SC to hear plea for CEC’s suspension next week

1. At a Glance

• A petition in the Supreme Court seeks the suspension of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar. It alleges he exercised authority unilaterally in the name of the Election Commission [1].
• It raises core questions:
• Is the ECI a collective body, or is the CEC in charge of it?
• How should decisions be taken inside a multi-member Commission?

• How independent is the CEC appointment process? [1]

• UPSC relevance: Art. 324, the CEC & Other ECs Act, 2023, Anoop Baranwal (2023), T.N. Seshan (1995), and the independence of constitutional bodies. This is core GS-II material.

2. Why in the News

• On Tuesday, 29 Sept 2026, the Supreme Court agreed to list and hear the petition early [1].
• The mention was made before CJI Surya Kant [1]:
• Counsel: Senior Advocate Vikas Singh with Advocates Sudeep Chandra and Mudit Gupta [1].

• Petitioner: Rakesh Kumar Singh [1].

• What the petition asks for [1]:

• That Mr Kumar not exercise CEC functions until the final hearing.
• A declaration that the two Election Commissioners must run ECI business through unanimous decisions.

• That any future CEC appointment follow the recommendation of a committee that includes the CJI.

• The CJI agreed to list the matter next week [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• 1950: Under Art. 324, the ECI began as a single-member body, with only the CEC [2].
• 16 Oct 1989: Two additional ECs were appointed, then removed in Jan 1990. The Commission went back to a single member [2].
• 1991: The Election Commission (Conditions of Service of Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991 was passed [2].
• 1 Oct 1993: The ECI became permanently multi-member (CEC + 2 ECs) [2].
• 1995, T.N. Seshan v. Union of India: The SC upheld the multi-member ECI and majority decision-making. It held that the CEC is first among equals, not superior to the ECs [2].
• 2 Mar 2023, Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India: A Constitution Bench ruled that, until Parliament made a law, appointments would be made on the advice of a committee of the PM, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha (or leader of the largest opposition party), and the CJI [2].
• Dec 2023: Parliament enacted the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. It replaced the CJI on the committee with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [2].
• Mar 2024: The SC refused to stay the 2023 Act. Challenges to its validity remain pending [2].
• Feb 2025: Gyanesh Kumar became CEC, the first CEC appointed under the 2023 Act [2].

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The petition asks the SC to require unanimity [1]. The statute lays down unanimity "as far as possible", with majority as the fallback [2]. The Court must decide whether it can go beyond the text of the Act.
• Interim suspension of a CEC is untested ground. Art. 324(5) gives the CEC removal protection equal to an SC judge, so a judicial order stopping him from functioning would be unprecedented [2].
• Bringing the CJI back onto the committee [1] would effectively restore the Anoop Baranwal arrangement. This overlaps with the pending challenges to the 2023 Act.

Governance / Institutional Integrity

• If one member acts unilaterally, it weakens the "first among equals" principle from Seshan [2].
• When the executive dominates the selection committee (2 of 3 members), questions arise about the ECI's perceived neutrality [2].

Political / Federal

• The ECI runs elections for the Union and the States. Its credibility shapes free and fair elections, which are part of the Basic Structure (Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975) [2].

Ethical

• The issues are institutional accountability versus independence, the appearance of impartiality, and whether deliberative collegiality in constitutional bodies weakens accountability.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• Feb 2025: Gyanesh Kumar took charge as CEC [2].
• 2025: The ECI's Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, starting with Bihar, was challenged in the SC and drew political criticism of the ECI [2]. Check specific dates before citing.
• 29 Sept 2026: The SC agreed to hear, next week, a plea to suspend the CEC, require unanimous ECI decisions, and put the CJI on the appointment committee [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The ECI derives its powers from Article 324 [2].
• The ECI became multi-member permanently from 1 Oct 1993 [2].
• The CEC can be removed only like an SC judge. ECs can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• The 2023 Act Selection Committee is PM + LoP (Lok Sabha) + a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. The CJI is not a member [2].
• The Search Committee under the 2023 Act is headed by the Union Law Minister [2].
• Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023) put the CJI on the interim selection panel [2].
• T.N. Seshan v. UoI (1995) upheld majority decision-making in the ECI [2].
• CEC/EC tenure is 6 years or 65 years of age, whichever is earlier [2].
• Gyanesh Kumar was the first CEC appointed under the 2023 Act [2].
• The 2023 Act repealed the Election Commission (Conditions of Service…) Act, 1991 [2].
• The plea was mentioned before CJI Surya Kant on 29 Sept 2026 [1].

