Examine how basing agreements reconcile **sovereignty** with **security dependence**, using Greenland as a case.
A basing agreement is the device by which a host state grants a foreign power functional military access while retaining legal title to its territory. The U.S.–Denmark–Greenland agreement of 22 September 2026, which amends the 1951 defence agreement while expressly reaffirming Danish sovereignty [1], illustrates both how this balance is engineered and how fragile it is.
The reconciling mechanism
- Title retained, access granted: the accord creates new Defence Areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig and expands Pituffik Space Base, with no transfer of territory [1].
- Consent as legitimiser: the arrangement is a negotiated treaty signed by the host, not an imposition — sovereignty is exercised, not surrendered.
- Written safeguards: reaffirmation of the Kingdom's sovereignty and territorial integrity, recognition of Greenlanders' right to self-determination, and contracting preference for Greenlandic enterprises [1].
- Reciprocity and continuity: in return for access, third-country (non-NATO) bases are barred, and a successor state after independence inherits the treaty's rights and obligations [1].
Where the reconciliation strains
- Autonomy asymmetry: the 2009 Self-Government Act transfers domestic affairs and mineral revenues to Greenland but reserves foreign, defence and security policy to Denmark [2] — those most affected hold the least formal say.
- Coercive backdrop: the deal followed open talk of acquiring the island "one way or the other". Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat of force against territorial integrity as much as its use [3]; consent extracted under pressure is thin consent.
- Lock-in: veto-like control over third-party presence converts temporary basing into durable strategic dependence.
Basing agreements therefore reconcile the two only where consent is genuine, terms reciprocal and reviewable, and benefits shared with the host community — in Greenland the form is preserved, the bargaining power is not. For India, an Arctic Council Observer whose 2022 Arctic Policy rests on scientific research, connectivity and governance and international cooperation [4], the imperative is to champion an Arctic ordered by cooperative governance and sovereign equality rather than competitive militarisation.
Sources
- 1Agreement between the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland amending the Agreement of 27 April 1951 — The White House (Sept 2026)amendment of the 1951 defence agreement, new Defence Areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, Pituffik expansion, sovereignty and self-determination clauses, non-NATO base bar, successor-state obligation
- 2Greenland — Prime Minister's Office, Government of Denmark (Act on Greenland Self-Government, in force 21 June 2009)foreign, defence and security policy not transferable; mineral-resource revenues accrue to Self-Government
- 3Chapter I, Charter of the United Nations — United NationsArticle 2(4) prohibition on the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence
- 4Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh releases India's Arctic Policy — PIB, 17 March 2022pillars of scientific research, transport and connectivity, and governance and international cooperation