Technology and trust: the EVM-VVPAT verification debate

Detail

1. The EVM and its legal basis

• EVM (Electronic Voting Machine): a machine that records votes electronically instead of on paper ballots. It has two parts:
• Ballot unit: the voter presses a blue button next to a candidate's name and symbol. It has 16 buttons, and the buttons carry no party data of their own [2].

• Control unit: kept with the presiding officer, who presses "BALLOT" to allow each new vote. The control unit stores the vote [2].

• History:

• EVMs were first used in an assembly bye-election in Kerala in 1982 [2].
• Using EVMs without a law was challenged in court. So Parliament passed Act 1 of 1989, which amended the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA) and inserted Section 61A. This section allows EVMs to be used [2].

• EVMs were used across the whole country for the first time in the 2004 general election, and in every election since [2].

• Detailed rules: the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, rr. 49A–49X cover voting by machine, r. 56D covers counting VVPAT slips and r. 93 covers who may inspect election papers.

• Advantages of EVMs: quicker counting, no invalid votes and no "booth capturing" by stuffing ballot boxes (NCERT: Class 8 lists EVM advantages).

2. EVM safeguards (layer by layer)

Stage	Safeguard
Manufacture	Made only by two public sector firms: BEL (Bharat Electronics Ltd, under the Ministry of Defence) and ECIL (Electronics Corporation of India Ltd, under the Department of Atomic Energy) [2]. One-time-programmable (OTP) chips: the program is "burnt" in once and cannot be rewritten.
Design	Standalone, non-networked machines with no internet, Wi-Fi or outside input [2]. M3 EVMs (models in use after 2013) have an Unauthorised Access Detection Mechanism (UADM). If anyone tries to open the chip or memory, the machine shuts down permanently [2].
First-Level Check (FLC)	Manufacturers' engineers check every machine at district level. Representatives of recognised parties watch. Every button is pressed 6 times. Larger test polls are run on a random 5% of machines, with 500–1,200 votes each, and the totals are matched with the VVPAT slips [2].
Two-stage randomisation	This means machines are handed out by random software draw, so nobody knows in advance which machine goes where. 1st draw: machines to each constituency. 2nd draw: machines to each polling station. The EVM Management System software does this with no human choice, in front of party agents and ECI observers. Not even the manufacturer knows where a machine will go [2].
Commissioning	Candidate names and symbols are loaded into the VVPAT using a symbol loading unit (SLU). SLU: a small device that loads only the candidates' serial numbers, names and symbols. It cannot change the burnt-in program [2]. A mock poll of 1,000 votes is run on 5% of machines. Then the machines are sealed with paper seals and tags that agents sign [2].
Poll day	A mock poll (trial voting) is held before party agents. After it, the trial data is cleared.
Storage	Sealed strong rooms with 24x7 CCTV and armed guards [4].

• Trust gap: claims that EVMs were rigged usually come from whichever parties lost the election. The ECI has answered with public demonstrations and an open "EVM challenge" (2017) (verify details).
• Track record before the 2024 judgment: VVPAT slips from 41,629 EVM-VVPATs were matched with their electronic counts. More than 4 crore slips were tallied. Only one mismatch was found, and the ECI's protocol explained and fixed it [2].

3. VVPAT: what it is and how it works

• VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail): a printer attached to the EVM. It prints a slip showing the serial number, name and symbol of the candidate the voter chose.
• The voter presses the button → the slip shows behind a lit glass window for 7 seconds → the slip is cut and drops into a sealed box → a sensor confirms this → the control unit records the vote [2].
• Rule 49M(3) requires only that the voter can see the slip. The voter does not get to keep it [2].
• Rule 49MA: a voter can complain that the slip showed the wrong candidate. The voter must make a written declaration and risks prosecution if the complaint is false. Up to 2024 there had been 26 such complaints, and none was found true [2].
• Slips are printed on thermal paper that lasts about 5 years. The paper is soft and sticky, which makes counting by hand slow [2].

4. VVPAT case law: three steps

Case	Date	What the Court held
Subramanian Swamy v. ECI (2013) 10 SCC 500	8 Oct 2013	A paper trail is an "indispensable requirement of free and fair elections", meaning elections cannot be called free and fair without it. VVPAT could be brought in in phases, and the Union government had to pay for it [2]. VVPAT rules were notified on 14 Aug 2013 [2]. VVPAT was used everywhere by 2019.
N. Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 377	8 Apr 2019	Slip counting was raised from 1 to 5 randomly chosen EVMs per assembly segment. The old Guideline 16.6 had required only one [2]. Opposition parties had asked for 50%.
ADR v. ECI, 2024 INSC 341	26 Apr 2024	Bench: Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, who wrote separate but agreeing judgments [2]. Rejected (1) a return to paper ballots, (2) counting 100% of VVPAT slips and (3) handing slips to voters [2].

• Naidu's logic: the Court did not doubt the system. It said more checks would give "greater satisfaction" to parties and voters without a big delay in results [2].

5. ADR v. ECI (2024): the two directions

• Direction (a): seal the SLUs.
• It applies to symbol loading done on or after 1 May 2024 [2].
• SLUs are sealed in containers, and candidates sign the seals [2].
• They are kept in the strong room with the EVMs for at least 45 days after results [2].

• Why 45 days: an election petition (a case in a High Court challenging the result) must be filed within 45 days of the result [2][4].

• Direction (b): check the burnt memory.

