Constitutional Bodies: UPSC, CAG, Finance Commission and Others

1. What makes a body constitutional: independence by design

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• A constitutional body is created directly by the Constitution. Its existence and core safeguards can change only by a constitutional amendment (Art. 368). Compare statutory bodies (NHRC, CVC, Lokpal), which an ordinary Act can reshape, and executive bodies (NITI Aayog), which a government order can close.
• Map: ECI (Art. 324), UPSC and SPSCs (315-323), CAG (148), Finance Commission (280), GST Council (279A), NCSC/NCST/NCBC (338/338A/338B), Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities (350B), Attorney General (76), Advocate General (165).
• Covered in other topics: State Election Commissions (243K) and State Finance Commissions (243I, 243Y) are in panchayati-raj, the Inter-State Council (263) is in federalism-centre-state, and there is also the Official Language Commission (344). Traps: the Delimitation Commission is statutory and the Solicitor General is not a constitutional post.
• Why independence matters: Class 11, Election and Representation uses a cricket example. The rules and the umpire must be fixed before the game starts, so they cannot be left to any government.
• The five safeguards: (1) fixed tenure (6 years or age 65 for the CAG and UPSC); (2) removal only by a judge-like process or after a Supreme Court inquiry; (3) expenses charged on the Consolidated Fund (so Parliament does not vote on them), e.g. Art. 148(6) and Art. 322; (4) service conditions that cannot be changed to their disadvantage; (5) bars on government jobs after retirement (Art. 148(4), Art. 319).
• Weak point: most of these bodies are appointed by the executive alone. Scholars call them "fourth-branch" or "guarantor" institutions, like South Africa's Chapter 9 bodies.
• ECI as the model (in brief): Art. 324 gives it "superintendence, direction and control" of elections. It had one member until 1989, briefly three in 1989, and three again since 1993. T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) upheld decisions by majority. The term is 6 years or age 65. The CEC is removed like a Supreme Court judge. The Supreme Court upheld its 2002 postponement of the Gujarat election.
• NCERT outdated on the ECI:
• Appointment: NCERT says "on the advice of the Council of Ministers". Now, after Anoop Baranwal (March 2023), the CEC and ECs Act 2023 sets a selection committee of the PM, the Leader of the Opposition (LoP) and a Cabinet minister chosen by the PM. A court challenge is pending (verify current).
• Removal: ECs can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation (Art. 324(5)).
• Elections: NCERT says "seventeen Lok Sabha elections". The count is now eighteen (2024).
• Detail is in elections-electoral-system.

2. Union and State Public Service Commissions: structure and independence

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• History: the Lee Commission (1924) led to the Public Service Commission of 1 October 1926. The GoI Act 1935 created a Federal PSC and provincial PSCs. The UPSC got its name on 26 January 1950. Class 11, Executive says the aim was a neutral, professional bureaucracy chosen on merit.
• Art. 315: provides for the Union Public Service Commission, a State Public Service Commission for each state, and a Joint State Public Service Commission (JSPSC).
• A JSPSC is created by a law of Parliament after two or more state legislatures pass resolutions asking for it.
• The President appoints its members, and it reports to each Governor.

• The UPSC can also serve a state if the Governor asks and the President agrees (315(4)).

• Appointment (Art. 316): the President appoints UPSC and JSPSC members, and the Governor appoints SPSC members. The Constitution does not fix the number of members (UPSC: a chairman and up to 10 members, verify current). At least half must have held government office for 10 years.

• Term: 6 years or until age 65 (UPSC) or 62 (SPSC/JSPSC, raised from 60 by the 41st Amendment, 1976). No reappointment to the same office.
• Removal (Art. 317): 1. The President refers a charge of misbehaviour to the Supreme Court. 2. The Court holds an inquiry (Art. 145 procedure). The member can be suspended meanwhile. 3. The President removes the member if the Court finds misbehaviour. Having an interest in a government contract counts as misbehaviour (317(4)).
• The President can also remove a member directly for insolvency, paid outside work, or infirmity of mind or body (317(3)).
• SPSC members are appointed by the Governor but can be removed only by the President.

• (NCERT: "enquiry made by a judge of the Supreme Court"; correct: an inquiry by the Supreme Court itself.)

