Rights versus directives: the conflict, 1951-1976

Detail

1. How NCERT frames the relationship

• Fundamental Rights (FRs) are in Part III. Courts can enforce them, so a citizen can go to court if one is broken.
• Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) are in Part IV. They are goals the State should work towards. Courts cannot enforce them (Art. 37).
• The two parts can work together:
• FRs restrain the State. They tell it what it must not do.
• Directives exhort the State. They push it to act.

• FRs protect the individual. Directives serve society as a whole.

• Where they clashed: States passed zamindari abolition laws to carry out directives such as Art. 39(b)-(c), which ask for fair sharing of wealth. Landlords challenged these laws under the right to property (Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 at that time).

• Government's view: the Constitution can be amended, and rights can be cut down (abridged) to carry out directives.

• Court's view: FRs are too sacred to be limited, even for that purpose.

• Conflict between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles: this means the 1951-1976 struggle over which part wins when a law that serves a directive breaks an FR. Parliament kept amending the Constitution, and the Supreme Court kept ruling on those amendments.

2. Champakam Dorairajan (1951): the first clash

• Champakam Dorairajan case (State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951):
• Madras had a Communal G.O. (Government Order). It reserved college seats by caste and community.
• The Supreme Court struck it down under Art. 29(2). This article says no citizen can be refused admission to a State-run or State-aided institution only because of religion, race, caste or language.

• The Court said directives are "subsidiary" to FRs. In other words, they rank below FRs. A directive cannot override an FR.

• At the same time, land reform was blocked: the Patna High Court struck down Bihar's land reform law in Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (1951) [6].

3. The 1st Amendment, 1951: Parliament's first reply

The aim was to validate zamindari abolition and keep it out of reach of the courts [6].

Change	What it did
Art. 15(4) (new)	Lets the State make special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes, SCs and STs. This overturned the effect of Champakam.
Art. 31A (new)	A law to acquire any estate, or to end or change rights in it, cannot be void because it breaks any right in Part III [7].
Art. 31B (new) and Ninth Schedule	Acts listed in the Ninth Schedule cannot be struck down for breaking FRs [4].
Art. 19(2) (amended)	Added new grounds to limit free speech: public order, friendly relations with foreign States and incitement to an offence.

• Ninth Schedule: a list of laws attached to the Constitution. Through Art. 31B, these laws are protected from challenge for breaking FRs. The 1st Amendment created it for the first time [4].

• At first it held 13 Acts, all about estates (land) [6].

• Arts. 31A and 31B were added with retrospective effect, meaning they also covered laws already passed [6].

4. The land and property cases, 1951-1970

Case (year)	What the Court held	What followed
Shankari Prasad (1951)	Upheld the 1st Amendment. Parliament can amend FRs under Art. 368.	Land reform went ahead.
Bela Banerjee (1954)	"Compensation" for land taken must be a just equivalent, meaning a fair market value.	4th Amendment, 1955. Courts could no longer question whether the compensation was adequate.
Sajjan Singh (1965)	Again upheld Parliament's power to amend FRs.
Golaknath (1967)	Eleven judges, 6:5. Parliament cannot abridge FRs, even to carry out directives.	Parliament could no longer cut down FRs.
R.C. Cooper (1970)	Struck down bank nationalisation (the 1969 takeover of 14 private banks) because the compensation was not fair [3].	25th Amendment
Madhav Rao Scindia (1970)	Struck down the de-recognition of former princes and the end of their privy purses.	26th Amendment

• Golaknath (1967): two key ideas
• Constitutional amendment = "law" under Art. 13. So an amendment that abridges an FR is void.
• Prospective overruling: the ruling applies only to the future. Earlier amendments, including the 1st, 4th and 17th, stayed valid. This kept past land reforms safe.

5. Parliament strikes back: the 24th, 25th and 26th Amendments (1971)

• 24th Amendment, 1971: restored the power to amend
• Added Art. 13(4). An amendment under Art. 368 is not "law" for Art. 13, so it cannot be struck down for breaking FRs.
• Made clear in Art. 368 that Parliament can amend any provision, including FRs.

• This undid Golaknath.

• 25th Amendment, 1971 (in force from 20 April 1972) [3]

• "Compensation" became "amount" in Art. 31(2). The State could now fix the payment for land it took, and courts could not test whether it was fair [3].
• Said that a property acquisition law cannot be challenged under Art. 19(1)(f), the right to property [3].
• Inserted Art. 31C (see below).

• The aim was to reverse R.C. Cooper [3].

• 26th Amendment, 1971: ended privy purses (yearly payments to former rulers) and the special status of the princes. This undid Madhav Rao Scindia.

6. Article 31C: the shield for directives

• Article 31C: a clause that protects certain directive-based laws from FR challenges. It had two parts.
• Part 1 (shield): a law that carries out Art. 39(b) (ownership and control of the community's material resources should serve the common good) or Art. 39(c) (wealth and the means of production should not be concentrated in a few hands) cannot be held void for breaking Arts. 14, 19 or 31 [2].

• Part 2 (bar on review): if a law declares that it serves this policy, no court can question whether it really does [2].

• Simple meaning: for these laws, directives would rank above equality (Art. 14), the freedoms (Art. 19) and property (Art. 31).

7. Kesavananda Bharati (1973): the Court's balance

• Thirteen judges, the largest bench the Supreme Court has ever sat [2].
• On Art. 31C:
• Upheld Part 1, the shield for Art. 39(b)-(c) laws [2].

• Struck down Part 2, the bar on court review. Courts can still check whether a law really serves Art. 39(b)-(c) [2].

• Basic structure doctrine: Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including FRs. But it cannot destroy its core features, such as democracity, federalism, secularism or judicial review (the courts' power to strike down laws that break the Constitution). Details are in amendment-basic-structure.

• Result: Golaknath was overruled on the power to amend, but the basic structure became a new limit on that power.

8. 42nd Amendment, 1976: the high point of directive primacy

• Section 4 of the 42nd Amendment changed Art. 31C. Its shield now covered laws carrying out any directive in Part IV, not just Art. 39(b)-(c) [2].
• Effect: every directive could now override Arts. 14 and 19. This was the high point of directives ranking above rights.
• What came after:
• Minerva Mills (1980) struck down this expansion. The Court held that the wider Art. 31C destroyed the harmony between Parts III and IV, and that this harmony is part of the basic structure [2].
• Waman Rao (1980, five judges) held that the original Art. 31C stayed valid to the extent Kesavananda upheld it [2].
• Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024, nine judges) looked at two questions: whether Art. 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda, still survives after Minerva Mills, and whether privately owned property counts as "material resources of the community" under Art. 39(b) [5]. The Court held that the original Art. 31C survives [5].
• Art. 31 and Art. 19(1)(f) were later removed by the 44th Amendment, 1978. Property became only a legal right under Art. 300A.

Prelims Hooks

• Champakam Dorairajan (1951): Madras Communal G.O. struck down under Art. 29(2). Led to Art. 15(4) through the 1st Amendment, 1951.
• 1st Amendment, 1951: added Arts. 31A and 31B and created the Ninth Schedule, which first held 13 land Acts [6][4]. It also added "public order" and "friendly relations with foreign States" to Art. 19(2).
• Bela Banerjee (1954) → 4th Amendment (1955): courts can no longer question whether compensation is adequate.
• Golaknath (1967): 11 judges, 6:5. Parliament cannot abridge FRs. It introduced prospective overruling.
• 24th Amendment (1971): inserted Art. 13(4). 25th Amendment (1971): "compensation" became "amount" and Art. 31C was added [3]. 26th Amendment (1971): privy purses ended.
• Trap: the original Art. 31C protected laws under Art. 39(b)-(c) only, and only from Arts. 14, 19 and 31. It did not cover Art. 21 or Art. 32 [2].
• Kesavananda Bharati (1973, 13 judges): upheld the first part of Art. 31C and struck down its judicial-review bar [2].
• 42nd Amendment (1976), Section 4: extended Art. 31C to all directives. Minerva Mills (1980) struck down this extension [2].
• Match the case to its subject: R.C. Cooper (1970) = bank nationalisation. Madhav Rao Scindia (1970) = princes' privy purses.

Mains Points

• Rights vs. social justice: in 1951-1976, Parliament put directives such as land redistribution (Art. 39(b)-(c)) first. The Court guarded individual rights. The final settlement, Minerva Mills (1980), says Parts III and IV must be kept in harmony, and neither can wholly override the other [2]. This makes a good GS-II answer on how courts and Parliament worked out their relationship.
• Amendment cycle as GS-I political history: a court ruling was followed by an amendment, then another ruling (Champakam → 1st; Bela Banerjee → 4th; Golaknath and Cooper → 24th and 25th; Scindia → 26th). This shows Nehru-era land reform and the Indira Gandhi era's "garibi hatao" politics (bank nationalisation, ending privy purses) shaping the Constitution itself.
• Judicial review as the limit: Kesavananda allowed the State to shield directive-based laws but did not allow it to stop courts from checking them [2]. A shield is acceptable; switching off review is not. The 2024 nine-judge ruling shows the debate is still alive, both on whether Art. 31C survives and on how far "material resources of the community" reaches [5].
• Critical view: the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31C were meant for land reform. Over time they protected many laws from review. Critics see this as taking an exception meant for social justice too far.