Examine how expanding BRICS's economic weight has not translated into commensurate reform of global financial governance institutions like the IMF.

BRICS today commands a large and rising share of global output, population and foreign exchange reserves, yet its members' voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions has moved only marginally. This gap between economic weight and institutional voice is the central grievance driving BRICS's parallel institution-building.

The widening economic weight

• Membership has expanded well beyond the original five: the 18th BRICS Summit (12–13 September 2026, Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi) under India's Chairship hosted Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, South Africa and the UAE [1].
• India's Chairship, themed "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability", generated over 350 meetings across 25 cities, signalling institutional depth [1].

Why reform has not followed

• The 16th General Review of Quotas (concluded December 2023) raised quotas by 50% equi-proportionally — expanding resources without realigning shares toward emerging economies [2].
• Realignment was merely deferred: approaches for a new quota formula were pushed to work under the 17th Review [2].
• Decisions need an 85% supermajority, giving the largest shareholder an effective veto; incumbents protect their shares [2].
• BRICS itself lacks a single bargaining identity — India prefers a "non-West" framing over the anti-West posture of some members, diluting collective leverage.

The compensatory response

• The New Development Bank, approved in 2014 with the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, mobilises resources for infrastructure and sustainable development to supplement existing multilateral institutions [3][4].
• The CRA offers short-term currency-swap liquidity support against balance-of-payments stress [3].
• NDB's widening membership and local-currency lending hedge dependence on dollar-based finance without pursuing full de-dollarisation.

Economic weight alone does not purchase governance power; voice must be negotiated institutionally. India's prudent course is twofold — press persistently for quota realignment in the 17th Review, while capitalising and broadening the NDB as a credible complement. Reformed multilateralism, not fragmentation, best serves both India's interests and the Global South's development needs.