• Other safeguards: service conditions cannot be changed to a member's disadvantage (Art. 318), and expenses are charged on the Consolidated Fund (Art. 322).

• Bar on further employment of PSC members (Art. 319): this protects their independence.
• The UPSC chairman can take no further government job.
• UPSC members can become only UPSC chairman or an SPSC chairman.
• An SPSC chairman can move only to the UPSC or to chair another SPSC.
• SPSC members can move only to the UPSC or to chair an SPSC.

3. Functions and limits of the Public Service Commissions

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• Exams (Art. 320): the PSCs conduct recruitment exams. For the UPSC these include the civil services, engineering and forest services, NDA/CDS and CAPF exams. On request, the UPSC helps two or more states with joint recruitment.
• Must be consulted (320(3)) on:
• methods of recruitment;
• principles for appointments, promotions and transfers, and candidates' suitability;
• disciplinary matters;
• claims for legal costs by officers sued for official acts;

• injury-pension claims.

• Art. 321: Parliament or a state legislature can give the commission extra functions, including for local authorities.

• Art. 323: the annual report is laid before the legislature with a memorandum explaining each case where the government did not accept the advice. This is the main accountability lever.
• Advisory role of the UPSC:
• Its advice is not binding.
• State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (1957) held Art. 320(3) "directory" (a guideline). If the government fails to consult the commission, its action is still valid.
• No consultation is needed on reservations under Art. 16(4) or on Art. 335 (320(4)).

• Posts can be taken out of its purview by regulations, such as the UPSC (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations 1958. These are laid before Parliament, which can modify them (320(5)).

• Work moving elsewhere: much recruitment now goes to the Staff Selection Commission and recruitment boards (see civil-services). Service disputes go to the Central Administrative Tribunal (see justice-delivery-tribunals).

• Extra roles: the UPSC empanels officers for state DGP posts after Prakash Singh (2006). It handled lateral-entry recruitment until that was withdrawn in 2024.
• Credibility problems:
• SPSC paper leaks, delays and court cases.
• The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act 2024 covers the UPSC, SSC, RRBs, IBPS, NTA and central departments (verify coverage).

• After the 2024 Puja Khedkar case, the UPSC cancelled her candidature and brought in Aadhaar-based and face-based checks. The UPSC chairman resigned in 2024 (verify current leadership).

• Representation: Class 11, Executive notes that reservations for SCs, STs, OBCs and EWS make the bureaucracy more representative. The Constitution protects recruitment, but not officers' day-to-day independence from politicians.

4. The Comptroller and Auditor General: office and independence

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• Origins: the Auditor General's office dates from 1860 (Sir Edward Drummond). It got statutory status under the GoI Acts of 1919 and 1935 and became Art. 148 in 1950. Ambedkar called the Comptroller and Auditor General "probably the most important officer in the Constitution of India".
• Appointment: by the President by warrant under hand and seal. The oath (Third Schedule) is to uphold the Constitution and the laws.

• Removal: only in the manner and on the grounds used for a Supreme Court judge (Art. 124(4)): 1. The ground is proved misbehaviour or incapacity. 2. Each House of Parliament passes an address by special majority (a majority of total membership plus two-thirds of those present and voting). 3. The President orders removal.

• Safeguards:

• Salary equals a Supreme Court judge's and cannot be changed to the CAG's disadvantage.
• No further office under the Union or states (148(4)).
• Office expenses are charged on the Consolidated Fund (148(6)).
• The President sets service conditions for the Indian Audit and Accounts Department (IA&AD) after consulting the CAG (148(5)).

• Current CAG: K. Sanjay Murthy (verify current).

• CAG (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971 (made under Art. 149): sets a term of 6 years or age 65, whichever comes first. It also lays down the CAG's audit duties and powers.

• Art. 150: the President decides the form of accounts on the CAG's advice.
• Art. 279: the CAG certifies the "net proceeds" of taxes, and this certificate is final.
• Separation of accounts from audit (1976 amendment): Union ministries now keep their own accounts under the Controller General of Accounts. This frees the CAG to focus on audit. Accountants General still compile most state accounts (verify current).
• Limits compared with the UK:
• The CAG is "comptroller" only in name: it does not control the release of money from the Consolidated Fund.
• It is appointed by the executive alone, with no selection committee (unlike the CVC, CIC and Lokpal).
• Unlike the UK's C&AG, it is not an officer of the legislature.