8. Where the 2023 Act Still Leaves the Government in Charge

• The government wins every vote on the panel, 2–1
• The Selection Committee has the PM, a Cabinet Minister chosen by the PM, and the Leader of Opposition (LoP) [3].
• So the ruling side always has a majority. PRS says this "may undermine the independence of the ECI" [3].

• This is the weakness the petition is really attacking when it asks for the CJI to come back [1].

• Before a general election, the opposition can be missing from the panel altogether

• The Act lets the committee act even when one seat is empty [3].
• The LoP seat is most likely to be empty after the Lok Sabha is dissolved. That is exactly the time before a general election [3].

• In that case, only ruling-party members would choose the person who runs the election [3].

• The Search Committee's list does not bind the panel

• The Search Committee (headed by the Law Minister) prepares 5 names. The Selection Committee can pick someone who is not on that list [3].

• So the filtering step can be skipped whenever the government wants.

• Only senior bureaucrats can apply

• Only people of Secretary rank or equal qualify [3].
• But the ECI also does quasi-judicial work (work like a court's), such as disqualifying legislators and deciding disputes over party symbols [3].

• People with legal or judicial experience are left out, and the candidates are people whose careers were spent under the government.

• The two ECs are less protected than the CEC

• An EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone [3].
• The SC said in Anoop Baranwal that it could not order equal removal protection, because the Constitution itself sets different processes [3].
• This matters here. If one CEC is accused of acting alone, the two ECs who might disagree with him can themselves be removed on his recommendation.

9. The Case Against the Petition, and What It Gets Right

• The strongest objection: a court cannot suspend a CEC
• Under Art. 324(5), a CEC can be removed only like an SC judge: proved misbehaviour, plus a special-majority vote in both Houses of Parliament [2].
• The Constitution gives no court the power to suspend a CEC in the middle of his term.

• If a single petition could stop a CEC from working, any losing party could use litigation to put pressure on the ECI. That would weaken the independence the petition says it wants to protect.

• Asking for unanimity could stop the Commission from working

• With three members, a unanimity rule gives every member a veto.
• The law already says "unanimity as far as possible, majority if members differ" [2], and Seshan (1995) upheld majority voting [2].

• Decisions about the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) during a campaign have to be made in hours. A single member could block them.

• The objection to the CJI fix

• M.R. Madhavan of PRS warns that if the CJI sits on the panel, other judges may find it hard to review an appointment made by the CJI [4].

• He suggests widening the panel without bringing in judges [4].

• What the petition gets right

• Seshan already held that the CEC is only "first among equals" [2]. A CEC acting alone in the Commission's name goes against settled law, even though suspension is the wrong remedy.
• The appointment problem is real. PRS independently found that the panel is dominated by the government and that the vacancy clause can shut out the opposition [3].
• An honest middle view: the Court is on firm ground when it enforces majority decisions and hears the pending challenge to the 2023 Act. It is on weak ground when it suspends a CEC or requires unanimity.

10. How Other Democracies Choose Their Election Referees

• South Africa puts a judge on the Commission itself
• Its five-member Electoral Commission includes a judge [3].

• Members must not have a "high party-political profile" [3]. India has no such bar.

• The United States bars serving officials

• Members of the Federal Election Commission cannot hold any other elected or appointed federal post [3].

