India slashed oil imports from U.S. and Russia in Sept.

1. At a Glance

• In September 2026, India cut its crude oil imports from the U.S. to zero and sharply reduced imports from Russia. It made up the shortfall from the UAE, which now supplies more than one-fourth of India's oil imports. [1]
• Even after this switch, India buys most of its crude from very few countries. Russia and the UAE together account for 60% of its oil imports. [1]
• The cut came in the same month the U.S. passed its "Russia Sanctions Act". This law allows secondary tariffs of up to 100% on countries that buy large amounts of Russian oil and gas. [1]
• India imports about 85% of its crude oil requirement [2]. That makes this topic central to GS-III energy security and to GS-II questions on India–U.S.–Russia relations and strategic autonomy.

2. Why in the News

• On 16 September 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. President Donald Trump signed it into law on 18 September 2026. [1]
• The Act lets the U.S. levy tariffs of up to 100% on countries such as India and China that import large quantities of Russian oil and gas. [1]
• On 16 October 2026, Trump signed an executive order temporarily waiving these tariffs. He also sent a certification to the U.S. Congress saying the pause was in the U.S. national interest. The tariffs are currently in abeyance. [1]
• Indian government data for September 2026 shows U.S. crude imports fell to zero, Russian imports were cut drastically, and the UAE's share rose. [1]

3. Background & Evolution

• Before 2022: Russia supplied under 3% of India's crude imports in 2021. The Middle East supplied about 61%. [2]
• After the Russia–Ukraine war began (2022 onward): Discounted Russian crude raised Russia's share to nearly 40% in 2023, while the Middle East's share fell to about 45%. [2]
• Import dependence kept rising: It went from 87.4% (2022-23) to 88.6% (2023-24), according to PPAC data cited by PRS. [4]
• 2023: The Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas warned that relying too heavily on one region hurts energy security. It recommended that MoPNG diversify crude and gas imports. [3]
• 21 November 2025: U.S. sanctions on Russian oil companies took effect and disrupted Russian supplies. Russia's share fell from about one-third to less than one-quarter. [2]
• September 2026: After the U.S. Act became law, India stopped buying U.S. crude, cut Russian purchases further, and turned to the UAE. [1]

4. Core Static Facts

• Key terms:
• Secondary sanctions/tariffs: penalties on third countries that trade with the sanctioned country (here, Russia). [1]
• Import dependence: the share of domestic crude requirement met by imports. [4]
• Supplier concentration: a large share of imports coming from a few countries. In Sept 2026, two countries supplied 60%. [1]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Economic

• With import dependence of about 85% [2], any change in supplier or price feeds directly into the current account deficit, the rupee and inflation.
• Moving from discounted Russian crude to UAE crude could raise India's import bill. This is an analytical inference; the actual price differential is not in the sources. [1][2]
• Total volume still rose (+9.5% from Aug, +4.1% from a year earlier). India changed where it bought oil, not how much. [1]

Geopolitical / Strategic

• India changed its buying pattern under U.S. secondary-tariff pressure. This tests India's stated policy of strategic autonomy. [1]
• Dropping U.S. crude to zero in the same month is notable. U.S. energy purchases had been a lever in India–U.S. trade talks. [1]
• The tariff waiver of 16 October 2026 is temporary, so the policy risk remains. [1]
• The UAE became the main alternative supplier, which points to India's deepening ties with the Gulf. [1]

Energy Security

• Concentration risk is still there: two suppliers provide 60% [1]. The Standing Committee had flagged over-dependence on any one region [3].
• The Middle East is prone to geopolitical tensions, which can disrupt supply [3]. The Israel–U.S. strikes on Iran are currently in the headlines [1].
• Production is falling (–2.67% CAGR) while net imports rise (+2.39% CAGR), so dependence keeps growing [3]. Strategic Petroleum Reserve capacity is below global standards [3].

Governance / Policy

• The government's energy-security strategy has four planks [3]: 1. Diversify energy sources. 2. Increase exploration and production. 3. Use alternate energy sources. 4. Transition to hydrogen and electric vehicles.

• The government planned to settle crude imports in Indian rupees to save foreign exchange, but progress has been slow. [3]

Environmental

• Ethanol blending (about 1.5% to about 10%) and the move to EVs and hydrogen reduce exposure to imported crude and to sanctions. [3]

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 21 Nov 2025: U.S. sanctions on Russian oil firms take effect. Russia's share falls from about one-third to under one-quarter. [2]
• 2026-27 Union Budget: PRS analysis of MoPNG grants puts import dependence at about 85%. [2]
• 16 Sept 2026: U.S. House passes the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. [1]
• 18 Sept 2026: President Trump signs the Act into law. [1]
• Sept 2026: India imports 209.4 lakh tonnes of crude. U.S. share is zero, Russian share is cut sharply, UAE share exceeds 25%. [1]
• 16 Oct 2026: Executive order temporarily waives the tariffs, with a national-interest certification sent to Congress. [1]
• Nov 2026 (due): Release of Indian data on October 2026 oil imports. [1]