5. What the CAG audits and how Parliament uses it

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Audit type	What it checks
Financial attestation	Certifies the Finance Accounts and Appropriation Accounts
Compliance audit	Whether spending followed the law, rules and sanctions, and whether accounts are correct
Performance audit	Whether programmes met their goals with economy, efficiency and effectiveness (the "3Es")
Propriety audit	Discretionary. Whether spending was wise and economical: spending no more than the occasion needs, no officer using power for personal gain, and public money not spent for one person or group

• What the 1971 Act covers:
• s. 13: Union and state spending from the Consolidated, Contingency and Public Accounts.
• s. 14: bodies mostly funded by government (grants or loans of ₹25 lakh or more and at least 75% of their spending).
• s. 16 and s. 17: receipts and stores.
• s. 19: government companies. Under the Companies Act 2013 (ss. 139 and 143), the CAG appoints their statutory auditors and can do a supplementary audit.

• s. 20: audits handed over by the President or Governor.

• Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers v. Union of India (2014): the CAG can audit private telecom firms' revenue-share accounts because they use a public natural resource. PPPs remain a grey zone.

• Local bodies: Arts. 243J and 243Z leave panchayat and municipal audit to state law. Usually a state Local Fund Audit department does it.
• Technical Guidance and Supervision: after the 11th Finance Commission, the CAG advises on and supervises this audit (an s. 20 entrustment).

• Later Finance Commissions tied local-body grants to audited accounts.

• How reports reach Parliament: 1. The CAG reports to the President or Governor (Art. 151). 2. The President or Governor has the report laid before the legislature. 3. The Public Accounts Committee (22 members, chaired by an opposition MP since 1967) examines it. The Committee on Public Undertakings examines reports on PSUs. 4. The government replies with action-taken notes.

• The CAG is called the PAC's "friend, philosopher and guide". PAC procedure is in parliamentary-procedure.

• International role: the CAG is a member of INTOSAI and ASOSAI and audits several UN bodies (verify current list).

6. Landmark audits and the audit-accountability debate

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• 2G spectrum audit:
• The CAG's 2010 performance audit looked at licences given in 2008 at 2001 prices on a first-come-first-served basis. It estimated a presumptive loss of up to ₹1.76 lakh crore.
• In Centre for PIL v. Union of India (2 February 2012), the Supreme Court cancelled 122 licences.
• In Natural Resources Allocation, In re (Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, September 2012), the Court said auction is not required by the Constitution for every natural resource.

• A CBI special court acquitted all accused in December 2017. The appeal is pending in the Delhi High Court (verify current).

• Coal block allocation audit:

• The CAG's 2012 report estimated a windfall gain of about ₹1.86 lakh crore to private firms given coal blocks without bidding.
• Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary (August–September 2014) held allocations made since 1993 illegal and cancelled 214 of 218.

• The Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act 2015 brought in auctions. Some convictions followed, including of a former Coal Secretary.

• Other examples: the Commonwealth Games (2011); Bharatmala Pariyojana Phase I (2023, including Dwarka Expressway cost escalation); PMJAY (2023, problems in the beneficiary database); Delhi's excise-policy report, held back and then tabled in 2025 (verify figures).

• The debate:
• Presumptive (estimated) loss vs actual loss.
• Should the CAG question policy, or only how it is carried out?
• Fear of audit can cause "policy paralysis" (officials avoid taking decisions).
• An acquittal in court does not cancel an audit finding.

• Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India (2013): a CAG report is examined by Parliament through the PAC. It does not by itself bind courts or the government.

• Reform ideas:

• A selection panel to appoint the CAG.
• Deadlines for tabling reports (Art. 151 sets none, and some states delay).
• Audit of PPPs and regulators.
• Reversing the fall in the number of audit reports (verify current trend).
• Stronger PAC follow-up.

7. The Finance Commission and the GST Council: fiscal-federal bodies in outline

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• Finance Commission (Art. 280):
• The President sets it up every five years, or earlier.
• It has a chairman and four members. The Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1951 sets their qualifications: the chairman needs experience in public affairs, and members are drawn from people qualified to be High Court judges and experts in finance, accounts, administration and economics.

• It recommends how central taxes are shared between the Union and the states (vertical) and among the states (horizontal). It also recommends principles for Art. 275 grants and steps to boost panchayat and municipal funds (280(3)(bb)/(c), added by the 73rd and 74th Amendments).

• Art. 281: its report and an explanatory memorandum are laid before Parliament. The report is advisory, but by convention the government accepts the tax-sharing award.

• Key commissions:
• 1st FC: K.C. Neogy.
• 14th FC: 42% share for states.
• 15th FC (N.K. Singh): 41%.
• 16th FC (Arvind Panagariya): 41% for 2026-31; report tabled 1 February 2026.

• Formula weights are in fiscal-federalism (economy subject).

• GST Council (Art. 279A, 101st Amendment, 2016; set up September 2016):

• Members: the Union Finance Minister (chair), the Union MoS (Finance/Revenue), and state finance ministers or other ministers named by the states.
• Quorum: half the members.
• Voting: decisions need three-fourths of the weighted votes of members present and voting. The Centre has one-third of the votes and the states together two-thirds, so neither side can pass a proposal alone.

• It recommends which taxes GST replaces, exemptions, rates, thresholds, and special provisions for north-eastern and hill states.

• Mohit Minerals case (Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, May 2022): the Council's recommendations are persuasive, not binding. Art. 246A gives Parliament and the state legislatures power to make GST laws at the same time. The dispute body under Art. 279A(11) has not been set up.

• Why both are constitutional: they move Union–state money bargaining away from the Union executive alone. By contrast, the Planning Commission and NITI Aayog were set up by executive order.

8. Law officers: Attorney General, Solicitor General and Advocate General

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• Attorney General of India (Art. 76): the Union's top law officer.
• Must be qualified to be a Supreme Court judge (Art. 124(3)).
• Appointed by the President and holds office "during pleasure" (can be removed at any time), on pay fixed by the President. There is no fixed term, and by convention the AG resigns when the government changes.
• Duties: advises the Government of India on legal matters and does other legal work given to them.
• Can appear in any court in India (76(3)).
• Can speak in either House, a joint sitting or a committee, but cannot vote (Art. 88). Has the same privileges as MPs (Art. 105(4)).

• Is not a Cabinet member (unlike in the UK). Is not barred from private practice, but may not advise or appear against the Government.

• Other AG roles:

• A private person needs the AG's consent to start criminal contempt proceedings in the Supreme Court (Contempt of Courts Act 1971, s. 15).
• Appears in Art. 143 references (the President asking the Supreme Court for advice).
• Is an ex officio member of the Bar Council of India.

• First AG: M.C. Setalvad (1950-63). Current AG: R. Venkataramani (verify current).

• Solicitor General of India: a non-constitutional post and the second law officer, helped by Additional Solicitors General.

• Duties come from the Law Officers (Conditions of Service) Rules 1987.
• Has no right to speak in Parliament (a Prelims trap).

• Current SG: Tushar Mehta (verify current).

• Advocate General of a state (Art. 165): the state's top law officer.

• Must be qualified to be a High Court judge. Appointed by the Governor during pleasure. Advises the state government.

• Can speak in the state legislature without a vote (Art. 177) and has members' privileges (Art. 194(4)).

• Debates:

• The law officer is both the government's lawyer and a constitutional officer.
• Appointments are often political.
• The AG and state Advocates General can be on opposite sides in Art. 131 suits between the Centre and states.
• Some argue for a fixed-term, independent law officer.

9. National Commissions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

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• How the commissions evolved:
• Original Art. 338: a Special Officer (Commissioner for SCs and STs).
• 1978: a non-statutory Commission set up by resolution. 1987: renamed a National Commission.
• 65th Amendment (1990): a constitutional, multi-member National Commission for SCs and STs.

• 89th Amendment (2003): split into the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (Art. 338) and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (Art. 338A), working from 2004.

• Composition: a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and three Members, appointed by the President by warrant. Tenure is three years, set by rules.

