Discuss how courts should reconcile the Right to Privacy under Article 21 with press freedom under Article 19(1)(a), using the proportionality doctrine.
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Press freedom is implied in Article 19(1)(a). The Right to Privacy was recognised under Article 21 in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017). They are Fundamental Rights of equal standing [1]. The Digital News Publishers Association (DNPA) is challenging the DPDP Act, 2023, which has no journalistic exemption, so reconciling the two rights is now urgent [1]. Courts must balance them, not rank one above the other, and proportionality is the tool for doing so.
Why the rights collide
- Investigative stories need the personal data of people who do not want to be exposed. The Act's consent model gives those people a veto, which petitioners call "a complete regime of pre-censorship" [1].
- Data-access and erasure rights could be used to expose confidential sources or force removal of published reports [1].
- On the other hand, an unchecked press can enable doxxing, trial by media and harm to victims and minors.
Applying the four-prong proportionality test
- Legitimate aim: protecting informational privacy is a valid State goal.
- Rational connection: consent rules do protect data, but they must target harm, not reporting itself.
- Necessity (least restrictive means): this is the decisive prong. The Srikrishna Committee's 2018 draft Bill exempted journalistic purposes [2][3], and the 2019 Bill kept that exemption [4]. Because the State itself drafted gentler alternatives, removing the exemption entirely is hard to justify.
- Balancing: courts should weigh the story's public interest against the intrusion. Public interest is not the same as "what interests the public".
How courts should strike the balance
- Purpose-based test: protect genuine newsgathering by its purpose, not by job title. This stops self-styled "journalists" from misusing the protection.
- Post-publication remedies: prefer defamation suits or privacy damages within Article 19(2) over prior restraint.
- Reading down: interpret the consent obligations as not applying to public-interest journalism, instead of striking down the Act.
- Source protection: do not allow the rights of data principals (the people the data is about) to be used to unmask whistleblowers [1].
- Ethics as a condition: link protection to codes such as Press Council of India norms, so that violators lose it.
Proportionality lets courts treat privacy and press freedom as two complementary parts of dignity and democracy. Parliament could restore a narrow, purpose-based journalistic exemption, or courts could achieve the same result by reading the Act down. Either route would protect both rights and fulfil Puttaswamy's vision that liberty and privacy strengthen each other.
Sources
- 1The Hindu, "Privacy vs press freedom: where should the line be drawn?" (16 Nov 2026)Article 19(1)(a)/Article 21 framing, Puttaswamy, no journalistic exemption in the DPDP Act, DNPA's "pre-censorship" argument, risks to sources and published reports (the exact article page could not be checked; linked to the domain root)
- 2PRS Legislative Research: Report Summary, *A Free and Fair Digital Economy* (Srikrishna Committee, 2018)the committee's report and draft law
- 3PRS Bill Track: Draft Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018exemption for journalistic purposes in the 2018 draft
- 4PRS Bill Track: The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019the 2019 Bill kept the journalistic exemption