7. Prelims Hooks

• India imported 209.4 lakh tonnes of crude in September 2026. [1]
• September 2026 imports were 9.5% higher than August 2026 and 4.1% higher than September 2025. [1]
• India's crude imports from the U.S. fell to zero in September 2026. [1]
• The UAE's share of India's oil imports rose to more than one-fourth in September 2026. [1]
• Russia and the UAE together supplied 60% of India's oil imports in September 2026. [1]
• The U.S. law is officially the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. [1]
• It allows tariffs of up to 100% on importers of Russian oil and gas. [1]
• Passed by the U.S. House on 16 Sept 2026 and signed on 18 Sept 2026. [1]
• Tariffs were temporarily waived by executive order on 16 Oct 2026. [1]
• Russia's share of India's crude imports went from under 3% (2021) to nearly 40% (2023). [2]
• India's crude import dependence was 87.4% in 2022-23 and 88.6% in 2023-24. [4]
• India's ethanol blending rose from about 1.5% (2013-14) to about 10% (2023-24). [3]
• The Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas (2023) recommended diversifying crude imports. [3]

8. Why Switching Suppliers Is Not the Same as Diversifying

• India only swapped one big supplier for another
• In September 2026, Russia and the UAE together still supplied 60% of India's crude [1].
• Diversification means spreading risk across many sources. Replacing one big supplier with another big supplier leaves the risk in the same place.

• The Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas warned about exactly this in 2023, when it said over-dependence on any one region hurts energy security [3].

• The replacement oil comes from the region India was trying to rely on less

• In 2021, the Middle East supplied about 61% of India's crude. Cheap Russian oil had brought that down to about 45% by 2023 [2].
• The UAE is a Middle East supplier, so the September switch pushes India back towards the old Gulf dependence.

• The Gulf is open to conflict, and the Israel–U.S. strikes on Iran are going on right now [1][3]. Each move away from Russia adds more of that risk.

• Each switch was caused by a U.S. decision, not an Indian plan

• In May 2019, the U.S. ended the waiver (a temporary exemption from sanctions) that had allowed India to buy Iranian oil. India then stopped importing from Iran [9].
• From 2022, Russia filled much of the gap. Now U.S. pressure on Russian oil sends India to the UAE [1][2].
• So India's supplier list has changed three times in seven years, and every time a foreign law forced the change. A supplier that can be removed by another country's law is not a dependable supplier.

9. Did India Give Up Its Strategic Autonomy? The Case For and Against

• The strongest case that it did
• Strategic autonomy (India's claim that it makes foreign-policy choices for itself, not under pressure from any bloc) is meant to protect exactly decisions like where India buys its oil.
• The U.S. passed a law threatening tariffs of up to 100%, and India cut Russian buying sharply in the same month [1].

• This also happened in 2019. When the U.S. refused to renew the waiver, India stopped buying Iranian oil [9]. Critics say this shows India gives in once the cost of saying no becomes high enough.

• What the critics get right

• India's oil choices are mostly reactions. It is not setting the terms.

• With import dependence of about 85% [2], India cannot afford to lose access to the U.S. market and keep buying oil from sanctioned sellers at the same time.

• Why the picture is less one-sided

• India did not stop buying Russian oil. If the UAE supplies a little over 25% and the two together supply 60%, Russia still supplies roughly a third [1].
• Total imports rose by 9.5% over the month [1], so India kept its supply secure while changing the mix.

• India also goes back when the door reopens. After a 30-day U.S. waiver in 2026, the first Iranian oil cargo since 2019 headed to India [10].

• A fair conclusion

• In oil, India's autonomy is practised as hedging: it keeps as many sellers as possible in play and adjusts the amounts when pressure rises. It does not mean openly defying the U.S.
• This works only while waivers keep coming. The 16 October 2026 waiver is temporary [1], so India's room to choose still depends on Washington.

10. The Emergency Oil Stock Is Too Small to Ride Out a Shock

• The government's reserve covers only about 9 days
• Phase I of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR, underground caverns holding emergency crude) holds 5.33 million tonnes. It is at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur [7].
• The government reserve run by ISPRL covers about 9 days of net imports. Stocks held by oil companies add about 65 days, so the total is about 74 days [5].

• The global standard is 90 days [5].

• Even the storage India has is not full

• Only 67% (3.6 million tonnes) of the three reserves had been filled [6].
• Money for ISPRL in one year was cut from Rs 628.04 crore to Rs 130 crore at the revised estimate stage [6]. The revised estimate is the mid-year correction of the budget, so the cash to buy oil was cut during the year.

• Phase II would add 6.5 million tonnes, or about 12 more days [7]. The Standing Committee noted in 2024 that its construction had not started [6].

• Why this matters for the September switch

• The more India depends on two suppliers in a conflict-prone region, the more it needs a buffer for when shipments stop.

• Right now that buffer is short, and part of it is empty.

