International context, constitutional principles and Nehru's non-alignment

Detail

1. The world India entered in 1947

• A world rebuilding after the Second World War. Countries were repairing the damage of the war.
• A new world body. The United Nations (UN) had just been set up, in 1945.
• Colonial rule was ending. Many new states were born in Asia and Africa.

• Each one faced twin challenges: making people's lives better (welfare) and building democracy.

• India's own burdens:

• Disputes left behind by the British (for example, unclear borders).
• The strain of Partition: refugees, violence and the Kashmir dispute.

• Mass poverty.

• Why poor states had limited aims abroad:

• Developing states have few resources → they aim mainly for peace and development in their own neighbourhood.

• Poor states needed foreign aid → many joined the camp of whichever power gave the aid → they lost freedom in foreign policy.

• Links with Indians abroad: NCERT gives the Indian National Army (INA), raised by Subhas Chandra Bose among Indians in South-East Asia, as an example of how the freedom struggle reached overseas Indians.

2. The Cold War and the two blocs

• Cold War: a long rivalry, from about 1945 to 1991, between the US-led bloc and the Soviet-led bloc. They competed through arms races, alliances and propaganda, not through direct war with each other. It split much of the world into two camps.
• US-led military alliance: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation).

• Soviet-led military alliance: Warsaw Pact.

• Pakistan joined the US-led alliances:

• SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization): set up by the Manila treaty of 8 September 1954. Its members were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK and the US. It worked from 1955 to 1977 [6].
• Baghdad Pact (1955), later renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles linked SEATO, the Baghdad Pact and NATO into one chain of alliances that ran from Australia, through Pakistan, to Turkey and Europe [7].
• Result for India: the Cold War was now on India's border. Pakistan received Western arms and diplomatic support, including on Kashmir.

3. Constitutional principles: Article 51

• Article 51 is in Part IV, the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). These are guidelines the state should follow when it makes laws and policy. Courts cannot enforce them (Art. 37).
• Article 51 says the State shall try to [2]:
• (a) promote international peace and security;
• (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
• (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another;

• (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. Arbitration means a neutral third party decides the dispute, instead of the sides going to war.

• Constituent Assembly background: Many members linked world peace and non-aggression to India's history and culture. The draft article was adopted with a few amendments on 25 November 1948 [2].

• NCERT's test question: how far did India live up to these principles in its first two decades (1947-1967)?

4. Constitutional machinery of foreign policy

Provision	What it does
Seventh Schedule, Union List, entries 10-21	Only the Union deals with foreign affairs, diplomatic representation, the UN, international conferences, treaties, war and peace, citizenship, extradition and related matters. States have no role.
Art. 73	The Union's executive power covers every matter on which Parliament can make laws. So the Union government can sign treaties and run foreign policy without a separate law.
Art. 253	Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of India to carry out a treaty or an international decision, even on State List subjects.
Art. 368 amendment	Needed to cede (give away) Indian territory to another country.

• Giving away territory: the Berubari line of cases
• The dispute: a 1958 India-Pakistan agreement planned to split Berubari Union No. 12 in West Bengal. Half the area would go to (East) Pakistan and the half next to India would stay with India [4].
• The question: was a simple law under Art. 3 (which lets Parliament form new states and change state boundaries) enough to carry out the agreement? [3]
• In re Berubari Union (1960): the Supreme Court said no. Giving Indian territory to a foreign country needs a constitutional amendment under Art. 368 [3].
• Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960: passed to follow the Court's opinion and carry out the transfer [4].
• Limit on the rule: a Constitution Bench later held that settling a boundary dispute is not cession of territory, so it does not need an amendment [3].
• Constitution (100th Amendment) Act, 2015: put the India–Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement into effect, including the exchange of enclaves.

5. Nehru's role

• Jawaharlal Nehru was Prime Minister and also his own Foreign Minister from 1946 to 1964. So he shaped foreign policy almost alone.

• His three aims: 1. Keep India's sovereignty (its freedom to make its own decisions). 2. Protect India's territorial integrity (keep its land whole and safe). 3. Bring rapid economic development.

• Non-alignment was his strategy for reaching all three.

• He told the Constituent Assembly (March 1949) that foreign relations are "the test of independence". A country that lets others decide its foreign policy is not truly free.

6. What non-alignment meant and did not mean

• Non-alignment: staying out of the military blocs of the Cold War and judging each international issue on its own merits.
• It is not neutrality (staying out of a war and taking no side).
• It is not isolation (cutting off from world affairs).

