A century after the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the promise of worker protection in India remains unfulfilled. Critically examine the structural and administrative factors responsible for this gap.

Q. A century after the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the promise of worker protection in India remains unfulfilled. Critically examine the structural and administrative factors responsible for this gap. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Trade Unions Act, 1926 gave registered unions immunity from criminal conspiracy and civil suits in furtherance of a trade dispute [1] — a decriminalisation of collective action rather than an empowerment of it. A century on, the gap between legal recognition and substantive protection is explained less by absent law than by structural exclusion and administrative under-delivery.

Structural factors - Informality: the overwhelming majority of India's workforce is unorganised, so a framework built around registered establishments and workplace-based unions structurally bypasses most workers. - Fragmentation: the low seven-member registration threshold under the 1926 Act encouraged a multiplicity of small, politically aligned unions, diluting bargaining strength [1]. - Normative deficit: India has ratified six of the eight fundamental ILO Conventions but not Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, citing restrictions on government servants [2]. - New-economy exclusion: gig and platform workers are formally defined and covered for social security under the Code on Social Security, 2020, yet are granted no corresponding right to organise or negotiate collectively [3].

Administrative factors - Implementation lag: the four Codes consolidating 29 laws were passed in 2019–20 but brought into force only on 21 November 2025, with central and state Rules still being notified — a five-year gap between legislative intent and executive delivery [4]. - Procedural tightening: the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 extends the 60-day strike-notice regime beyond public utilities to all establishments, narrowing the space for lawful spontaneous action [5].

The other side The reforms are not merely restrictive: they create a universal social-security architecture, mandate aggregator contributions of 1–2% of turnover (capped at 5% of payments to gig workers), enable portable e-Shram benefits, and institutionalise a Negotiating Union/Council for dispute resolution [3][5].

The deficit, therefore, is one of reach and enforcement, not intent. Timely notification of state Rules, a simplified recognition route for platform-sector unions, and progressive movement toward ratifying Conventions 87 and 98 would convert statutory promise into lived security — giving substance to Article 19(1)(c) and to the Directive Principle of worker participation under Article 43A.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. The Trade Unions Act, 1926 (Act No. 16 of 1926), India Code — union immunities; seven-member registration threshold 2. PIB — ILO Fundamental Conventions — India's non-ratification of Conventions 87 and 98 and reasons 3. PIB — Labour Reforms: Formalising and Safeguarding India's Gig & Platform Workforce — gig/platform worker definitions, aggregator contribution, e-Shram portability 4. PIB — India's Labour Reforms: Simplification, Security, and Sustainable Growth (Nov 2025) — 29 laws into four Codes; implementation from 21 November 2025 5. PRS Legislative Research — The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 — strike-notice provisions; Negotiating Union and Council