Is right-wing populism set to retreat?

1. At a Glance

• Populism is the politics of whatever is popular with the people, or can be made popular. It comes back in democracies from time to time. The current wave began rising after the 2008 global financial crisis, which hit ordinary people hard [1].
• Every populism, left or right, targets ruling elites and names a major, almost unyielding "enemy of the people" [1].
• Left populism treats the capitalist system itself as the problem. Right populism blames a self-serving "globalist" business elite, and adds a second enemy: immigrants and foreigners [1].
• Why it matters for UPSC: it covers GS-I (globalisation's effects on society), GS-II (democratic backsliding, how developed countries' politics affects India, diaspora and immigration) and GS-IV (ethics of majoritarian appeals). Trust deficits in institutions, documented by the OECD and the UN, are its structural driver [2][3][4].

2. Why in the News

• The Republican Party's historic defeat in the November 2026 U.S. midterm elections raised the question of whether right-wing populism is waning [1].
• The debate covers whether the right's focus on immigration and foreigners still moves voters, and how the anger of young protesters in India, France and other countries will find political expression [1].
• A precursor: the Democrats' historic wins in the 2025 off-year U.S. elections, with Spanberger, Sherrill and Mamdani among the winners [5].

3. Background & Evolution

• Trigger point: the 2008 financial crisis started the latest rise of populism. Its economic pain fed hostility towards elites [1].
• 2010s: Donald Trump's rise gave right-wing populism a global boost. Because the U.S. is powerful and other democracies often follow its lead, his success made this politics look legitimate elsewhere [1].
• A transnational network: Trump has backed fellow populists, including the Bolsonaros (Brazil), Nayib Bukele (El Salvador) and Viktor Orbán (Hungary) [1].
• Institutional backdrop: the OECD lists political polarisation, disinformation and the rise of populism among the internal and external pressures on democracies [3].
• 2025–26: the Democrats' wins in the 2025 off-year elections [5] were followed by the Republicans' historic midterm defeat in 2026 [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Definition	Politics of what is, or can be made, popular with the people [1]
Common core (left and right)	Anti-elite; names an unyielding "enemy of the people"; on the surface both target capitalism [1]
Left-populist diagnosis	The system itself (capitalism) is the problem [1]
Right-populist diagnosis	A self-serving globalist business elite, plus immigrants/foreigners as a second enemy [1]
Behaviour in power	Expand executive authority; frequently game the electoral system and institutional checks to stay in office [1]
Origin of current wave	Post-2008 financial crisis [1]
OECD Trust Survey (2024)	44% have low or no trust in their national government; 39% have high or moderately high trust [3]
OECD Trust Survey (2026 results)	Trust is significantly linked to people's sense of having an effective say (political voice) in what government does. Low perceived voice is a persistent, central driver of low trust [4]
UN DESA view	Declining trust is linked to support for extreme political views, public discontent, protests and sometimes violent conflict [2]
Leaders named in source	Trump (U.S.), Bolsonaros (Brazil), Nayib Bukele (El Salvador), Viktor Orbán (Hungary) [1]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Economic

• Populism's current wave is rooted in economic distress after 2008. Anti-elite anger tracks losses felt by ordinary people [1].
• Right populism splits off the "globalist" business elite from capitalism as a whole, which lets it keep pro-market positions while attacking globalisation [1].
• Implication: populist parties lose ground when governing populists fail on cost-of-living and economic delivery. This is analysis, not a sourced claim.

Governance / Ethical

• In power, populists centralise executive authority and game institutional checks. This erodes horizontal accountability: courts, election bodies, the media [1].
• The trust deficit (44% low/no trust against 39% high trust in the OECD, 2024) supplies populism's demand side [3].
• Political voice is the lever: the more people feel heard, the more they trust institutions. This argues for participatory governance [4].

Social

• Right populism turns immigrants and foreigners into an "enemy". This deepens identity polarisation and makes minorities more vulnerable [1].
• Youth anger (India, France and elsewhere) is an open question: will it go to the left, to the right, or to protest outside institutions? [1]
• UN DESA links low trust to protests and, in some cases, violent conflict [2].