• What should follow

• MoPNG should fill the caverns quickly. The 2025-26 Standing Committee asked for this, and it said cheap crude should be bought for storage when geopolitics allows it [5].
• MoPNG should start Phase II and aim for 90 days. The same committee set the 90-day global standard as India's long-term target [5].
• The 2025-26 budget made a start. It gave Rs 5,876 crore to ISPRL for filling caverns [6]. That money now has to reach the caverns without being cut mid-year.

11. Who Pays If the New Oil Costs More

• A costlier barrel shows up in Indian prices
• RBI research finds that a 10% rise in global crude prices raises India's headline inflation (the overall rise in consumer prices) by about 20 basis points (0.20 percentage points) in the same period [8].

• If UAE crude costs India more than discounted Russian crude, part of that extra cost reaches households in the same way. The sources do not give the actual price gap, so this is a direction, not a measured figure [1][2].

• Cheaper oil is no longer the only goal

• From 2022, India bought Russian oil mainly because it was cheap [2].
• Now India must weigh price against the risk of U.S. tariffs [1]. The cheapest oil is not always the safest oil.
• The plan to pay for crude in rupees could have lowered the need for dollars, but it has moved slowly [3]. So India's oil payments remain exposed to dollar-based pressure.

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: Russia + UAE supplied 60% of India's crude imports in Sept 2026, showing high supplier concentration [1]
• Data: Government SPR covers about 9 days of net imports; with oil-company stocks the total is about 74 days, against a 90-day global standard [5]
• Data: A 10% rise in global crude adds about 20 basis points to India's headline inflation (RBI) [8]
• Report/Committee: Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas (2023): diversify crude imports and avoid over-dependence on one region [3]; Standing Committee report (2025-26): fill the SPR caverns and aim for 90 days of storage [5]
• Law/Case: Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which allows secondary tariffs of up to 100%, waived by executive order on 16 Oct 2026 [1]
• Comparison: Iran 2019: India stopped Iranian imports when the U.S. waiver ended on 2 May 2019 [9], and resumed under a 2026 waiver [10]. This is the same pattern of supply set by sanctions
• Scheme: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Phase II (6.5 MT, about 12 more days of cover) [7]; Ethanol Blending Programme, which reduces crude demand [3]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-III:
• Indian economy: mobilisation of resources and external sector (CAD, forex).
• Infrastructure: energy.

• Energy security.

• GS-II:

• Effect of the policies and politics of developed countries on India's interests.

• Bilateral relations: India–U.S., India–Russia, India–UAE.

• Question stems: 1. Secondary sanctions by major powers increasingly constrain India's energy choices. Examine this in light of India's crude import pattern since 2022, and suggest measures to protect energy security. (15 marks) 2. Switching suppliers does not, by itself, diversify supply. Critically analyse India's crude oil sourcing strategy. (10 marks) 3. How far can strategic autonomy be sustained when about 85% of crude is imported? Discuss with reference to recent U.S. sanctions legislation. (15 marks)

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• Strategic Petroleum Reserves (ISPRL): capacity is below global standards [3]. This is the buffer against supply shocks.
• Secondary sanctions and CAATSA: earlier U.S. law with a similar extraterritorial logic. Relevant to India–Russia defence ties.
• Rupee trade settlement (RBI framework): connects to the stalled plan to pay for crude in rupees [3].
• Ethanol Blending Programme / National Policy on Biofuels: a demand-side way to reduce crude imports [3].
• India–UAE CEPA and strategic partnership: context for the UAE's rising share [1].
• Current Account Deficit and oil prices: how the oil bill transmits to the macroeconomy [2].
• Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy (HELP) / OALP: addresses falling domestic output [3].
• G7 price cap on Russian crude: an earlier Western tool for limiting Russian oil revenue.

15. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Secondary sanctions (Economy): The U.S. Act threatens tariffs on third countries like India buying Russian oil, which drove the supplier switch.
• Energy security (Economy): Heavy import dependence and few suppliers (Russia and UAE at 60%) make supply risk the note's central concern.
• Economic sanctions (Economy): U.S. sanctions on Russian oil firms and the new Act are the pressure behind India's changed buying.
• Tariff (Economy): The Act allows tariffs up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil, waived temporarily by executive order.
• Current account deficit (Economy): Importing about 85% of crude means supplier and price shifts feed straight into the deficit and rupee.
• Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Geography): Reserve capacity is the buffer against supply shocks, and the note says India's is below global standards.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Two different U.S. measures:
• The Nov 2025 U.S. sanctions targeted Russian oil companies. [2]
• The Sept 2026 Act allows tariffs on importing countries such as India. [1]

• Do not mix them up.

• Tariffs are not in force: they are waived/in abeyance since 16 Oct 2026, not cancelled. [1]

• Volume vs. sources: India's total imports rose in September 2026 [1]. Only the country mix changed.
• Import dependence figures differ by year and method: about 85% (PRS 2026-27) [2] vs 88.6% (2023-24) [4]. Always quote the year with the figure.
• Name of the Act: it is the "Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026", not "Russia Sanctions Act" alone. [1]