Secondary sanctions by major powers increasingly constrain India's energy choices. Examine this in light of India's crude import pattern since 2022, and suggest measures to protect energy security.

Secondary sanctions penalise third countries for trading with a sanctioned state. India imports about 85% of its crude requirement [2]. For India, such measures now decide whom it can buy oil from, and not only how much the oil costs.

Sanctions and India's import pattern since 2022

• Russian pivot (2022–23): Discounted Russian crude raised Russia's share from under 3% (2021) to nearly 40% (2023). Over the same period the Middle East's share fell from about 61% to 45% [2].
• Sanctions on Russian firms (Nov 2025): U.S. sanctions on Russian oil companies cut Russia's share from about one-third to under one-quarter [2].
• Secondary tariffs (Sept 2026): The U.S. Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 allows tariffs of up to 100% on big buyers of Russian oil. In the same month India cut Russian purchases sharply, imports from the U.S. fell to zero, and the UAE's share crossed one-fourth [1].
• Continuing uncertainty: The tariffs are only temporarily waived by an executive order of 16 Oct 2026, so the threat remains [1].

Extent of the constraint

• Concentration persists: Russia and the UAE together still supply 60% of imports [1]. The Standing Committee had warned against exactly this kind of over-dependence [3].
• Back towards the Gulf: The switch undoes the post-2022 shift away from a conflict-prone region [2][3].
• Autonomy hedged, not surrendered: Total imports rose by 9.5% month-on-month, and Russia remains a major supplier [1]. India changed the supplier mix without losing supply.

Measures to protect energy security

• Buffer stocks: The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) covers only about 9 days of net imports. With oil-company stocks the total is about 74 days, against a 90-day global norm [4]. Phase II (6.5 MMT, Chandikhol and Padur) should be fast-tracked [5].
• Wider sourcing: Spread term contracts across more producers and move more crude by pipeline [3].
• Sanction-resilient payments: Speed up rupee settlement of crude imports, which has been slow [3].
• Lower demand: Expand ethanol blending (about 1.5% to 10%, 2013-14 to 2023-24), EVs and green hydrogen [3].
• Higher domestic output: Reverse the decline in domestic crude production (CAGR –2.67%, 2014–23) through exploration reforms [2].

Since 2022, India's crude basket has followed foreign sanction decisions rather than its own plans. A layered strategy of deeper reserves, wider sourcing, rupee trade and a faster clean-energy transition would let India exercise strategic autonomy from a position of strength. That would also advance SDG 7 on affordable and reliable energy.