BRICS lacks a coherent geopolitical identity, yet the New Development Bank offers India a pragmatic avenue for engagement. Discuss.

The 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi (12–13 September 2026), chaired by India under the theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability" [1], underlined a familiar paradox: a bloc of growing economic weight but no single strategic voice. For India, the New Development Bank (NDB) remains its most usable BRICS instrument.

Why BRICS lacks a coherent geopolitical identity

• Divergent framings: Russia, China and Iran push an anti-West agenda, while India, Brazil and South Africa prefer a non-West posture consistent with India's deep ties with the United States.
• Heterogeneous membership: expansion to Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE [1] widened income levels and imported rivalries — India–China border friction, Iran–Gulf tensions.
• Thin institutional architecture: no charter, secretariat or security mechanism; outcomes rest on consensus, so the New Delhi Declaration urged restraint in West Asia without naming parties [1].
• Currency question: India has distanced itself from any common BRICS currency, resisting de-dollarisation as a bloc objective.

Why the NDB is the pragmatic avenue

• Parity of ownership: the Agreement signed at Fortaleza on 15 July 2014 set an authorised capital of USD 100 billion and subscribed capital of USD 50 billion shared equally by the five founders [2] — unlike the China-dominated AIIB, no member holds a controlling share, and the Bank's first President was from India [2].
• Legitimate grievance, functional response: the IMF's 16th General Review (2023) raised quotas 50% equiproportionally, leaving relative voting shares unchanged [3] — justifying additional development finance rather than confrontation.
• Developmental mandate: as an MDB established by emerging economies for infrastructure and sustainable development [4], the NDB supplements Bretton Woods institutions instead of challenging them.
• Realistic reform levers for India as Chair: fresh capital infusion, wider membership and greater local-currency lending, which cuts exchange-rate risk without an ideological de-dollarisation agenda.

BRICS will remain a plural, loosely-bound platform; India's gains therefore lie in institution-building, not bloc politics. Anchoring its engagement in a well-capitalised, transparently-governed NDB lets India finance SDG-aligned infrastructure across the Global South, press credibly for equitable global financial governance, and maximise the grouping's potential without ceding strategic ground.