Conflict between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles

Topic: Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties · NCERT: Class 11, Ch 2 "Rights in the Indian Constitution"; Class 11, Ch 6 "Judiciary"; Class 11, Ch 9 "Constitution as a Living Document"

Meaning

The conflict between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles was a struggle from 1951 to 1976 over one question: which part wins when a law made to carry out a Directive Principle (Part IV) breaks a Fundamental Right (Part III)? Parliament kept amending the Constitution and the Supreme Court kept ruling on those amendments. Minerva Mills (1980) settled it: the two parts must be kept in harmony, and neither can wholly override the other [2].

It matters because this struggle shaped the amending power, the Ninth Schedule, Article 31C and the basic structure doctrine. These are some of the most tested areas in polity.

Explanation

Why the two parts clashed

• Fundamental Rights (FRs), Part III: courts can enforce them. If an FR is broken, a citizen can go to court.
• FRs restrain the State. They say what it must not do.

• They protect the individual.

• Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), Part IV: goals the State should work towards. Courts cannot enforce them (Art. 37).

• Directives exhort the State. They push it to act.

• They serve society as a whole.

• Where they met head-on: states passed zamindari abolition laws (laws ending big landlord estates). These carried out Art. 39(b)-(c), which ask for fair sharing of wealth.

• Landlords challenged these laws under the right to property, which was then in Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31.

• The two views:

• Government: the Constitution can be amended, and FRs can be cut down (abridged) to carry out directives.
• Court: FRs are too sacred to be limited, even for that purpose.

The cycle: a ruling, then an amendment

The conflict moved in a loop. The Court struck a law down, Parliament amended the Constitution, and the Court ruled again.

Court ruling	Parliament's reply
Champakam Dorairajan (1951); Patna HC in Kameshwar Singh (1951) [6]	1st Amendment, 1951
Bela Banerjee (1954)	4th Amendment, 1955
Golaknath (1967) and R.C. Cooper (1970)	24th and 25th Amendments, 1971
Madhav Rao Scindia (1970)	26th Amendment, 1971
Kesavananda Bharati (1973)	42nd Amendment, 1976
Minerva Mills (1980)	Final settlement: harmony

Three stages of the balance

• Stage 1: Rights on top (1951)

• In Champakam Dorairajan, the Court called directives "subsidiary" to FRs. This means they rank below FRs, and a directive cannot override an FR.

• Stage 2: Directives on top (1971-1976)

• Art. 31C (25th Amendment) let Art. 39(b)-(c) laws override Arts. 14, 19 and 31 [2].

• The 42nd Amendment (1976), Section 4 widened this shield to any directive in Part IV [2]. This was the high point of directives ranking above rights.

• Stage 3: Harmony (1980 onward)

• Minerva Mills struck down the 42nd Amendment's expansion. The wider Art. 31C destroyed the harmony between Parts III and IV, and that harmony is part of the basic structure [2].

Limits that survived

• Judicial review (the courts' power to strike down laws that break the Constitution) could never be switched off.

• In Kesavananda, Parliament could shield directive-based laws, but courts could still check whether a law really served Art. 39(b)-(c) [2].

• The original Art. 31C never protected laws from Art. 21 or Art. 32 [2].

In the Constitution and practice

• Art. 37: directives cannot be enforced by courts, but they are basic to governance.
• 1st Amendment, 1951. Its aim was to validate zamindari abolition and keep it out of reach of the courts [6].
• Art. 15(4): special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes, SCs and STs. This overturned the effect of Champakam, where the Madras Communal G.O. (a Government Order reserving college seats by caste and community) was struck down under Art. 29(2).
• Art. 31A: a law to acquire an estate, or to end or change rights in it, cannot be void for breaking any right in Part III [7].
• Art. 31B and the Ninth Schedule: Acts placed in this list cannot be struck down for breaking FRs [4]. At first it held 13 Acts, all about land [6].

• Arts. 31A and 31B were added with retrospective effect, so they also covered laws already passed [6].

• Shankari Prasad (1951): upheld the 1st Amendment. Parliament can amend FRs under Art. 368.

• Bela Banerjee (1954): compensation for land taken must be a just equivalent (fair market value).

• 4th Amendment (1955): courts could no longer question whether compensation was adequate.

• Sajjan Singh (1965): again upheld Parliament's power to amend FRs.

• Golaknath (1967): eleven judges, decided 6:5
• Parliament cannot abridge FRs, even to carry out directives.
• A constitutional amendment counts as "law" under Art. 13, so an amendment that abridges an FR is void.

• Prospective overruling: the ruling applied only to the future. The 1st, 4th and 17th Amendments stayed valid, which kept past land reforms safe.