• Sources: Nehru's letter to K.P.S. Menon (January 1947); his words about "not tying yourself off with military blocs".

• How the policy grew: India, Yugoslavia and many new Asian and African states refused to join either the Soviet-led communist bloc or the US-led Western bloc [8].

• Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (April 1955): 29 nations attended, led mainly by Nehru, Nasser (Egypt) and Sukarno (Indonesia) [7].

• First Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit, Belgrade, 1961 [9].

• Active, not passive. India worked to reduce Cold War tensions and served in UN peacekeeping:

• Korea, 1953-54: India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). This body handled prisoners of war who did not want to go home after the Korean War. Its members were Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India.
  • Gen. K.S. Thimayya was Chairman [5].
  • India sent Custodian Forces – India (CFI), a brigade group of 5,230 personnel, to guard the prisoners [5].
  • By February 1954, 21,839 prisoners had returned to the UN Command side and only 628 had gone north [10].

• Congo, 1960-64: India sent two brigades to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) to stop the breakaway of Katanga province and keep the country united [5].

  • Indian women medical officers also served in the Congo in the 1960s. This was an early example of women in Indian peacekeeping [5].

• Aid from both blocs: India took economic and technical help from the US and from the USSR. This showed that non-alignment did not mean picking a side.

7. An imperfect balance

• Suez crisis, 1956: Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt after it nationalised the Suez Canal. India led the world protest.
• Hungary, 1956: the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in the same year. India did not join the public condemnation.
• The criticism: India was quick to criticise the West but slow to criticise Moscow. This made Western countries doubt that India was really non-aligned.

8. Debate at home and the costs abroad

• Critics at home: B.R. Ambedkar, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and later the Swatantra Party (founded 1959) wanted closer ties with the US bloc.

• But Nehru had wide freedom of action, because Congress was dominant and he held the foreign ministry himself.

• US unease: the US disliked non-alignment and India's growing partnership with the USSR. Ties stayed uneasy through the 1950s.

• Economic cost: import-substitution planning meant making goods at home instead of buying them from abroad. This limited India's trade and economic contact with the world.
• Rajaji's verdict (1950): C. Rajagopalachari said India, a country "without material, men or money", had become "the biggest moral power in the civilised world". India's standing came from its ideas, not from military or economic power.

Prelims Hooks

• Art. 51 (DPSP, Part IV): international peace, just and honourable relations, respect for international law and treaties, and arbitration. It is not a Fundamental Duty (that is Art. 51A), and courts cannot enforce it.
• Art. 253: Parliament can make laws to carry out treaties even on State List subjects. Art. 73 extends the Union's executive power to foreign affairs.
• Foreign affairs, treaties, and war and peace are in the Union List (entries 10-21), not the Concurrent List.
• In re Berubari Union (1960): ceding territory needs an Art. 368 amendment, not just an Art. 3 law. It led to the 9th Amendment, 1960. The 100th Amendment, 2015 carried out the India–Bangladesh LBA.
• SEATO: Manila treaty, 8 Sept 1954; Pakistan was a member. Baghdad Pact (1955) was later called CENTO.
• Bandung, April 1955: 29 Afro-Asian nations. First NAM summit: Belgrade, 1961.
• NNRC, Korea (1953): India was chairman and custodian of the prisoners. Gen. K.S. Thimayya led it, with a CFI of 5,230 personnel.
• Trap: in 1956 India condemned the attack on Egypt (Suez) but not the Soviet invasion of Hungary.
• Nehru was PM and Foreign Minister from 1946 to 1964. He called foreign relations "the test of independence" (Constituent Assembly, March 1949).

Mains Points

• Non-alignment as strategic autonomy (freedom to choose one's own path): staying out of blocs protected India's sovereignty and let it take aid from both camps. It also gave a poor state influence far beyond its power, through Bandung, NAM, Korea and the Congo. Rajaji's "biggest moral power" captures this.
• Limits and contradictions: the double standard of Suez versus Hungary, the US distrust that pushed it towards Pakistan (SEATO, CENTO), and the inward-looking import-substitution economy. These show that moral standing could not replace hard power, a gap later exposed in 1962.
• Art. 51 versus practice (first two decades): India pushed peace and UN peacekeeping and accepted outside settlement in some disputes. But DPSP ideals cannot be enforced in court, and security pressures often came first. This is a useful frame for judging how well Part IV guides foreign policy.
• Parliament's role in treaties: Art. 73 lets the executive make treaties alone. The Berubari rule (an amendment is needed to cede territory) is the main check by Parliament. This supports the argument for more Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties.