"The security of tenure of the Chief Election Commissioner is both a shield for independence and a barrier to accountability." Critically examine.

Under Article 324(5), the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) can be removed only "in like manner and on the like grounds" as a Supreme Court judge. That means proved misbehaviour or incapacity, voted by a special majority in both Houses [1]. In April 2026, Opposition notices seeking CEC Gyanesh Kumar's removal were rejected [4]. The episode shows that this protection works in both directions.

Security of tenure as a shield for independence

• Insulation from the executive: the CEC's service conditions cannot be changed to the CEC's disadvantage after appointment. This lets the CEC rule against the government of the day [1].
• High removal threshold: removal needs a majority of total membership plus two-thirds of members present and voting, in each House [1]. A passing majority cannot remove an inconvenient referee.
• Track record: no CEC has ever been removed. This has supported the ECI's credibility as a neutral umpire.

Security of tenure as a barrier to accountability

• Admission-stage filter: the LS Speaker and RS Chairman rejected the notices before any inquiry committee examined the charges [4].
• Misbehaviour vs. policy dispute: complaints about roll revisions (SIR) rarely amount to "misbehaviour". The courts can correct such decisions but cannot remove a CEC.
• Asymmetry within the ECI: the other ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2]. Internal dissent is therefore weak: the CEC is protected, but colleagues are not.
• Appointment tilt: the 2023 Act's panel has the PM, a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, and the LoP [2]. Tenure security therefore protects an appointee whom the Opposition sees as the government's choice.
• Shift to the street: with the formal route closed, the INDIA bloc staged a symbolic "public impeachment" [6]. This risks lowering public trust in the referee.

Assessment and way forward The real weakness lies in how the CEC is appointed and checked, not in tenure security itself. Making removal easier would expose the CEC to majoritarian pressure.

• Neutral selector: add one, as the Goswami Committee (1990) advised and as the interim Anoop Baranwal (2023) panel of PM, LoP and CJI did [3].
• Equal protection for ECs: amend Article 324(5) to give ECs the same removal protection as the CEC, as the Law Commission's 255th Report urged [5].
• Reasoned orders: presiding officers should publish full orders whenever they refuse a removal notice.

In sum, security of tenure is a necessary shield. Accountability should come from transparent appointments, collegial checks and judicial review, not from easier removal. Acting on the Goswami and Law Commission recommendations would keep the ECI both independent and answerable, which is what Article 324 intends and what free and fair elections need.