Belt and Road Initiative

Also called: BRI, One Belt One Road · Topic: World Transport and Communication · NCERT: Beyond NCERT

Meaning

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also called One Belt One Road, is China's worldwide plan to build infrastructure such as railways, roads, pipelines and ports, paid for with Chinese loans. Xi Jinping launched it in 2013.

• It matters because building and running these routes gives China trade, political influence and sometimes military access. This is called the geopolitics of connectivity.
• India has not joined BRI. Its main project, CPEC, passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which is Indian territory under Pakistan's occupation.

Explanation

The two parts of BRI

Part	Medium	What it builds
Silk Road Economic Belt ("Belt")	Overland	Railways, roads, pipelines, China-Europe freight trains
21st Century Maritime Silk Road ("Road")	Sea	Ports and shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean to Africa and Europe

• Naming trap: the "Belt" is the land route and the "Road" is the sea route.
• BRI is a set of economic corridors. An economic corridor is a planned route that links ports, railways, roads, pipelines and sometimes power and data cables, so goods can move cheaply between regions.

How it works: from loans to influence

• Step 1, the loan: China lends money to a country to build a port, railway or power project.
• Step 2, the build: Chinese firms build the project, and often run it afterwards.
• Step 3, the result: China gains trade routes, influence over the borrower and sometimes access for its navy.
• Chokepoint avoidance: a chokepoint is a narrow sea passage or land strip where traffic can be easily blocked.
• Much of China's trade passes through the Strait of Malacca.
• BRI routes such as CPEC give China a land-and-sea outlet to the Arabian Sea, so some of this trade can avoid the long trip through Malacca.

Flagship project: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• CPEC (2015) is the flagship BRI project. It is a bundle of roads, railways, pipelines and energy projects running through Pakistan.
• Route, north to south: Kashgar (Xinjiang, China) → Khunjerab Pass (about 4,700 m, on the China-Pakistan border in the Karakoram) → Gilgit-Baltistan → down through Pakistan → Gwadar port.
• India's objection:
• Gilgit-Baltistan is Indian territory under Pakistan's occupation.
• So CPEC goes against India's sovereignty (a country's full right to control its own territory).
• For this reason India does not join BRI.

The debate: debt traps and military use

• Debt-trap diplomacy: the claim that a lender gives loans for projects the borrower cannot repay, and then takes control of key assets in exchange.
• Hambantota (Sri Lanka) is the example most often cited. In 2017, Sri Lanka could not repay its Chinese loans, so it leased the port to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years. A lease means renting something out for a long, fixed period.

• The other side: some experts argue the debt came from the borrower's poor choice of projects, not from a deliberate Chinese plan.

• Three common concerns:

• Debt sustainability: whether small economies can repay large loans.
• Transparency: loan terms are often kept secret.
• Dual use: a port built for trade could later host warships.

Where it occurs

• Land route ("Belt"): railways, roads, pipelines and China-Europe freight trains running across Asia to Europe.
• CPEC (Pakistan): from Kashgar in Xinjiang, over the Khunjerab Pass in the Karakoram, through Gilgit-Baltistan, to Gwadar.
• Gwadar: on Pakistan's Makran coast in Balochistan, near the mouth of the Gulf of Oman. China built it and runs it, and it is the southern end of CPEC. It lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow exit of the Persian Gulf that much of the world's oil trade passes through. It is east of Iran's Chabahar port.
• Hambantota: on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, close to the main east-west shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. It was leased to China for 99 years in 2017.
• "String of pearls": India's name for the chain of Chinese-linked ports and bases around the Indian Ocean, which could be used to surround India:
• Gwadar (Pakistan): a port at the end of CPEC.
• Hambantota (Sri Lanka): a port on a 99-year lease.
• Kyaukphyu (Myanmar, Bay of Bengal coast): a port and pipeline terminal.
• Djibouti (Horn of Africa, at the Bab-el-Mandeb): China's first overseas military base, 2017.

Don't confuse with

• Belt vs Road: the Silk Road Economic Belt is the land route. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is the sea route. The names suggest the opposite.
• CPEC: this is only one part of BRI (its flagship, started in 2015). BRI itself began in 2013 and covers many countries.
• String of pearls: this is India's term for Chinese-linked ports and bases around the Indian Ocean. It is not China's official name for BRI. It also includes a military base (Djibouti), not just trade projects.
• IMEC: this is a rival corridor that India backs, not China. It was announced at the G20 New Delhi summit in September 2023, alongside the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) [2].

Prelims Hooks

• BRI was launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. The "Belt" = overland and the "Road" = maritime.
• CPEC (2015) route, north to south: Kashgar → Khunjerab Pass → Gilgit-Baltistan → Gwadar.
• Gwadar is in Balochistan (Makran coast), Pakistan. Chabahar is in Sistan-Baluchestan, Iran. Gwadar lies east of Chabahar.
• Hambantota was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017.
• China's first overseas military base is at Djibouti (2017), near the Bab-el-Mandeb.
• Kyaukphyu (a "pearl") is in Myanmar, on the Bay of Bengal coast.

Mains Points

• Connectivity as geopolitics (GS-I/GS-II):
• BRI and CPEC extend China's reach. CPEC lets China's trade avoid the Strait of Malacca.
• Ports like Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukphyu and Djibouti raise worries about debt sustainability, secret loan terms and possible military use.

• In answers, present both sides of the "debt-trap" debate: deliberate Chinese plan, or the borrower's poor choice of projects.

• India's response:

• India refuses BRI on sovereignty grounds because of Gilgit-Baltistan.
• It offers SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), now extended as MAHASAGAR, to be a security and development partner for Indian Ocean countries.

• It has port access at Sabang (Indonesia), Duqm (Oman) and Chabahar (Iran).

• Rival corridors (GS-III, infrastructure):

• INSTC and Chabahar reach Central Asia and Russia without crossing Pakistan. India holds a 10-year contract to run Chabahar's Shahid Beheshti terminal [1].
• IMEC links India to Europe, with an expected cut of about 30% in logistics costs and 40% in transit time [3].
• The lesson is that corridors depend on political stability. Chabahar is exposed to US sanctions on Iran, and IMEC has been stalled by the Gaza war.

Related concepts

• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
• Gwadar port
• Hambantota port
• String of pearls
• International North-South Transport Corridor
• Ashgabat Agreement
• India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
• Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor
• Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project
• BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement

Read more

• New corridors and the geopolitics of connectivity