Examine the adequacy of the in-house and statutory mechanisms for judicial accountability in India in light of recent controversies.

Judicial accountability in India rests on a two-tier design: the Supreme Court's non-statutory in-house procedure, adopted with the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, for misconduct short of removal [2]; and removal under Articles 124(4) and 218 read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [1]. Recent controversies suggest both are only partially adequate.

In-house mechanism: swift but toothless

• The CJI receives complaints against Supreme Court judges and High Court Chief Justices, and may order a peer inquiry [2].
• Its outcomes are advisory — counselling, withdrawal of judicial work, or a request to resign; there is no binding sanction.
• Proceedings are not ordinarily published, so findings rarely satisfy public scrutiny.
• It is still the fastest first response: the burnt currency notes found at a Delhi High Court judge's residence in March 2025 were handled in-house, followed by transfer to the Allahabad High Court [5].

Statutory mechanism: rigorous but rarely conclusive

• The 1968 Act requires motion admission, a three-member committee (a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, a jurist), and a special-majority address by both Houses [1] — a threshold so high that no judge has ever been removed.
• The Supreme Court upheld the Speaker's power to constitute such a committee in January 2026, affirming the process [6].
• Yet resignation at will can pre-empt it: Justice Yashwant Varma resigned in April 2026 mid-inquiry — the third such instance — leaving it unsettled whether Parliament may act on the report the Committee nonetheless submitted in May 2026 [3].
• Administrative ambiguity persisted: he was still listed as a sitting judge by the High Court and the Department of Justice months later, while his Bar status turned "active" [5].

Both mechanisms thus protect judicial independence better than they deliver accountability. Reviving the graded framework once proposed in the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — asset declaration, a complaints scrutiny panel, and intermediate sanctions [4] — alongside statutory clarity on abatement after resignation, would close this gap while preserving the independence that Articles 124 and 218 were designed to secure.