Critically evaluate why the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down, and assess whether the Collegium system has since addressed the concerns that motivated NJAC.

The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 [2] and the NJAC Act, 2014 [3] sought to replace the judges-only Collegium with a mixed appointment body. The Supreme Court's 2015 verdict preserved judicial primacy, but the accountability deficit that motivated NJAC survives largely unaddressed.

Why the NJAC was struck down

• Basic structure doctrine: a five-judge Bench held, 4:1, that independence of the judiciary is part of the basic structure, and executive participation in selection compromised it [1].
• Composition: the six-member body included the Union Law Minister and two "eminent persons"; any two members could veto a recommendation, letting non-judicial members override the CJI-led majority [1].
• Vagueness: no criteria governed who qualified as an "eminent person", opening a route for political influence.
• Precedent: primacy of the CJI, established in the Second (1993) and Third (1998) Judges Cases, was treated as constitutionally entrenched [1].

Critique of the verdict

• The Court struck down the amendment wholly rather than reading down the veto and eminent-persons clauses — foreclosing a narrower remedy.
• It conceded the Collegium needed reform and directed revision of the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP), which remains unfinalised amid Executive–Judiciary disagreement [4].

Has the Collegium answered NJAC's concerns?

• Partly on transparency: resolutions are now uploaded, and reasons were disclosed for a period — but recent resolutions have carried no stated reasons, a return to opacity criticised from within the Bench itself.
• Structural gaps persist: the Judicial Transparency Index (2026) finds proactive disclosure by the Supreme Court and High Courts uneven across judicial processes, governance and personnel [5].
• Delay and accountability: with no binding timelines, executive action on recommendations took months in recent years, sustaining vacancies and pendency [1].

The verdict correctly protected independence but left transparency to judicial self-restraint. A finalised MoP, codified eligibility criteria and a permanent secretariat can secure both — reconciling Articles 124 and 217 with the constitutional value of accountable public power.