• Who can ask: candidates placed 2nd or 3rd [2].
• Deadline: a written request within 7 days of the result [2].
• What is checked: the burnt memory or microcontroller (the chip holding the machine's fixed program) of 5% of EVMs (control unit, ballot unit and VVPAT) per assembly segment. The candidate picks the machines by polling station or serial number [2].
• Who checks: engineers from the manufacturers. The District Election Officer then certifies whether the memory is intact [2].

• Cost: the candidate pays. The money is refunded if tampering is found [2].

• Suggestions the Court left to the ECI: count slips by machine, and print barcodes on slips to make machine counting possible [2].

• Key reasoning:
• Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) includes the voter's right to know that the vote was counted as cast. Seeing the slip for 7 seconds satisfies this right [2].
• No fundamental right to 100% VVPAT tallying exists. Going back to paper ballots would be "a folly" [2].
• Justice Datta: "blindly distrusting any aspect of the system can breed unwarranted scepticism and impede progress" [2].

6. When are extra slips counted?

• Rule 56D: a candidate can ask for VVPAT slips to be counted, and the Returning Officer decides [2].
• Rule 56D(4)(b) and ECI guidelines: sometimes the control unit total does not match Form 17C, for example because trial-poll data was not cleared. Form 17C is the presiding officer's account of how many votes were cast at a booth, and agents get a copy. In such a case the booth's slips are counted, but only if the winning margin is equal to or smaller than the votes at that booth [2].

7. Secrecy vs audit

• Totaliser: a device that pools votes from about 14 EVMs before counting. This hides how each booth voted, so a village or community cannot be punished or threatened for its vote.
• The ECI proposed it in 2008. The Law Commission's 255th Report (2015, on electoral reforms) backed it.
• The government has not adopted it.

• Tension: booth-wise results help audits, but they hurt voter secrecy.

• Form 17C and turnout data (2024): there were disputes over publishing booth-wise Form 17C and final turnout figures during the 2024 Lok Sabha election (verify outcome). In the ADR case the ECI said EVM totals and Form 17C data had matched [2].

• Rule 93(2)(a) amendment:
• The Conduct of Elections (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024 were notified on 20 Dec 2024 [3].
• Old rule: all election papers were open to public inspection, except a listed set such as ballot papers and marked rolls [3].
• New rule: only papers "as specified in these rules" are open [3].

• Effect: electronic records such as CCTV and webcast footage are no longer open to public inspection. The change has been challenged in the Supreme Court (verify current).

• CCTV and webcast footage:

• About 50% of polling stations had CCTV. The footage was kept for at least 45 days after results [2].
• For 2025 assembly elections, webcasting was required in all critical and vulnerable polling stations, or in at least 50% of all stations, whichever was higher [4].

• Rules on how long footage is kept followed in 2025 (verify).

• Comparison with Germany: Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (2009) struck down EVM use. Its reason: ordinary citizens could not check each step of voting and counting without expert knowledge (the "public nature of elections").

8. The core frame

• Three values pull against each other:
• Secret ballot: favours the totaliser and limited release of footage.
• Efficiency: favours fast EVM counting and a limited VVPAT sample.

• Verifiability: favours more slip counts, burnt-memory checks and open records.

• Indian courts have chosen more checks within the EVM system, not a return to paper ballots.

Prelims Hooks

• Section 61A, RPA 1951 (inserted by Act 1 of 1989) allows EVMs. They were first used in Kerala in 1982 and across India in 2004.
• Subramanian Swamy v. ECI (2013): a paper trail is an "indispensable requirement" of free and fair elections. VVPAT was to be introduced in phases.
• N. Chandrababu Naidu (2019): VVPAT slip count rose from 1 to 5 EVMs per assembly segment, not 50%.
• ADR v. ECI (26 Apr 2024): SLUs sealed for 45 days. A 5% burnt-memory check if the 2nd or 3rd-placed candidate asks within 7 days, at their own cost and refunded if tampering is found.
• Trap: the 2024 check is done by manufacturers' engineers (BEL/ECIL), not ECI staff or independent auditors. The DEO certifies the result.
• The VVPAT slip is visible for 7 seconds (Rule 49M(3)). A false complaint can be prosecuted under Rule 49MA.
• M3 EVMs have UADM, which permanently disables the machine if someone tries to open it.
• Totaliser: pools about 14 EVMs. Proposed by the ECI (2008), backed by the Law Commission's 255th Report, not adopted.
• Rule 93(2)(a), amended 20 Dec 2024, narrowed public inspection of election papers to those "specified in these rules".
• Germany 2009: the constitutional court struck down EVMs because the public could not verify them.

Mains Points

• Trust vs proof: decades of matched VVPAT counts (over 4 crore slips) support EVM accuracy [2]. But in a democracy, voters must also see that elections are fair. Better trust-building tools include machine-countable barcoded slips, larger risk-based VVPAT samples for close contests and open publication of FLC and randomisation records.
• Secret ballot vs auditability: the totaliser protects booth-level secrecy and reduces post-poll intimidation. The Rule 93 change and limits on CCTV access protect voter privacy but reduce public scrutiny. A balanced design could give footage to candidates and courts under safeguards instead of closing it entirely.
• Judicial restraint and ECI autonomy (Article 324): in ADR (2024) the Court refused to second-guess the ECI's technical choices without evidence. It still added after-result checks. This shows a model of "trust but verify" oversight.
• Lessons from abroad: Germany's 2009 public-verifiability test suggests India could adopt independent technical audits and publish its source-code review process. This would help make the ECI's credibility less dependent on court rulings.