Does statutory immunity for election commissioners strengthen institutional independence or weaken accountability? Analyse.

Section 16 of the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 protects the Chief Election Commissioner and the Election Commissioners from legal proceedings over acts done while performing official duties [1]. On its own, immunity protects the referee of elections. Alongside the Act's other features, however, it narrows the routes to accountability.

Immunity as a support for independence

• Protection from harassing lawsuits: Losing parties could otherwise file cases against the CEC or ECs over decisions on the Model Code, poll schedules or party symbols. Immunity keeps such cases from discouraging firm decisions.
• Same treatment as other high offices: It follows the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and the rule that public servants can be prosecuted only with government sanction. The Act also gives the CEC and ECs the same salary as Supreme Court judges [1].
• Builds on Art. 324(5): The CEC can be removed only in the way a Supreme Court judge is removed. Immunity adds protection from lawsuits to this security of tenure.
• Final decisions during polls: It fits the logic of Art. 329(b), which allows election disputes to be challenged mainly through election petitions.

Immunity as a weakness for accountability

• No middle option: Removal needs a special majority in both Houses (Art. 124(4)), which is rarely possible. With prosecution also blocked, there is no remedy short of removal.
• Government controls entry: The Selection Committee is the PM, a Cabinet Minister and the LoP [2]. The Act dropped the CJI, who sat on the Anoop Baranwal (2023) interim panel [3]. So immunity protects someone chosen by a 2:1 government majority, which shields the person in office more than the institution.
• Broad wording: "Official duty" is not defined narrowly, so even acts done in bad faith may be covered.
• Trust deficit: In October 2026, students protested against the CEC by name over alleged irregularities [4]. When formal channels are closed, complaints move to the street.

Overall assessment Immunity in itself supports independence. The accountability gap comes from combining it with a government-majority selection panel and no intermediate form of review.

On balance, the problem lies in the design around immunity, not in immunity itself. Parliament could limit protection to acts done in good faith, with judicial screening of complaints. It could add a neutral member to the selection panel and give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC. Together, these changes would protect the ECI's freedom from pressure while keeping it answerable, consistent with Art. 324 and with free and fair elections as part of the basic structure [3].