Dissent in the Commission

1. At a Glance

• Two Election Commissioners (ECs), Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi, have written formal dissent notes. They question changes to electoral rolls, centralised control and the Election Commission's decision-making process [1].
• Both were appointed under the 2023 law on appointing the CEC and ECs. The government was described as having "virtually handpicked" them, which is why their dissent drew attention [1].
• Their objections centre on anomalies in the nationwide Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls over roughly 10 months [1].
• UPSC relevance: the topic brings together the independence of constitutional bodies, the working of a multi-member Commission, appointment processes and electoral roll integrity (GS-II).

2. Why in the News

• After the draft roll was published in the Delhi SIR, notices were issued to electors. One of the names on them was EC Sukhbir Singh Sandhu himself [1].
• Reports then said that Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had flagged "many anomalies" in the SIR process across the country over the last 10 months [1].
• The ECs wrote formal dissent notes, including one to the Cabinet Secretary [1].
• Rumours of a rift within the Commission had been circulating for some months before this [1].
• The article appeared in The Hindu, Chennai, Sunday supplement, 27 September 2026, p. 17 [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• 1950: Under Article 324, the Election Commission (EC) was set up as a single-member body headed by the CEC [2].
• 1989: The EC briefly became multi-member when two ECs were appointed on 16 Oct 1989. The posts were abolished in January 1990 [2].
• 1991: The Election Commission (Conditions of Service of ECs and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991 was passed. It says business should be transacted unanimously as far as possible, and by majority if members differ. This is the legal basis for dissent inside the Commission [2].
• 1993: The Commission became permanently multi-member, with a CEC and 2 ECs [2].
• 1995: In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the multi-member Commission. It held that the CEC and ECs stand on an equal footing and that decisions are taken by majority [2].
• 2019: EC Ashok Lavasa dissented on Model Code of Conduct (MCC) complaints. This set the precedent for asking that minority views be recorded [2].
• 2 March 2023: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench ruled that until Parliament made a law, appointments would be made on the advice of a committee of the PM, the Leader of the Opposition (LoP) and the CJI [2].
• December 2023: The CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was enacted. It replaced the CJI on the selection committee with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [2]. The article calls it the "2023 Law for Appointment of the CEC and ECs" [1].
• 14 March 2024: Sandhu and Gyanesh Kumar (now CEC) were appointed. The vacancies arose from the retirement of EC Anup Chandra Pandey and the abrupt resignation of EC Arun Goel [1]. Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury (Congress) gave a formal dissent note in the selection committee [1].
• 17 February 2025: Vivek Joshi was appointed EC. Congress again gave written objections [1].

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• A multi-member Commission is meant to decide by majority, and dissent is part of that design. In Seshan (1995), the Supreme Court treated the CEC as primus inter pares (first among equals), not a superior [2].
• Centralised control by the CEC, which the ECs objected to [1], raises the question of how much the CEC can act alone. There is a related asymmetry: ECs can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation, so they have weaker tenure protection than the CEC [2].
• Sending a dissent note to the Cabinet Secretary, an executive functionary [1], raises questions about the Commission's autonomy from the executive and about the right channel for internal disagreement.

Ethical / Governance

• It is notable that both dissenters were picked under a law that critics say gives the executive a 2:1 majority on the selection committee [1][2]. It suggests that institutional culture can matter as much as the appointment method.
• Transparency: Should dissent be recorded and disclosed? The Lavasa episode in 2019 left this unsettled [2].
• Public trust: A visible rift weakens the perceived neutrality of the body that referees elections [1].

Administrative

• The SIR is a large verification exercise. An EC receiving a notice in the Delhi SIR [1] suggests possible false positives in flagging electors.
• The dissent notes flagged anomalies accumulated over about 10 months across the country [1]. That points to design or implementation problems in centralised roll revision, not just isolated errors.

Political / Federal

• The Opposition's dissent at both appointments (Chowdhury in 2024, Congress in 2025) [1] shows a lack of bipartisan consensus in the appointment process.
• Changes to electoral rolls affect universal adult franchise (Art. 326), and exclusion errors fall hardest on migrants and marginalised voters [2].

Historical / Comparative

• The 2019 Lavasa dissent was a single EC objecting to specific MCC decisions [2]. The 2026 episode is two ECs jointly questioning systemic process, which makes it a broader challenge [1].

