Discuss the evolution of the anti-defection law in India since 1985, highlighting the impact of the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003.

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 [5], sought to end "Aya Ram Gaya Ram" floor-crossing by disqualifying legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or defy the party whip [1]. Four decades on, its journey reveals partial success and persisting loopholes.

Phase I: The 1985 framework

• Disqualification decided by the Speaker/Chairman, with two escape routes — a split (one-third of the legislature party) and a merger (two-thirds) [1][2].
• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld the Schedule's validity, treating the Speaker as a tribunal whose decisions remain open to judicial review.
• The split clause proved the weak link, legitimising bulk defections; the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) urged deleting both the split and merger exemptions [3].

Phase II: Impact of the 91st Amendment, 2003

• Deleted the split exemption, leaving the two-thirds merger under Paragraph 4 as the sole exit [1][2][5] — raising the numerical bar for lawful defection.
• Capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of House strength (Articles 75(1A), 164(1A)), shrinking the ministerial spoils that fuelled defections [5].
• Barred disqualified members from ministerial office or remunerative political posts until re-election.
• Net effect: individual defections became rare, but group defections shifted to "mergers".

Persisting gaps

• No time limit on the Speaker's decision, allowing defectors to continue as members pending adjudication [1]; the 2nd ARC and Law Commission favoured shifting adjudication to the President/Governor acting on the Election Commission's advice [3][4].
• A "deemed merger" is claimed on the strength of legislators' numbers alone, without proof that the parent party merged — an interpretation now before the Supreme Court.
• Rigid whips also compress genuine intra-party dissent.

The law has thus curbed retail defection while wholesale defection has adapted. Reform must fix the adjudicatory forum, prescribe a time-bound decision, and tighten the merger test, so that the electoral mandate — the essence of representative democracy — is not renegotiated after polling day.