• India fills the ECI only from recently retired or serving Secretaries [3], the opposite approach.

• The United Kingdom lets Parliament choose, not the government

• A Speaker's Committee in Parliament runs the recruitment, and the House of Commons must approve the choice [3].

• In India, the executive (the government of the day) holds 2 of 3 seats on the panel [3].

• Lesson for India: none of these three models gives the ruling party a built-in majority in choosing the people who referee elections.

11. What Parliament, the Court and the ECI Should Do Next

• Parliament: break the 2–1 government majority
• Both the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission (2015) recommended putting the CJI on the panel [3].

• If the CJI raises the judicial-review problem Madhavan warns about [4], Parliament could add a neutral member instead, such as the Lok Sabha Speaker. The UK's Speaker's Committee is a model [3].

• Parliament: stop the panel from meeting without the opposition

• Amend the vacancy clause so the committee cannot recommend a name while the LoP seat is empty [3].

• Without this, the pre-election gap PRS identified stays open [3].

• Parliament: give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC

• The SC said only the Constitution can create equal removal protection [3]. That needs a constitutional amendment to Art. 324(5).

• Once the ECs cannot be removed at the CEC's word, their ability to disagree with him becomes real.

• Supreme Court: decide the challenge to the 2023 Act, not the person

• The challenge to the 2023 Act is still pending [2]. Deciding it settles the rule for every future CEC.

• An order about one CEC settles nothing, and it risks a clash with Art. 324(5).

• ECI: publish how it decides

• The ECI could record and publish dissents on major decisions.
• Then "majority" is visible, and no single member can speak for the Commission unnoticed.

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: The Selection Committee under the 2023 Act has 3 members, 2 of them from the government (PM + Cabinet Minister) [3]
• Report/Committee: Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and Law Commission (2015): both recommended the CJI on the selection panel [3]
• Law/Case: Art. 324(5); T.N. Seshan v. UoI (1995): CEC is first among equals, majority decides; Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023): appointments must not be made by the executive alone [3]
• Comparison: UK: a Speaker's Committee recruits electoral commissioners, House of Commons approves; South Africa: a judge sits on the Commission, and members must not have a high party-political profile [3]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: Appointment to various constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies; Salient features of the Representation of People's Act; Separation of powers.
• GS-IV: Probity in governance; institutional integrity.
• Possible questions: 1. "The independence of the Election Commission rests as much on its method of appointment as on its security of tenure." Critically examine in light of the 2023 Act and Anoop Baranwal. 2. "Should decision-making within a multi-member Election Commission be collegial or CEC-centric?" Discuss with reference to judicial pronouncements. 3. Examine the limits of judicial intervention in the functioning of constitutional authorities that have removal protection similar to judges.

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023): the judicial template for appointments that the plea wants restored.
• CEC & Other ECs Act, 2023: the statutory framework under challenge.
• Removal of SC/HC judges (Art. 124(4), Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968): the procedure that also applies to removing the CEC.
• Model Code of Conduct: the main area of ECI discretion where collective decision-making matters.
• Special Intensive Revision / electoral rolls (RPA, 1950): recent flashpoint over ECI credibility.
• Appointments of CBI Director, CVC and Lokpal: comparable collegium-type selection panels.
• Dinesh Goswami (1990) and Tarkunde (1975) Committees: reform proposals for ECI appointments.

15. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• The CJI is not on the selection committee under the 2023 Act. The CJI was on the interim panel set up by Anoop Baranwal.
• The CEC and the ECs have different removal protections. The ECs do not get SC-judge-like protection.
• The ECI decides by majority, not mandatory unanimity. Unanimity is the petitioner's demand [1], not the current law.
• The Search Committee is headed by the Law Minister, not the Cabinet Secretary. Salary parity is with an SC judge, not the Cabinet Secretary.
• 1989 vs 1993: 1989 saw the first, short-lived multi-member ECI. The permanent arrangement dates from 1993.