Targeted sanctions have become the UN Security Council's preferred tool against non-state armed actors. Evaluate their effectiveness with reference to the Yemen sanctions regime.

The Security Council created the Yemen sanctions regime through Resolution 2140 (2014) under Chapter VII. It does not embargo the whole country. It targets named individuals and entities. In November 2026 the Council renewed it unanimously [1]. The regime's record is mixed. It works as a tool for monitoring and putting pressure on armed groups, but it has not produced peace.

Effectiveness: Strengths

• Adapts to the threat: Resolution 2624 (2022) put the Houthis as a group under the arms embargo [3]. Resolution 2837 (2026) extended controls to dual-use components and precursor chemicals, and it expanded the Panel of Experts with maritime experts [4].
• Evidence through monitoring: The Panel recorded a seizure of more than 750 tons of materiel meant for the Houthis in June 2025. It also found that Somalia is becoming a transit hub [5]. No other independent public record exists.
• Humanitarian design: Asset freezes and travel bans hit only the people and groups listed, not ordinary Yemenis [1].
• Wider political support: Renewal votes moved from 11-0-4 (2022) [3] to 13-0-2 (2025) [2] and then to a unanimous vote (2026) [1].

Effectiveness: Limitations

• Enforcement gap: The UN has no navy or police of its own, so seizures depend on individual states acting. The Panel found the violations were continued and systematic, carried out through hidden cargo and false declarations [5].
• Houthi behaviour has not changed: Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia escalated in 2026, and the Council condemned them in a press statement [9].
• Agreement only on a reduced text: China abstained in 2025 and objected that maritime interdiction would breach flag-State rights [2]. The 2026 text won unanimity only by leaving out a terrorist designation and putting off the dual-use list [4].
• Spillover: The Panel found arms moving from the Houthis to Al-Shabaab and closer cooperation between the Houthis and AQAP [5]. Sanctions have not contained these regional networks.

Verdict Targeted sanctions slow arms flows and build an evidence base, but they cannot change a group's political calculations on their own.

Overall, the Yemen regime has worked well for monitoring and poorly for enforcement. To make it work better, the Council should:

• finalise the dual-use list;
• require member states to share seizure data;
• build maritime cooperation in the Horn of Africa;
• link delisting to concrete steps in peace talks.

This matches the Special Envoy's call for "politics rather than force" [8]. Sanctions linked to a peace process in this way would serve the goal of peaceful and inclusive societies under SDG 16.