• Functions (338(5)/338A(5)):
• investigate and monitor safeguards;
• inquire into complaints that people were denied their rights;
• advise on and review socio-economic planning;

• report every year with recommendations.

• Powers:

• While investigating, they have a civil court's powers to summon people, take evidence on affidavit and call for records (338(8)).
• The Union and every state must consult them on major policy matters (338(9)).
• Reports go to the President and are laid before Parliament with a memorandum on action taken. State-specific reports go to the Governor.

• Art. 338(10) also covers Anglo-Indians. The reference to OBCs was removed in 2018.

• Limit: All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1996) held that these civil-court powers are only for investigation. They do not allow the commission to grant injunctions (court orders to stop an action).

• In practice: the commissions handle service grievances, reservation-roster complaints and atrocity cases. They monitor the PCR Act 1955 and the SC/ST (PoA) Act 1989.
• NCST extra duties (2005 notification): minor forest produce, rights over minerals and water, displacement and rehabilitation, land alienation, PESA and shifting cultivation. It is also relevant to the Forest Rights Act 2006.
• Common problems: reports tabled years late, recommendations ignored, long vacancies and political appointees (verify current vacancies).

10. National Commission for Backward Classes and the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities

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• National Commission for Backward Classes:
• Indra Sawhney (1992) ordered a permanent body, which led to the NCBC Act 1993. That body only examined inclusion in and exclusion from the central OBC list, and its advice was ordinarily binding.
• The 102nd Amendment (2018) inserted Art. 338B (a constitutional NCBC with a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and three Members, civil-court powers and a right to be consulted). It also added Art. 342A (the President notifies SEBCs, and only Parliament can change the list) and Art. 366(26C). The 1993 Act was repealed.
• Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (Maratha quota, May 2021) read Art. 342A as taking away states' power to identify SEBCs.
• The 105th Amendment (2021) gave back state and UT lists (342A(3)) and freed them from the 338B(9) consultation rule.

• A new chair took charge in March 2026 (verify current). Creamy layer and sub-categorisation are covered in vulnerable-sections-safeguards.

• Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities (Art. 350B):

• Added by the 7th Amendment, 1956, on the States Reorganisation Commission's advice.
• Appointed by the President. Called the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities and works under the Ministry of Minority Affairs.
• Investigates safeguards under Arts. 29-30, 347, 350 and 350A (teaching in the mother tongue at primary stage), plus the Nationally Agreed Scheme of Safeguards.
• Reports to the President, who lays reports before Parliament and sends them to the states.

• Limits: it cannot enforce anything and its reports are delayed (verify current backlog).

• Pattern: bodies move from resolution to statute to Constitution (SC/ST commission: 1978 → 1990 → 2003; NCBC: 1993 → 2018). This gives them status and a right to be consulted. Constitutional status alone has not made their recommendations binding.

11. Comparing constitutional bodies: a table and an assessment

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Body (Art.)	Appointed by	Tenure	Removal	Reports to
ECI (324)	President, on the 2023 Act committee's advice	6 yrs/65	CEC like an SC judge; ECs only on the CEC's recommendation	No annual report
UPSC (315-323)	President	6 yrs/65	Art. 317 (SC inquiry)	President → Parliament, with memo on advice not accepted (323)
SPSC	Governor	6 yrs/62	President under Art. 317	Governor → legislature
CAG (148-151)	President by warrant	6 yrs/65 (1971 Act)	Like an SC judge	President/Governor → legislature (151)
Finance Commission (280)	President	As set in the order (5-year award)	Not specified	President → Parliament, with memorandum (281)
GST Council (279A)	Ex officio (members by office held)	—	—	Recommendations to Union and states
AG (76) / AdvGen (165)	President / Governor	Pleasure	Pleasure	—
NCSC/NCST/NCBC (338/338A/338B)	President by warrant	3 yrs (rules)	By rules	President → Parliament, with action-taken memo
Linguistic Minorities officer (350B)	President	—	—	President → Parliament and states

• Binding powers are rare: the ECI's orders on conducting elections are binding, and the CAG's net-proceeds certificate is final. Almost everything else is advice, so these bodies' influence depends on the report-and-memorandum chain and on political will.
• Problems:
• The executive controls most appointments, though selection committees are spreading (ECI 2023; compare the CVC, CIC and Lokpal).
• Former members get jobs after retirement, and some chairs have political links.
• Posts stay vacant and reports are late.