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 17 Feb 2025: Vivek Joshi appointed EC over Congress's written objections [1].
• About Nov 2025 to Sep 2026: Over roughly 10 months, the two ECs flagged anomalies in the nationwide SIR [1].
• 2026: The Delhi SIR draft roll was published, and notices were issued, including one to EC Sandhu [1].
• 2026: Formal dissent notes surfaced, including one addressed to the Cabinet Secretary [1].
• 27 Sep 2026: The Hindu carried the analysis "Dissent in the Commission" [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The EC derives its powers from Article 324 of the Constitution [2].
• The 2023 Act's selection committee is the PM, the LoP (Lok Sabha) and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. The CJI is not a member [2].
• The Search Committee under the 2023 Act is headed by the Law Minister, not the Cabinet Secretary [2].
• Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023) created the interim PM–LoP–CJI selection panel [2].
• T.N. Seshan v. UoI (1995) upheld the multi-member EC and decision by majority [2].
• The EC first became multi-member in October 1989 and has been permanently multi-member since 1993 [2].
• An EC can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC [2].
• The CEC is removed like a Supreme Court judge [2].
• CEC/EC tenure is 6 years or 65 years of age, whichever is earlier [2].
• Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Gyanesh Kumar were appointed on 14 March 2024 [1].
• Vivek Joshi was appointed EC on 17 February 2025 [1].
• Arun Goel resigned abruptly as EC in 2024, and Anup Chandra Pandey retired [1].
• SIR stands for Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls [1].

8. How the 2023 Law Lets the Government Control Who Gets Picked

• The government can pick ECs even when the Opposition has no seat at the table
• The 2023 Bill says the Selection Committee's choice stays valid even if one seat on the committee is empty [3].
• The PM's seat and the Cabinet Minister's seat can never be empty. Only the Leader of Opposition (LoP) seat can be empty, and that happens when the Lok Sabha is dissolved [3].

• So just before a general election, when the stakes are highest, the committee can be made up only of ruling-party members [3].

• The shortlist is not binding

• A Search Committee proposes five names. The Selection Committee may still pick someone who is not on that list [3].

• PRS notes both sides of this. It weakens the Search Committee, but it also stops a panel made up only of civil servants from controlling the choice [3].

• Only senior bureaucrats can apply, even though the job is partly judicial

• Only people who are, or have been, of Secretary rank in government are eligible [3].
• The EC also does quasi-judicial work (deciding disputes like a court). It advises on disqualifying MPs and MLAs, and it settles disputes over party symbols [3].

• In South Africa, one of the five commissioners must be a judge. In the US, a sitting government officer cannot be appointed [3].

• Why this matters for the dissent story: the law was criticised for letting the government pick 'loyal' officers. When two of those officers dissent anyway [1], it shows that choosing the people does not fully control how they behave. But it does not show that the law is safe. The design problems PRS found are still there.

9. Why an EC Who Dissents Has Weaker Job Protection Than the CEC

• Equal vote, unequal protection
• In T.N. Seshan (1995), the Supreme Court held that ECs are at par with the CEC and have an equal say in decisions [3].
• But under Article 324(5), an EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation. The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge [3].

• In this case, Sandhu and Joshi are dissenting against how the Commission, led by CEC Gyanesh Kumar, is run [1]. The person they disagree with is also the person whose recommendation can remove them.

• The Supreme Court saw the problem but left it to Parliament

• In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Court said it could not order equal removal protection, because the Constitution itself sets out two different removal methods [3].
• It said giving ECs the same protection is for Parliament to decide [3].

• This needs a Constitutional Amendment. The 2023 law, an ordinary Act, left the removal rule unchanged [3].

• What this does to dissent: a vote cast by majority is meaningful only if the minority can vote without fear. The 1991 rule of deciding by majority [2] assumes all three members are equally safe in their jobs. The Constitution does not make them so.

10. The Case That This Dissent Harms the Commission — and Its Limits

• The strongest argument against the dissenters
• Voters trust an election referee that speaks with one voice. A public split gives any losing party a ready excuse to reject the result.
• One note went to the Cabinet Secretary [1], the top civil servant of the executive (the government of the day). Taking an internal fight to the government is the opposite of keeping the EC independent of it.

• The SIR is backed by written safeguards (see the next section) [4]. Individual errors, like a notice going to the wrong person, may be normal in a revision covering the whole country.

• What is right about it

• The channel is a genuine problem. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said elections must be kept out of the hands of the government of the day [3]. A note to the Cabinet Secretary pulls the government into the EC's internal working.

• The facts are thin. This note rests on a single newspaper report [1]. The content of the dissent notes has not been published, so no one can yet judge whether the 'many anomalies' are serious.

• Why the argument still fails

• Disagreement is built into the design. Seshan upheld a multi-member body that decides by majority [3]. Three members who always agree give no more protection than one member.
• Part of the reason dissent travels outside is that the EC has no independent secretariat (its own staff and office, not controlled by a ministry). The Goswami Committee (1990) and the ECI itself asked for one, like the ones Parliament and the courts have [3]. Without it, the EC's administrative links run through the government.
• So the real fix is to give dissent a proper place inside the Commission, not to suppress it.

11. What the SIR Rules Promise, and What a Notice to an EC Reveals

• The written safeguards are strong on paper
• In the 2025 Bihar SIR, the ECI said no name can be deleted from the draft roll without a hearing and a written order [4].
• That order can be appealed to the District Magistrate (DM) and the state Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) [4].

