Examine the appropriateness of using the ordinance route (Article 123) to increase the Supreme Court's judge strength ahead of a full parliamentary session. What safeguards exist against misuse of this power?

Q. Examine the appropriateness of using the ordinance route (Article 123) to increase the Supreme Court's judge strength ahead of a full parliamentary session. What safeguards exist against misuse of this power? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 124(1) permits Parliament to fix the Supreme Court's judge strength "by law", and that law — the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 — was amended on 16 May 2026 by an Ordinance under Article 123, raising strength from 33 to 37 judges excluding the CJI (38 including the CJI) [2]. The route was legally valid, but its appropriateness turns on whether genuine urgency existed.

Case for appropriateness - Constitutionally permissible instrument: judge strength is statutory, not constitutional; an Ordinance amending a plenary Act is within Article 123's competence, and it was later placed before Parliament as a Bill on 20 July 2026 [3]. - Functional urgency: the Court had been working at near-full sanctioned strength, and expansion was justified as enabling speedier and more effective disposal amid rising arrears [1]. - Lead time for appointments: the Collegium's consultative process is slow; early notification allows vacancy-filling to begin rather than await the session.

Concerns over appropriateness - Judicial independence optics: expanding the Bench by executive instrument, even temporarily, invites the perception of executive initiative in shaping the apex court. - Bypassed deliberation: pendency is chronic, not sudden; a matter warranting scrutiny of whether more judges cure arrears was settled without debate or committee examination [3]. - Capacity, not root cause: numbers alone do not address the institution–disposal gap, listing practices or infrastructure.

Safeguards against misuse - Article 123(2): an Ordinance must be laid before both Houses and lapses six weeks after reassembly unless approved — hence the replacing Bill [3]. - Presidential satisfaction is confined to when Parliament is not in session. - Judicial review: courts may strike down mala fide or colourable use, and re-promulgation to evade the legislature is impermissible.

The Ordinance was thus lawful and functionally defensible, but such power is best reserved for true emergencies. Institutional reform of this weight gains legitimacy from deliberation — as Parliament's subsequent consideration of the Bill correctly restored.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill — Cabinet approval, Press Information Bureau — increase of judges from 33 to 37 (excluding CJI); rationale of efficient and speedy justice 2. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice — promulgation on 16 May 2026 under Article 123; amendment of the 1956 Act 3. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 — PRS Legislative Research — introduction in Lok Sabha on 20 July 2026 to replace the Ordinance