"Should decision-making within a multi-member Election Commission be collegial or CEC-centric?" Discuss with reference to judicial pronouncements.

Under Article 324(2), the Election Commission (ECI) is made up of the CEC and "such number of other Election Commissioners" as the President fixes. It has been a permanent three-member body since 1993. A recent Supreme Court plea says the CEC acted unilaterally in the Commission's name [1], which reopens the question. Both the law and principle favour collegial functioning, with the CEC as "first among equals."

Judicial pronouncements

• T.N. Seshan v. UoI (1995): A Constitution Bench upheld the multi-member ECI. It held that letting the majority view prevail is consistent with democratic principles and is not arbitrary [2].
• The same case held that ECs are at par with the CEC [3]. The CEC chairs the Commission but is not above the other members.
• Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023): Appointments should not be made by the Executive alone [3]. The Court was protecting the independence of the institution, not of one office-holder.
• 2023 Act: Business is done by unanimity where possible, otherwise by majority. The CEC has no veto [4].

Case for collegial functioning

• Checks arbitrariness: Three members deliberating reduce the risk and appearance of one person's bias.
• Credibility: The ECI runs Union and State elections. Collective decisions carry more legitimacy with every party.
• Guards against capture: The government holds 2 of 3 seats on the selection panel [3]. A collegium makes it harder for any single appointee to dominate.

Case for a stronger CEC role

• Speed: Model Code of Conduct violations need decisions within hours, and a divided Commission can stall.
• Unanimity risks paralysis: The petitioners want unanimity [1]. That would give each member a veto.
• Clear accountability: Only the CEC has SC-judge-like removal protection under Art. 324(5), so there is a clear chain of responsibility.

The asymmetry problem

• An EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [3]. This discourages dissent and pushes a collegial body towards control by the CEC.

The best model is collegial decision-making by majority, with the CEC as chair for administration and coordination, not unanimity and not control by the CEC alone. Three reforms would help:

• Record dissents on major decisions and publish them.
• Amend Art. 324(5) to give ECs equal removal protection [3].
• Broaden the selection panel, as the Dinesh Goswami Committee recommended [3].

Together these would give effect to Seshan's "first among equals" principle and to SDG 16's goal of accountable institutions, protecting free and fair elections.