• R.C. Cooper (1970): struck down bank nationalisation (the 1969 takeover of 14 private banks) because the compensation was not fair [3].

• Madhav Rao Scindia (1970): struck down the de-recognition of former princes and the end of their privy purses (yearly payments to former rulers).
• 24th Amendment (1971): added Art. 13(4). An amendment under Art. 368 is not "law" under Art. 13. This undid Golaknath.
• 25th Amendment (1971, in force from 20 April 1972) [3]:
• "Compensation" became "amount" in Art. 31(2). Courts could no longer test whether the payment was fair [3].
• Property acquisition laws could not be challenged under Art. 19(1)(f) [3].

• Inserted Art. 31C [3].

• 26th Amendment (1971): ended privy purses and undid Madhav Rao Scindia.

• Kesavananda Bharati (1973): thirteen judges, the largest bench the Supreme Court has ever sat [2].
• Upheld Art. 31C Part 1, the shield for Art. 39(b)-(c) laws [2].
• Struck down Part 2, the bar on court review [2].

• Laid down the basic structure doctrine. Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, but it cannot destroy core features such as democracy, federalism, secularism or judicial review.

• 44th Amendment (1978): removed Art. 31 and Art. 19(1)(f). Property became only a legal right under Art. 300A.

• Minerva Mills (1980): struck down the 42nd Amendment's extension of Art. 31C and held that harmony between Parts III and IV is part of the basic structure [2].
• Waman Rao (1980, five judges): the original Art. 31C stays valid to the extent Kesavananda upheld it [2].
• Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024, nine judges): looked at whether the original Art. 31C survives after Minerva Mills, and whether privately owned property counts as "material resources of the community" under Art. 39(b) [5]. The Court held that the original Art. 31C survives [5].

Don't confuse with

• Original Art. 31C (25th Amendment, 1971) vs. extended Art. 31C (42nd Amendment, 1976): the original covered only Art. 39(b)-(c) laws and is still valid [2][5]. The extension to all directives was struck down in Minerva Mills [2].
• Golaknath (1967) vs. Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Golaknath said Parliament cannot abridge FRs at all. Kesavananda said Parliament can amend FRs but cannot destroy the basic structure.
• Art. 31A vs. Art. 31B: 31A protects laws on acquiring estates [7]. 31B protects any Act placed in the Ninth Schedule [4]. Both came through the 1st Amendment, 1951.
• Right to property as an FR vs. Art. 300A: before the 44th Amendment (1978), property was an FR under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31. Since then it is only a legal right under Art. 300A.

Prelims Hooks

• Champakam Dorairajan (1951): Madras Communal G.O. struck down under Art. 29(2). Directives were called "subsidiary" to FRs. This led to Art. 15(4) through the 1st Amendment, 1951.
• 1st Amendment, 1951: added Arts. 31A and 31B and created the Ninth Schedule, which first held 13 land Acts [6][4].
• Golaknath (1967): 11 judges, decided 6:5. Parliament cannot abridge FRs. It introduced prospective overruling.
• Amendment–change pairs: 24th = Art. 13(4). 25th = "compensation" became "amount", plus Art. 31C [3]. 26th = privy purses ended.
• Trap: the original Art. 31C shielded only Art. 39(b)-(c) laws, and only from Arts. 14, 19 and 31. It did not cover Art. 21 or Art. 32 [2].
• Case–subject match: R.C. Cooper (1970) = bank nationalisation [3]. Madhav Rao Scindia (1970) = privy purses. Minerva Mills (1980) = struck down the 42nd Amendment's extension of Art. 31C [2].

Mains Points

• Rights vs. social justice: from 1951 to 1976, Parliament put land redistribution and other directives first. The Court guarded individual rights. Minerva Mills (1980) settled it: Parts III and IV must stay in harmony, and neither can wholly override the other [2]. This is a strong GS-II example of how courts and Parliament worked out their relationship.
• The amendment cycle as GS-I history:
• Each ruling was followed by an amendment: Champakam → 1st; Bela Banerjee → 4th; Golaknath and Cooper → 24th and 25th; Scindia → 26th.

• This shows Nehru-era land reform and the Indira Gandhi era's "garibi hatao" politics (bank nationalisation, ending privy purses) reshaping the Constitution itself.

• Judicial review as the limit:

• Kesavananda allowed the State to shield directive-based laws but not to stop courts from checking them [2].
• Critics say the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31C were meant for land reform but over time protected many other laws from review.
• The 2024 nine-judge ruling shows the debate is still alive, both on whether Art. 31C survives and on how far "material resources of the community" reaches [5].

Related concepts

• Champakam Dorairajan case
• Article 31C

Read more

• Rights versus directives: the conflict, 1951-1976