The Bengal SIR episode has exposed structural limitations in the Election Commission's administrative capacity. Critically examine the constitutional and governance implications of the Supreme Court's intervention under Article 142.

Q. The Bengal SIR episode has exposed structural limitations in the Election Commission's administrative capacity. Critically examine the constitutional and governance implications of the Supreme Court's intervention under Article 142. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324 vests superintendence of electoral rolls in the ECI, yet Section 13B, RP Act 1950 obliges it to designate Electoral Registration Officers only "in consultation with" the State Government [2]. West Bengal's Special Intensive Revision showed how this dependence can stall a constitutional body, inviting an extraordinary judicial remedy.

Structural limitations exposed - Borrowed machinery: EROs are state-deputed officers. The Court took serious note of the State not sparing enough Group 'A' officers for the revision, leaving quasi-judicial inclusion/deletion decisions to junior staff [3]. - No permanent cadre: unlike tribunals, the ECI has no dedicated quasi-judicial establishment for a Phase-II exercise covering nearly 51 crore electors nationally [5]. - Trust deficit: the Court had to direct District Magistrates and police to give logistical support to the deployed judges [3].

Constitutional implications — the enabling side - Article 142's "complete justice" power filled a statutory vacuum by deploying serving and former district judges as adjudicators [3]. - 19 Appellate Tribunals headed by former High Court judges, including a former Chief Justice, were notified on the Court's 10 March 2026 order — a real gain in procedural fairness for franchise claims [4]. - Continued supervision secured publication of supplementary rolls before the polls [1][6].

The critical side - Judicialisation of administration: Article 142 is a remedy, not a substitute for institutional capacity; routine use normalises judicial performance of executive functions. - Federal friction: judicially compelling a State may deepen, not dissolve, Centre–State distrust. - Capacity and equity cost: diverting judges strains an overburdened judiciary, while deadline-bound adjudication risks excluding migrants and the document-poor.

Judicial ingenuity rescued one election; it cannot institutionalise electoral integrity. A statutory permanent ERO cadre for the ECI, standing appellate machinery written into the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and agreed Centre–State deputation protocols would let the Commission discharge Article 324 on its own strength — keeping free and fair elections a matter of institutional design, not exceptional judicial rescue.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Supreme Court of India, Order dated 02.04.2026 in the West Bengal SIR matter — Court's continuing supervision of the SIR roll-revision process 2. The Representation of the People Act, 1950 (Section 13B), India Code — EROs designated by the ECI in consultation with the State Government 3. SC directs serving and former district judges to assist EC in West Bengal's SIR of electoral rolls, DD News/Prasar Bharati — State not sparing Group 'A' officers; judges deployed; DM and police support 4. ECI sets up 19 Appellate Tribunals in West Bengal for voter roll appeals, Akashvani News — tribunals under former HC judges, notified on the SC's 10 March 2026 order 5. Special Intensive Revision (SIR) Phase-II begins in 9 States and 3 UTs, PIB — scale of Phase-II SIR coverage 6. SIR 2026, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, West Bengal — official publication of SIR and supplementary electoral rolls