's "ornamental EC" risk [1] stays.
• Parliament should bring back a neutral member on the Selection Committee. This could be the Chief Justice, as the Law Commission and Anoop Baranwal proposed [2]. Then members would not all owe their posts to one side.
• Parliament should link EC pay back to a Supreme Court judge's pay, as the 1991 Act did [2]. The executive then cannot change it.

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: The government holds 2 of the 3 seats on the Selection Committee for the CEC and ECs under the 2023 law [2]
• Report/Committee: Goswami Committee (1990); Law Commission (2015); 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission. All wanted a Selection Committee that the government does not control [2]
• Law/Case: S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India (1991) and the T.N. Seshan Constitution Bench [1]; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023): Selection Committee of PM, Leader of Opposition and CJI; unequal removal protection left to Parliament [2]
• Comparison: South Africa: a Constitutional Court judge chairs the selection panel. Canada: the House of Commons appoints the chief electoral officer [2]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: Appointment to various constitutional posts; powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies; Salient features of the Representation of People's Act.
• GS-IV: Institutional integrity, accountability, probity in public institutions.
• Possible question stems: 1. The Supreme Court has consistently favoured a collegial Election Commission over a CEC-centric one. Examine the rationale and assess whether the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 adequately secures it. (15 marks) 2. An institution 'armed with vast powers and accountable to none' needs internal checks. Discuss with reference to the Election Commission of India. (10 marks) 3. Recent friction within the Election Commission raises questions about its functional independence. Suggest reforms for its internal decision-making. (15 marks)

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• Article 324 and the EC's plenary powers: the source of the "vast powers" the Court discussed.
• Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023): the SC ruling on how CEC and ECs are appointed.
• CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 (full text): the selection committee, service conditions and Section 18.
• Removal of CEC vs ECs: the unequal protection given to the two, which is central to the collegiality debate.
• Model Code of Conduct: where the EC's discretion is used most visibly.
• Other multi-member constitutional or statutory bodies (UPSC, CAG, CVC): useful for comparing how they are designed.
• Electoral reforms (Law Commission, Goswami and Indrajit Gupta Committees): earlier proposals on EC independence.

15. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Case confusion: Dhanoa (1991) is the original reasoning. The T.N. Seshan Constitution Bench upheld the multi-member EC by quoting Dhanoa. Do not swap them. [1]
• "Nearly four decades ago": This is the newspaper's phrasing. Dhanoa was decided in 1991, so quote the year, not the phrase. [1]
• Act name: It is the "Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023", not the 1991 Act it replaced. [1]
• The Court's reasoning: The Court did not say a single individual can never withstand pressure. It said a wise individual might, but that sharing power is still the prudent choice. [1]
• Section 18: The article only links it to the "spirit" of the judgments. Verify its exact content before quoting it in an answer. [1]