Reforming the office: controversies, chancellorship and commission recommendations

Detail

1. Why the office causes conflict

• The basic problem. The Governor is not elected. The President appoints the Governor (Art. 155), which in practice means the Union government chooses the person.
• The Governor holds office "during the pleasure of the President" (Art. 156). This means the Union can remove a Governor at any time.
• So when one party rules at the Centre and a rival party rules the state, the state often sees the Governor as the Centre's agent.

• Class 11, Federalism explains that conflict is highest in exactly these cases.

• The rule on advice. The Governor must normally act on the aid and advice of the state Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister (Art. 163). The Governor can act alone only where the Constitution allows it. Most controversies come from Governors reading this "alone" space very widely.

• Pleasure doctrine (the rule that someone holds office only as long as the appointing authority wants) is limited by the courts. In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010), the Supreme Court held: [2]
• the Centre can remove a Governor without giving reasons or a hearing;
• but removal must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or made in bad faith. It is allowed only for "rare and exceptional" reasons;
• a change of government at the Centre, or a policy disagreement with the Centre, is not enough to remove a Governor;
• courts can review a removal, but the person removed must first show that it was clearly arbitrary.

2. The Governor as chancellor of universities

• What the chancellor is. The chancellor is the formal head of a university. The chancellor usually appoints the vice-chancellor (VC), who runs the university day to day, and presides over convocations.
• Where the power comes from. It comes from state university Acts passed by state legislatures, not from the Constitution.
• Because it is a statutory role (one created by an ordinary law), there is debate over whether the Governor must follow ministerial advice (Art. 163) when acting as chancellor, or can act alone.

• A state legislature can also change the law and remove the Governor from this role.

• UGC rules bind VC appointments. The University Grants Commission (UGC) is the central body that sets standards for higher education. Its regulations fix how VCs must be chosen.

• Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022): the Supreme Court cancelled a VC's appointment because the selection did not follow UGC rules. Where a state law conflicts with UGC regulations, the UGC regulations win.
• Prof. Sreejith P.S. v. Dr. Rajasree M.S. (2022): the Supreme Court cancelled the appointment of the VC of APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University in Kerala. A search committee (the panel that shortlists candidates) must send the chancellor a panel of names. A single name is not enough.

Flashpoint	What happened
Kerala (2022)	Relying on the Sreejith ruling, the Governor asked nine VCs to resign.
Kerala, Kannur University (2023)	The Supreme Court cancelled the VC's reappointment. The chancellor had let the state government influence a decision that the chancellor was meant to make alone.
West Bengal (2024)	After a long dispute between the state and the Governor, the Supreme Court set up a search-cum-selection committee headed by former CJI U.U. Lalit to recommend VCs.
Tamil Nadu (2025)	Bills giving VC appointments to the state were among the ten bills in the Supreme Court's 2025 ruling on the Governor's delay in giving assent.

• State response: Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Punjab passed bills to remove the Governor as chancellor, or to let the state government appoint VCs.

• Many of these bills were then held up at the assent stage under Art. 200 (the Governor's choice to give assent, withhold it, or reserve a bill for the President).

• UGC draft regulations (2025): these draft rules would give the chancellor a larger role in choosing VCs. Several opposition-ruled states passed resolutions against them (verify current status).

• Punchhi Commission (2010) view: Governors should not be given statutory posts such as chancellor. Such posts expose the office to controversy and public criticism. The state government will naturally want to regulate university education, so a clash of powers should not be kept alive.

3. Other flashpoints

• The Governor's address to the House. Under Art. 176, the Governor addresses the legislature at the first session after each general election and at the start of each year's first session. The speech is prepared by the state Cabinet.
• Tamil Nadu (2023-25): the Governor left out parts of the prepared text, or walked out of the House.
• Kerala (2024): the Governor read only the last paragraph of the address.

• Convention says the Governor reads the address as the Cabinet wrote it.

• "Withdrawing pleasure" from individual ministers. Art. 164(1) says ministers hold office during the Governor's pleasure. By convention, this pleasure is used only on the Chief Minister's advice.

• Kerala (2022): the Governor publicly threatened to withdraw pleasure from a minister.
• Tamil Nadu (2023): the Governor dismissed a minister without the CM's advice, then put the order on hold.