• Money and staff come through ministries.

• Reforms: collegium-style appointments, deadlines for tabling and action-taken reports, and whether bodies like the NCW or Lokpal should become constitutional.

• Framing question (Class 11, Executive, exercise 9): should autonomous agencies be freed from ministers? Weigh expertise and neutrality against democratic control by elected representatives.

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Exam angles

Prelims — high-yield facts and traps

• Articles: 76 AG · 148-151 CAG · 165 Advocate General · 279A GST Council · 280-281 FC · 315-323 PSCs · 317 removal of PSC members · 320(4) no consultation on reservations · 323 PSC reports · 324 ECI · 338/338A/338B NCSC/NCST/NCBC · 350B linguistic minorities.
• Amendments: 7th (1956) Art. 350B · 41st (1976) SPSC age 62 · 65th (1990) multi-member SC/ST commission · 89th (2003) NCST · 101st (2016) GST Council · 102nd (2018) NCBC · 105th (2021) state OBC lists.
• Not constitutional: Solicitor General, Delimitation Commission, NHRC, CVC, Lokpal, NCW, NCM. NITI Aayog is an executive body.
• Tenure: CAG 6 yrs/65, removed like an SC judge · UPSC 6/65, SPSC 6/62 · SPSC members are appointed by the Governor but removed only by the President after a Supreme Court inquiry · the AG has no fixed term.
• Bars and charged expenses: the CAG and UPSC chairman can hold no further government office, but an SPSC chairman can move to the UPSC. PSC and CAG expenses are charged on the Consolidated Fund.
• Law officers: the AG can speak in Parliament and its committees but cannot vote, and has MPs' privileges. "The SG can speak in Parliament": FALSE. The Advocate General can speak in the state legislature (Art. 177).
• CAG: compliance, performance and propriety (discretionary) audits · Union accounts separated from audit in 1976 · Technical Guidance and Supervision for local bodies · certifies net proceeds (Art. 279) · 2G: 122 licences cancelled (2012) · coal: 214 allocations cancelled (2014).
• GST Council: Centre ⅓ of votes, states ⅔ · three-fourths majority to decide · quorum of half · Mohit Minerals (2022): recommendations not binding. FC: chairman + 4 members, qualifications set by the 1951 Act.
• Cases: "UPSC advice is binding": FALSE (Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, 1957) · the NCSC cannot grant injunctions (1996) · commissions have civil-court powers only while investigating.

Mains — GS-II themes

1. Independence of constitutional bodies: tenure and removal safeguards vs executive appointments. The ECI story (Anoop Baranwal → 2023 Act) as a model for the CAG and others.
2. The CAG and accountability: performance audit and parliamentary control, the presumptive-loss debate (2G, coal), audit vs policy paralysis, delayed tabling, audit of PPPs and local bodies.
3. UPSC and SPSCs: merit and honest recruitment (paper leaks, identity fraud), the limits of an advisory role, and how weak PSCs hurt state capacity.
4. Fiscal-federal bodies: the Finance Commission as a balancing wheel, and the GST Council's pooled sovereignty after Mohit Minerals.
5. NCSC, NCST and NCBC: constitutional status without binding power, late reports, vacancies, and the gap between safeguards and outcomes.
6. Law officers: the AG as constitutional officer vs government lawyer, and the independence of state Advocates General.
7. Does making a statutory body constitutional improve how it works?

Current-affairs hooks

• Tabling of CAG and PAC reports, state reports held back and then tabled, and the falling number of audit reports.
• UPSC and SPSC controversies (leaks, candidate fraud, leadership changes) and how the Public Examinations Act 2024 works in practice.
• GST Council meetings and rate changes, and the 16th Finance Commission report with the government's action-taken memorandum.
• Appointments, vacancies and reports at the NCSC, NCST and NCBC, and state demands on OBC lists and caste surveys.
• AG and SG appointments and extensions, and their role in Art. 143 references.
• Court petitions on ECI appointments under the 2023 Act.