Critically evaluate why the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down, and assess whether the Collegium system has since addressed the concerns that motivated NJAC.

Q. Critically evaluate why the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down, and assess whether the Collegium system has since addressed the concerns that motivated NJAC. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 [2] and the NJAC Act, 2014 [3] sought to replace the judges-only Collegium with a mixed appointment body. The Supreme Court's 2015 verdict preserved judicial primacy, but the accountability deficit that motivated NJAC survives largely unaddressed.

Why the NJAC was struck down - Basic structure doctrine: a five-judge Bench held, 4:1, that independence of the judiciary is part of the basic structure, and executive participation in selection compromised it [1]. - Composition: the six-member body included the Union Law Minister and two "eminent persons"; any two members could veto a recommendation, letting non-judicial members override the CJI-led majority [1]. - Vagueness: no criteria governed who qualified as an "eminent person", opening a route for political influence. - Precedent: primacy of the CJI, established in the Second (1993) and Third (1998) Judges Cases, was treated as constitutionally entrenched [1].

Critique of the verdict - The Court struck down the amendment wholly rather than reading down the veto and eminent-persons clauses — foreclosing a narrower remedy. - It conceded the Collegium needed reform and directed revision of the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP), which remains unfinalised amid Executive–Judiciary disagreement [4].

Has the Collegium answered NJAC's concerns? - Partly on transparency: resolutions are now uploaded, and reasons were disclosed for a period — but recent resolutions have carried no stated reasons, a return to opacity criticised from within the Bench itself. - Structural gaps persist: the Judicial Transparency Index (2026) finds proactive disclosure by the Supreme Court and High Courts uneven across judicial processes, governance and personnel [5]. - Delay and accountability: with no binding timelines, executive action on recommendations took months in recent years, sustaining vacancies and pendency [1].

The verdict correctly protected independence but left transparency to judicial self-restraint. A finalised MoP, codified eligibility criteria and a permanent secretariat can secure both — reconciling Articles 124 and 217 with the constitutional value of accountable public power.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Rethinking judicial appointments: Collegium vs. Commission — PRS Legislative Research — Three Judges Cases, NJAC composition and veto, grounds of the 2015 verdict, appointment delays 2. Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 — Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice — constitutional amendment creating the NJAC 3. The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 — India Code — statutory framework of the NJAC, since struck down 4. Memorandum of Procedure of appointment of Supreme Court Judges — Department of Justice — MoP as the operative, unfinalised procedural framework 5. Measuring Transparency in the Indian Judiciary: The Judicial Transparency Index — Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy (JALDI) — disclosure gaps across judicial processes, governance and personnel