Examine the constitutional basis of the Election Commission of India's powers under Article 324. How has judicial interpretation expanded the ECI's role in electoral governance?

Q. Examine the constitutional basis of the Election Commission of India's powers under Article 324. How has judicial interpretation expanded the ECI's role in electoral governance? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324 vests in the Election Commission of India (ECI) the "superintendence, direction and control" of elections to Parliament, State legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President. Its text is sparse; its content has largely been supplied by the Supreme Court.

Constitutional basis

• Article 324(1) confers a plenary mandate over preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of all elections — the source of ECI's rule-making and supervisory authority [1].
• Article 324(2) makes the ECI a multi-member body, with appointments by the President "subject to any law made by Parliament" [1].
• Independence safeguards: the CEC is removable only in the manner of a Supreme Court judge; Articles 325–326 guarantee a single roll and adult suffrage, and Article 329(b) bars judicial interference in an ongoing election except by election petition [1].
• The Model Code of Conduct, though non-statutory, is enforced purely under this constitutional mandate, operating from announcement of the schedule until declaration of results [1].

Judicial expansion of the ECI's role

• Mohinder Singh Gill (1978): Article 324 is a "gap-filler" — the ECI may act in areas unoccupied by legislation to secure free and fair polls, including cancelling a vitiated poll and ordering a repoll [2]. This power was visible when the ECI ordered a fresh poll in Falta, West Bengal (2026), keeping the MCC alive there after statewide results [7].
• T.N. Seshan (1995): equated Election Commissioners with the CEC, who chairs rather than commands — converting plenary power into collegial, majority-based decision-making [3].
• S. Subramaniam Balaji (2013): while holding manifesto promises are not a corrupt practice, it directed the ECI to frame manifesto guidelines within the MCC, judicially widening the Code's reach [4].
• Anoop Baranwal (2023): filled Parliament's decades-long silence under Article 324(2) by prescribing a PM–LoP–CJI committee for appointments [5].

The judiciary has thus both empowered and disciplined the ECI, treating free and fair elections as a foundational constitutional value. Giving the MCC statutory backing, as urged by the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) [6], alongside a transparent appointments law, would shift the Commission's credibility from personality-driven assertion to durable institutional rule.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Election Commission of India — official portal (Constitution of the ECI, Model Code of Conduct) — Article 324 mandate, multi-member composition, MCC's non-statutory basis and period of operation 2. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, Supreme Court (1978) — plenary/"gap-filler" reading of Article 324; power to cancel poll and order repoll 3. T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, Supreme Court (1995) — CEC as chairman, parity of Election Commissioners, majority decision-making 4. S. Subramaniam Balaji v. Government of Tamil Nadu, Supreme Court (2013) — direction to the ECI to frame election-manifesto guidelines under the MCC 5. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, Supreme Court (2023) — committee-based appointment of CEC/ECs pending a law under Article 324(2) 6. Law Commission of India, 170th Report, Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999) — recommendation for statutory strengthening of electoral conduct norms 7. "EC lifts model code in States where polls concluded", The Hindu, 8 May 2026 (link unverifiable at time of writing) — MCC lifted after results; retained in Falta, West Bengal, where a fresh poll was ordered