Politics in caste: politicisation, dominant castes and new coalitions

Detail

1. Politics changes caste: the two-way link

• Caste in politics means caste shapes politics. Parties pick candidates by caste, and voters may vote along caste lines.
• Politics in caste is the opposite direction. Taking part in elections changes caste itself. NCERT says caste does not stay the same once it enters politics.
• Politicisation of caste means caste groups turn into political actors. They organise, bargain and compete for power, so caste starts working like an interest group, not only like a ritual ranking.
• Rajni Kothari, in Caste in Indian Politics (1970), said democracy politicises caste. He argued against the idea that politics becomes "caste-ridden".
• NCERT names three ways politics reshapes caste:
• Expansion: each caste tries to grow bigger. It absorbs nearby castes or sub-castes that were left out of it before.
• Coalition: no single caste can win power alone. Castes must talk, negotiate and form coalitions with other castes and communities.

• New groupings: new political categories such as "backward" and "forward" castes appear. These are blocs made for politics, not traditional jatis (the local, birth-based caste groups).

• Effect: caste hierarchy (who is "higher" or "lower") matters less. Caste numbers, meaning how many votes a group can deliver, matter more.

2. Dominant caste (M.N. Srinivas)

• Dominant caste is a term from M.N. Srinivas, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura" (1959). It is a caste that:
• is large in number in a local area;
• owns a big share of the land, which gives it economic power;

• holds local political power, and is often not at the top of the ritual order.

• Examples: Jats (Haryana, western UP, Rajasthan), Marathas (Maharashtra), Patidars/Patels (Gujarat), Vokkaligas and Lingayats (Karnataka), Reddys and Kammas (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana).

• After land reforms and the Green Revolution, many of these castes became rural power-holders. They controlled cooperatives, panchayats and state politics.

3. Dominant castes demanding backward status

• Why they demand it: farms are being split into small plots, farm incomes are falling, and government jobs are scarce. So landed castes now seek OBC (Other Backward Classes) or similar backward status to get reserved jobs and seats in education.
• Major agitations:

Caste	State	Year(s)	Note
Patidars	Gujarat	2015	Mass movement for OBC status
Jats	Haryana	2016	Violent agitation for OBC quota
Marathas	Maharashtra	2018; 2023-24	Repeated laws and court challenges
Kapus	Andhra Pradesh	2010s	Demand for backward-class status

• The legal wall is the 50% ceiling:
• In Indra Sawhney (1992), seven of nine judges agreed that reservation has a quantitative limit of 50%. Four judges said this limit can be crossed only in extraordinary circumstances, and the State must give a separate justification [5].
• Maharashtra's SEBC Act, 2018 (amended 2019) gave Marathas 12% and 13% reservation (education and jobs) on top of the existing 50% [5].
• In Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister (2021), a Constitution Bench struck down these provisions. It found no extraordinary situation that could justify crossing 50% [5].

• Maharashtra then brought the SEBC Bill, 2024 (introduced 20 February 2024). It gives Marathas 10% reservation in government jobs and in admissions to public and private educational institutions. The creamy layer (the better-off section of a backward class) is left out [6].

• Constitutional amendments on the ceiling: Parliament has used amendments to get around the Indra Sawhney limits, for example the 77th Amendment and the 81st Amendment [5].

4. Caste coalitions and new formations

• KHAM (Gujarat, 1980s): Congress's Kshatriya-Harijan-Adivasi-Muslim alliance. It brought together groups that are not dominant, against the Patidars.
• AJGAR (Charan Singh): Ahir (Yadav), Jat, Gujjar and Rajput. These were middle peasant castes of north India united by farm interests.
• Muslim-Yadav ("M-Y") alliances in Bihar and UP. These were the base of parties that rose after Mandal.
• Kanshi Ram's bahujan politics (bahujan means the majority made up of SCs, STs, OBCs and minorities):
• BAMCEF (1978): a federation of backward and minority employees.
• DS4 (1981): Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti, a struggle committee for Dalits and the oppressed.

• BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party, 1984). It formed governments in UP (see Class 10, Political Parties).

• After Mandal (1990 onwards): reservation for OBCs in central jobs was put into force. OBC-based parties then grew strong in north India.