Geopolitical / Strategic

• U.S. power legitimises imitation. A setback in the U.S. may weaken the demonstration effect for populists worldwide [1].
• Washington's patronage of Bolsonaro, Bukele and Orbán points to a transnational populist network, not isolated national cases [1].
• For India: restrictive immigration and visa politics in host countries directly affects the Indian diaspora and remittances. This is analysis, not a sourced claim.

Historical / Comparative

• Populism is cyclical. It "surfaces in democracies from time to time", so one election loss does not mean it has ended structurally [1].
• Midterm losses are a check on the governing party, not necessarily a rejection of the ideology. Populist themes such as immigration may persist inside both parties. This is analysis, not a sourced claim.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• November 2025: the Democrats win historic victories in the U.S. off-year elections: Spanberger, Sherrill and Mamdani [5].
• 2026: the OECD releases its Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2026 Results, which emphasises political voice as a driver of trust [4].
• November 2026: the Republicans suffer a historic defeat in the U.S. midterms. Supporters celebrate the Democrats' victory [1].
• 11 November 2026: The Hindu (International page, p. 10) publishes Atul Mishra's analysis "Is right-wing populism set to retreat?" [1]
• Ongoing: youth protests in India, France and other countries, whose political direction is still unresolved [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The latest global populist wave began rising after the 2008 financial crisis [1].
• Populism of both left and right targets ruling elites and names an "enemy of the people" [1].
• Left populism: the capitalist system itself is the problem [1].
• Right populism: a self-serving globalist business elite is the problem, plus immigrants/foreigners as a second enemy [1].
• Populists in power typically increase executive authority and game institutional checks [1].
• Nayib Bukele is a populist leader of El Salvador, not of Brazil or Hungary [1].
• Viktor Orbán: populist leader associated with Hungary [1].
• Bolsonaros: populist political family of Brazil [1].
• OECD Trust Survey 2024: 44% low/no trust in national government against 39% high/moderately high trust [3].
• In the OECD survey, trust has stabilised across OECD countries after an earlier decline [3].
• OECD 2026 Trust Survey results: perceived political voice is a central driver of trust [4].
• UN DESA links declining institutional trust to support for extreme political views [2].
• The OECD names polarisation, disinformation and the rise of populism as pressures on democracies [3].

8. The Best Case That Right-Wing Populism Really Is Retreating

• Two big defeats in a row are hard to explain away as bad luck
• The Democrats won historic victories in the November 2025 off-year elections [5].
• A year later, the Republicans suffered a historic defeat in the 2026 midterms [1].

• So the 2026 result is part of a trend. It is not a one-off protest vote.

• The election itself shows the check is still working

• Populists in power try to game the electoral system and institutional checks so they can stay in office [1].
• If voters can still remove a populist party from control through a normal, scheduled election, then that gaming has not fully worked in the U.S.

• This matters because a populist party that loses once usually finds it harder to get back the power it needs to rig the next contest.

• The U.S. example works in both directions

• Trump's rise made right-wing populism look legitimate in other countries, because other democracies often follow the U.S. lead [1].

• The same copying can now run the other way. Populists abroad who leaned on Washington's backing, such as the Bolsonaros, Bukele and Orbán [1], lose some of their cover when their patron loses at home.

• Where this argument is right: a defeat in the most powerful democracy does weaken right populism's claim that it is 'what the people want'. That claim is its main source of legitimacy.

9. Why the Anger Behind Populism Has Not Gone Away

• Elections change governments. They do not fix the reasons people got angry
• The IMF linked the post-2008 discontent to three things: slow growth, high unemployment and rising income inequality [6].

• None of these goes away just because a different party wins a midterm. The voters who were angry are still there and still looking for someone to blame.

• Most people still do not trust their governments

• In the OECD's 2024 survey, 44% had low or no trust in their national government, against 39% with high or moderately high trust [3].

• Trust has only stabilised after an earlier fall [3]. It has not recovered. This low trust is populism's 'demand side' (the supply of voters ready to listen to anti-elite messages).

• People who feel unheard stay open to populists

• The OECD's 2026 results find that a low sense of political voice (the feeling of having a real say in what government does) is a lasting, central cause of low trust [4].