• The list of names that were on the old roll but missing from the draft roll was shared with all political parties [4].

• But the process puts the burden on the voter

• These safeguards start only after the system flags a person. The voter must then respond, attend the hearing and, if needed, appeal.
• In the Delhi SIR, a notice went to a sitting Election Commissioner, Sandhu [1]. If the system flagged someone that senior and easy to verify, it can also flag ordinary voters by mistake.

• A migrant worker or a daily-wage earner may not be able to spend days on a hearing and an appeal. A wrong flag costs them far more than it costs an EC.

• Why this matters: the ECs' complaint is about the design of the process, spread over about 10 months across the country [1]. That is different from a complaint about a few bad cases. The written safeguards [4] cannot answer that complaint, because they act only after a name has been flagged.

12. What India's Committees and Other Democracies Suggest

• India's own reform bodies have never proposed a 2:1 government majority
• Goswami Committee (1990): the CEC should be appointed in consultation with the CJI and the LoP. For ECs, the CEC should be consulted too [3].
• National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002): a five-member panel of the PM, the LoPs of both Houses, the Lok Sabha Speaker and the Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman [3].
• Law Commission (2015) and the Supreme Court (2023): the PM, the LoP and the CJI [3].

• All of these panels include someone outside the ruling party. The 2023 Act does not [3].

• Other democracies put the legislature, not the cabinet, in charge

• UK: a Speaker's Committee of MPs runs recruitment, and the House of Commons approves the names [3].
• US: the President nominates, but the Senate must confirm [3].
• Canada: appointed by a resolution of the House of Commons [3].

• South Africa: a panel headed by the President of the Constitutional Court [3].

• Who should do what

• Parliament: amend Article 324(5) so an EC can be removed only like the CEC. The Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal named this as Parliament's job [3].
• Parliament: add a neutral member, such as the CJI as the Law Commission (2015) proposed, to the Selection Committee. This would end the ruling party's automatic majority [3].
• Government, on the ECI's request: create an independent secretariat for the ECI, as the Goswami Committee (1990) and the ECI's own reform proposals (2018) recommend [3].
• ECI: before its next nationwide revision, publish how it flags electors for notices, so errors like the notice to Sandhu [1] can be checked from outside.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: A Search Committee shortlists 5 names, but the Selection Committee may pick someone outside the list [3]
• Report/Committee: Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990) — CJI and LoP on the appointment panel; independent ECI secretariat [3]; Law Commission (2015) — PM + LoP + CJI panel [3]; NCRWC (2002) — five-member panel including the Speaker and the LoPs of both Houses [3]
• Law/Case: Article 324(5) — an EC is removed on the CEC's recommendation; T.N. Seshan v. UoI (1995) — ECs at par with the CEC; Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023) — equal removal protection left to Parliament [3]
• Comparison: UK — House of Commons approves electoral commissioners; US — Senate confirms; South Africa — panel chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court [3]
• Scheme: SIR safeguard — no deletion from the draft roll without a hearing and a written order, appealable to the DM and CEO (Bihar, 2025) [4]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: Appointment to various constitutional posts; powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies; salient features of the Representation of People's Act.
• GS-II: Separation of powers; accountability of institutions.
• GS-IV: Integrity and impartiality in public service; conscience versus institutional loyalty.
• Model question stems: 1. "Dissent within a multi-member constitutional body strengthens rather than weakens its credibility." Discuss with reference to the Election Commission of India. (15 marks) 2. Critically examine whether the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 adequately secures the independence of the Election Commission in light of Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India. (15 marks) 3. Special Intensive Revisions of electoral rolls aim at purity of rolls but risk exclusion. Suggest safeguards. (10 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Anoop Baranwal judgment (2023): the judicial trigger for the 2023 appointment law.
• CEC & ECs Act, 2023 vs. the 1991 Act: changes in appointment method, salary and legal immunity.
• Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls: the subject matter of the dissent.
• Representation of the People Act, 1950: the law on preparing and revising rolls.
• Model Code of Conduct and the Lavasa dissent (2019): the earlier precedent of dissent inside the EC.
• Independence of other constitutional bodies (CAG, UPSC, Finance Commission): a comparison of appointment safeguards.
• Article 326 (universal adult franchise): the rights dimension of roll deletions.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Selection vs. Search Committee: The Law Minister heads the Search Committee, and the PM chairs the Selection Committee. The Cabinet Secretary heads neither under the 2023 Act [2]. Don't confuse this with the dissent note that was sent to the Cabinet Secretary [1].
• Anoop Baranwal panel ≠ 2023 Act panel: The CJI sat on the interim judicial panel only [2].
• Removal asymmetry: The CEC is removed like a Supreme Court judge. ECs are not; they are removed on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• Gyanesh Kumar's 2024 appointment was as an EC. He is described as "CEC" in 2026 reporting [1], and he became CEC later, in 2025 [2].
• Multi-member since 1993, not 1989: The 1989 appointments were reversed in 1990 [2].