• Targeting sub-castes: parties now court the non-dominant OBCs and non-dominant Dalit sub-castes that gained little from reservation. An example is the Karpoori Thakur formula in Bihar, which split backward-class quotas so that the most backward groups get a separate share.
• "PDA" slogan (2024 Lok Sabha election): Pichhde (backward), Dalit, Alpsankhyak (minority). It was a new version of a broad social coalition.

5. NCERT's balance sheet

• Gains:
• Dalits and OBCs got space to claim power and better access to decision-making.

• Political and non-political groups campaign against discrimination, and for dignity, land and resources.

• Costs:

• Politics based only on caste identity diverts attention from poverty, development and corruption.

• It can lead to tension, conflict and violence.

• NCERT's limit on "caste decides everything": no constituency has a clear majority of one caste. Voters do not vote as a single block. Parties field candidates from the same caste. Ruling parties and sitting MPs often lose.

6. New frontier: sub-classification and caste data

• Sub-classification means splitting a reserved category (SC or OBC) into smaller groups. Each group gets its own share, so the less-advanced castes inside the category are not crowded out.
• State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024): a seven-judge bench, by 6:1, held that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is constitutionally permitted [2].
• Test used: the classification must rest on an intelligible differentia (a clear, real difference between groups). It must also have a reasonable nexus (a logical link) with the aim of the law. This is the twin test under Article 14 [2].

• Equality under Article 14 is read in a substantive sense, meaning real fair treatment, not just equal formal rules [2].

• Caste enumeration in Census 2027:

• Since independence, every census has left out caste counts except for SCs and STs [4].
• The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) decided that castes will be counted in the second phase of the census [3][4].
• The intent to hold the census was notified in the Gazette of India on 16 June 2025, under Section 3 of the Census Act, 1948 [3][4].
• Reference dates: 00:00 hours, 1 March 2027 in general. For Ladakh and the snow-bound areas of J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, it is 1 October 2026 [3].
• Population Enumeration (Phase II) is due in February 2027. It is India's first digital census [4].
• Caste data will feed new demands for sub-classification and for revising the 50% ceiling.

Prelims Hooks

• "Caste in Indian Politics" (1970) is by Rajni Kothari. Its idea is that caste is politicised, not that politics becomes casteist.
• "Dominant caste" comes from M.N. Srinivas (1959, Rampura). The three markers are numbers, land and local power. A high ritual rank is not required.
• KHAM = Kshatriya-Harijan-Adivasi-Muslim (Gujarat, 1980s). AJGAR = Ahir-Jat-Gujjar-Rajput (Charan Singh).
• Order of Kanshi Ram's organisations: BAMCEF (1978) → DS4 (1981) → BSP (1984).
• Indra Sawhney (1992): 7 of 9 judges set the 50% ceiling, which can be crossed only in "extraordinary circumstances" [5].
• Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (2021) struck down the Maratha quota under the SEBC Act, 2018 [5]. Maharashtra SEBC Bill, 2024 = 10% for Marathas, with the creamy layer excluded [6].
• Davinder Singh (2024): 7-judge bench, 6:1, allows SC sub-classification under Article 14 [2].
• Census 2027: first full caste count since independence. Reference date 1 March 2027. Notified under Section 3, Census Act 1948 [3][4].

Mains Points

• Caste is politicised (Kothari) and this cuts both ways:
• Elections turned caste from a closed hierarchy into a bargaining group. Lower castes gained voice, representation and dignity.

• But identity-only mobilisation can push aside debates on poverty, jobs and corruption, and can lead to violence (e.g. the Jat agitation of 2016).

• Dominant-caste quota demands show rural distress, not "backwardness" alone:

• Small farms and job scarcity drive demands from Patidars, Jats, Marathas and Kapus.
• Courts hold the 50% line (Indra Sawhney, Jaishri Patil) [5].

• The lasting answer lies in agrarian reform, skills and job creation, not ever-wider quotas.

• Sub-classification and caste data deepen social justice but also split coalitions:

• Davinder Singh (2024) [2] and the Census 2027 caste count [3] allow benefits to be targeted at the most excluded.
• They also risk new sub-caste rivalries and fresh pressure to breach the 50% ceiling.

• Data-based commissions and regular review are needed.

• Coalition logic (from KHAM and AJGAR to bahujan politics to PDA) shows no single caste can win alone:

• Democracy forces castes to work across groups, which softens exclusive caste politics.
• This supports NCERT's view that caste alone does not decide elections.