• Tamil Nadu (2024): the Governor refused to swear in again a minister recommended by the CM. The Supreme Court rebuked the Governor, and the swearing-in followed.

• Delays in swearing-in and floor tests. A floor test is a vote in the Assembly to show that the CM has majority support. When Governors delay inviting a leader to form a government, or delay a floor test, it can allow defections and horse-trading.

• Sitting on Election Commission opinions (Art. 192). When an MLA may be disqualified under Art. 191: 1. the question goes to the Governor; 2. the Governor must get the Election Commission's opinion; 3. the Governor must act according to that opinion. Delaying a decision after the opinion arrives has been a source of controversy.

• Public political statements by Governors that criticise the elected state government.

4. Commission recommendations

Commission	Appointment	Tenure and removal	Other recommendations
Sarkaria (1988) (on Centre-state relations)	An eminent person from outside the state, not recently active in politics; appointed after consulting the CM	Full 5-year term, not cut short except for compelling reasons; a Governor facing removal should get a chance to explain, and the grounds should be stated [2]	No other office after the term, except Vice-President or President; reserve bills for the President (Art. 200) sparingly
NCRWC (2002) (National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah)	Appointed after consulting the CM	Normally allowed to complete 5 years; if early removal is needed, the CM should be consulted first [2]	—
Punchhi (2010) (second commission on Centre-state relations)	Chosen by a committee of the PM, Union Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker and the state CM	Fixed 5-year term; delete "during the pleasure of the President" from Art. 156; removal only by a resolution of the state legislature [2]	No chancellorships or other statutory posts; a time limit for decisions on bills (verify)

• Status: none of these recommendations has been made binding law. Art. 156 still contains the pleasure clause [2].

5. Reform options for Mains

• Write down conventions: for example, a code on inviting leaders to form a government, floor tests, and the Governor's address.
• Time limit under Art. 200 for giving assent to bills (linked to the Supreme Court's 2025 ruling in the Tamil Nadu case).
• Open appointment panel on the Punchhi model, plus security of tenure that builds on B.P. Singhal (2010).
• Leave chancellorship to the states: state laws can name the CM, the education minister or an eminent academic as chancellor, while UGC standards (Gadhvi, Sreejith) still apply.
• Abolish the office (scholarly proposal): a ceremonial head would be replaced, and the High Court Chief Justice would act only during emergencies.

Prelims Hooks

• The Governor's role as university chancellor comes from state university Acts, not from any Article of the Constitution.
• Art. 156: the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. The 5-year term is subject to this.
• B.P. Singhal (2010): a Governor can be removed without reasons, but not arbitrarily. A change of government at the Centre is not a valid ground [2].
• Gambhirdan Gadhvi (2022) and Sreejith v. Rajasree (2022): UGC regulations override conflicting state laws on VC appointments.
• Art. 192: in disqualifying an MLA, the Governor is bound by the Election Commission's opinion.
• Art. 176: the Governor's special address opens the first session after each general election and the first session of every year.
• Trap: Sarkaria allowed a Governor to take later office only as VP or President. Punchhi, not Sarkaria, proposed removal by a state legislature resolution.
• Punchhi selection panel: PM, Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker and state CM. The CJI and Rajya Sabha Chairman are not members.
• NCRWC (2002) was chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah [2].

Mains Points

• Federal tension: an unelected Governor who can be removed at will is easily turned into the Centre's agent when rival parties rule the Centre and the state. Security of tenure (Punchhi) together with B.P. Singhal (2010) limits on removal would reduce this.
• Chancellorship trade-off: an independent chancellor can protect universities from state politics, as in the Kannur case (2023). But a Governor-chancellor creates a parallel power centre and leads to deadlocks, as in Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. Punchhi's answer is that Governors should hold no statutory posts, with UGC standards protecting quality.
• Conventions vs. codification: walkouts from the address, withdrawing pleasure from ministers, delayed swearing-in and delayed assent show that unwritten conventions are breaking down. Possible fixes are written guidelines, time limits under Art. 200 and judicial review.
• Implementation gap: the Sarkaria, NCRWC and Punchhi reports agree on consulting the CM and on secure tenure, yet none has been made law in decades. Possible routes are an Inter-State Council consensus or a constitutional amendment to Arts. 155-156.