• Changing the party in power does not give citizens more say between elections. So the cause stays untouched.

• Low trust can turn into extremism and unrest, not only votes

• UN DESA links falling trust to support for extreme political views, protests and sometimes violent conflict [2].

• So even if right-wing parties lose votes, the same anger can come out on the street instead.

• The source itself warns against reading the end of a cycle

• Populism 'surfaces in democracies from time to time' [1]. It goes down and comes back up. One low point in the cycle is not the end of it.

10. The Anger May Change Sides Instead of Disappearing

• A retreat of the right is not a retreat of populism
• Left and right populism share the same core: both attack ruling elites and both name an 'enemy of the people' [1].
• They differ only in who they blame. The left blames the capitalist system. The right blames a globalist business elite plus immigrants [1].

• So voters can move from right to left and keep the same anti-elite mood. Only the 'enemy' changes.

• The open question is the young

• Young protesters in India, France and other countries are angry, but it is not yet clear where that anger will go politically [1].
• It has three possible channels: a left party, a right party, or protest outside elections altogether.

• The third channel is the most worrying, because UN DESA links low trust to protest and sometimes violence [2].

• Exam tip: in a Mains answer, write 'right-wing populism may be losing ground' rather than 'populism is ending'. The first is a claim you can defend; the second is not.

11. Why India Should Watch U.S. Immigration Politics Closely

• The U.S. is now India's biggest source of money from abroad
• Remittances are money that people working abroad send home to their families.
• The RBI's survey shows the U.S. became the largest source of India's inward remittances, at about 27.7% of the total in 2023-24 [8].

• Remittances to India hit a record of about $107 billion in FY24 [7].

• So U.S. anti-immigrant politics is a direct economic risk for India

• Right populism names immigrants and foreigners as an 'enemy' [1].
• When that idea turns into U.S. policy, such as tighter visas or fewer work permits, fewer Indians can work there. That means less money sent home.

• Because India now depends on the U.S. more than before [8], the same policy hurts India more than it used to.

• Do not assume a Democratic win removes the risk

• The anger over immigration has not gone away (see the section above), so both U.S. parties may keep a hard line on it.
• India's diplomacy needs to plan for the diaspora's interests whichever party controls Congress.

12. What Would Actually Shrink Populism's Base

• Governments should give citizens more say, not only more welfare
• The OECD finds that people trust governments more when they feel they have a real say in decisions [4].
• So the fix is participation: consulting people before decisions, holding public hearings, using citizen assemblies.

• In India, the constitutional version of this is the Gram Sabha (the assembly of all voters in a village). Making Gram Sabhas actually work is a direct answer to the 'no voice' problem.

• Countries should tackle the economic causes together

• The IMF argued that effective international cooperation can help leaders head off a populist backlash, because the causes it named — slow growth, joblessness and inequality — cross borders [6].

• Acting alone, one country cannot easily fix losses that came from global trade and finance.

• Protect the institutions that let voters remove populists

• Populists in power expand executive authority (the power of the government of the day) and game checks such as courts, election bodies and the media [1].
• The 2026 midterm result was possible only because elections stayed free enough to punish the ruling party [1].
• The lesson for any democracy, India included: an independent Election Commission and judiciary are what make a 'retreat' possible at all. Weaken them, and a populist does not have to retreat.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 44% of people in OECD countries have low or no trust in their national government, against 39% with high or moderately high trust (OECD Trust Survey, 2024) [3]
• Data: The U.S. gives about 27.7% of India's inward remittances (2023-24), more than any other country [8]; total remittances hit a record of about $107 billion in FY24 [7]
• Report/Committee: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2026 Results (political voice as a central driver of trust) [4]; UN DESA Policy Brief No. 108 (low trust linked to extreme views and unrest) [2]; IMF Finance & Development, December 2016 (slow growth, unemployment and inequality feeding populist discontent) [6]
• Law/Case: Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — basic structure doctrine, which limits any majority's power to amend away core constitutional checks; Article 324 — independent Election Commission; Article 243A — Gram Sabha as a forum for direct citizen voice
• Comparison: U.S. 2025 off-year elections and 2026 midterms — voters punished the governing populist party through regular elections, showing that the electoral check still worked [5][1]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-I: Effects of globalisation on Indian society; social empowerment and youth movements.
• GS-II: Effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India's interests; Indian diaspora; comparison of the Indian constitutional scheme with other countries; role of institutions in a democracy.
• GS-IV: Ethics in public life; majoritarianism versus constitutional morality; accountability.
• Essay: Democracy, populism and the crisis of trust.

Question stems:

1. "Populism, whether of the left or the right, thrives on the trust deficit between citizens and institutions." Discuss with reference to recent global electoral trends. (GS-II, 15 marks)
2. Examine how the rise and fall of right-wing populism in developed democracies affects India's interests, particularly its diaspora and migration agenda. (GS-II, 10 marks)
3. "Populists in power expand executive authority and weaken institutional checks." Critically evaluate the safeguards a constitutional democracy can deploy against this tendency. (GS-II/GS-IV, 15 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Democratic backsliding and executive aggrandisement: this is how populists behave in power, by gaming checks [1].
• OECD Trust Survey / trust in government: the empirical data on populism's demand side [3][4].
• 2008 global financial crisis: the origin of the current populist wave [1].
• Global migration politics and the Indian diaspora: right populism's anti-immigrant plank affects Indians abroad.
• Youth protests and Gen-Z movements: an unresolved channel for anti-elite anger [1].
• Disinformation and social media regulation: listed by the OECD as a pressure on democracies [3].
• Participatory governance (Gram Sabhas, citizen assemblies): political voice is a remedy for low trust [4].
• The U.S. political system (midterms, Congress): needed to read the 2026 result correctly.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Democratic backsliding (Polity): Populists in power expand executive authority and game institutional checks, which is the core of democratic backsliding.
• Democracy (Polity): The article asks how populism and trust deficits strain democracies and how voters respond through elections.
• Executive (Polity): Populists in power expand executive authority, so you need to know what the executive is and how it is checked.
• Horizontal accountability (Polity): Courts, election bodies and the media check the executive, and populists tend to weaken these checks.
• Left and right (Polity): The note contrasts left and right populism, so you need the basic meaning of these labels.
• Capitalist economy (Economy): Left populism blames the capitalist system itself, while right populism blames only a globalist business elite.
• Globalisation (Economy): Right populists attack a 'globalist' elite, and the 2008 crisis fed anger at globalisation.
• Immigration (Geography): Immigrants and foreigners are right populism's second 'enemy of the people', and the immigration issue is central to the debate.
• Indian diaspora (Geography): Restrictive immigration politics in host countries affects Indians abroad, a likely GS-II angle.
• Majoritarianism (Polity): Populist appeals that target minorities and foreigners link to majoritarian politics and its ethical questions.
• Constitutional morality (Polity): This concept explains how constitutional values can guard against majoritarian and populist excesses, as the GS-IV stems ask.
• Accountability (Polity): The trust deficit and the call for political voice are about making government answerable to citizens.
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Economy): The OECD's trust surveys supply the data on the trust deficit that drives populism.
• Remittances (Economy): Anti-immigrant politics in rich countries can hit money sent home by the Indian diaspora.
• Demonstration effect (Economy): This is the economic term for imitation; the note applies the same idea to how U.S. politics is copied abroad.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Treating populism as only right-wing. The source says explicitly that left and right both share anti-elite, "enemy of the people" framing. They differ in the diagnosis: the system versus a globalist elite plus foreigners [1].
• Saying both stripes target capitalism in the same way. Only on the surface. The left targets the system; the right targets a business elite [1].
• Mixing up leaders and countries: Bukele belongs to El Salvador, not Venezuela or Brazil; Orbán to Hungary, not Poland [1].
• Dating the wave to Trump's 2016 victory. The source dates it to the 2008 financial crisis. Trump's rise in the 2010s boosted it [1].
• Misreading OECD figures. In the 2024 survey, 44% is low/no trust and 39% is high/moderately high. Do not swap them [3].
• Over-reading a midterm loss as the end of populism. Populism "surfaces from time to time" and is cyclical [1].