Switching suppliers does not, by itself, diversify supply. Critically analyse India's crude oil sourcing strategy.

India imports about 85% of the crude oil it uses [2]. In September 2026, after the U.S. passed a law threatening tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil, India stopped buying U.S. crude and sharply cut Russian purchases. It turned to the UAE, which now supplies over one-fourth of India's imports [1]. This was a change of supplier, not a spreading of risk.

Strengths of the strategy

• Russian pivot after 2022: Russia's share rose from under 3% (2021) to nearly 40% (2023), while the Middle East's share fell from about 61% to 45% [2].
• Supply kept steady: September imports still rose 9.5% over August. India changed where it bought oil, not how much [1].
• Flexible buying: Spot purchases rose from 27.6% to 35.1% of purchases between 2017-18 and 2022-23, which lets India switch quickly [3].
• Hedging, not defiance: Russia still supplies roughly a third of India's imports, so India keeps several sellers in play [1].

Weaknesses: why switching is not diversifying

• Supply still concentrated: Russia and the UAE together supply 60% of imports [1]. The Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas (2023) warned against relying too much on one region [3].
• Back to the Gulf: Replacing Russian oil with UAE oil brings back exposure to a region prone to conflict [3].
• Choices driven by other countries: The U.S. Act set India's supplier mix. The 16 October 2026 waiver is temporary, so the risk remains [1].
• Thin emergency stock: Strategic reserves of 5.33 MT cover about 9.5 days of need [4]. Total cover is about 74 days, below the 90-day global standard [2].
• Structural gaps: Domestic production is falling (CAGR –2.67%), and the plan to pay for crude in rupees has moved slowly [3].

Way forward

• Spread term contracts across Africa and Latin America, and move more crude by pipeline, as the Standing Committee recommended [3].
• Build SPR Phase II, which adds 6.5 MT at Chandikhol and Padur [5], and work towards 90 days of cover [2].
• Cut demand by building on ethanol blending, which rose from about 1.5% to about 10% [3], and by moving to EVs and hydrogen.

India's sourcing has kept oil flowing but has only moved risk from one supplier to another. Real diversification needs more suppliers, larger reserves and lower demand. That is what makes strategic autonomy workable and supports SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy).