Analyse the constitutional and federal dimensions of alcohol prohibition policy in India, referring to Article 47 and the State List.

Article 47 directs the State to "endeavour to bring about prohibition" of intoxicating drinks except for medicinal purposes, while Entry 8 of the State List vests liquor policy exclusively in the States [1]. Prohibition is therefore a constitutionally encouraged but federally fragmented policy — and, as the Supreme Court held in Balaji Formalin Pvt Ltd v. Union of India (2026), one whose chosen instrument has failed even where its goal is legitimate [2].

Constitutional dimension: an aspiration, not a mandate

• Article 47 is a Directive Principle, non-justiciable under Article 37; the word "endeavour" creates neither a right to prohibition nor a duty to legislate [1].
• The medicinal exception is written into Article 47 itself, so regulating industrial spirits is constitutionally distinct from banning consumption [1].
• Judicial review of subordinate legislation: the Court struck down Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972 — denaturant and colourant safeguards on methanol — as regulation on paper [2].
• Its criticism of prohibition was obiter dicta; the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 survives untouched [2].

Federal dimension: States as sole policy-makers

• Entry 8, List II covers production, possession, transport, purchase and sale of liquor — hence Gujarat dry since 1960, Bihar since 2016, Maharashtra regulated. Yet Gujarat saw 10+ major hooch tragedies and 600+ deaths [2].
• Fiscal federalism: alcohol lies outside GST, making excise a principal own-tax revenue; the Court listed revenue loss first among prohibition's five "evils" [2].
• Federal externality: a dry State's ban is defeated by supply from wet neighbours, prompting the Court's call for interstate border surveillance [2].
• Institutional cost: Bihar's ban generated 40,000–50,000 FIRs annually (2018–20) and pending trials near 1,14,000, forcing the 2022 amendment to permit fines and compounding [3].

Constitutionally, prohibition is an aspiration; federally, it is a State choice with spillover costs. Article 47's real object — public health — is better served by regulation than criminalisation: WHO's SAFER "best buy" of higher excise, a minimum unit price and tax stamps curbs harm while retaining revenue [4]. Coupled with inter-State coordination on illicit supply, this fulfils the Directive Principle's spirit without repeating its instrument's failure.