The anti-defection law has made the Speaker a powerful quasi-judicial authority while simultaneously exposing the office to partisanship. Discuss with relevant constitutional provisions and judicial pronouncements.

The 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985 inserted the Tenth Schedule, making the Speaker the sole first-instance judge of defection [2]. This fused a political office with a judicial function, enlarging the Speaker's authority while leaving impartiality dependent on convention rather than constitutional design.

The Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority

• Para 6, Tenth Schedule: the question of disqualification is decided by the Speaker, whose decision was declared final [2].
• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): the Supreme Court upheld the Schedule but struck down Para 7, holding the Speaker acts as a tribunal whose orders are subject to judicial review [3].
• The Schedule prescribes no time limit for decision, effectively giving the Speaker control over when a legislator's fate is settled [2].
• This adds to existing powers — Art. 110 certification of Money Bills, Art. 96 casting vote, and control of the Business Advisory Committee and House discipline [1].

Exposure to partisanship

• The Speaker is elected from the ruling side and retains party membership; unlike the Westminster convention, India has not required severing party ties [2].
• Delay becomes a political tool: withholding decisions can preserve or topple governments, a pattern seen in several State Assemblies [2].
• Nabam Rebia (2016): the Court barred the Speaker from adjudicating disqualification while a notice for their own removal is pending — a judicial admission of conflict of interest [4].
• Art. 94 requires an effective majority with 14 days' notice for removal, making a Speaker backed by the ruling majority practically irremovable [1].

The Tenth Schedule thus made the Speaker indispensable to legislative stability yet structurally vulnerable to the very majority that elects them. Reform proposals — a fixed timeline for defection decisions, adjudication by an independent tribunal or the Election Commission, and the convention of resigning party membership — would restore the office's neutrality. A Speaker trusted by both benches strengthens Parliament's role as a deliberative institution under the constitutional scheme.