Examine the constitutional and ethical basis for the state's paternalistic duty of care towards persons on indefinite fasts. Should force-feeding ever be permissible?

Q. Examine the constitutional and ethical basis for the state's paternalistic duty of care towards persons on indefinite fasts. Should force-feeding ever be permissible? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

An indefinite fast places two constitutional values in tension: the state's positive obligation under Article 21 to preserve life, and the individual's Article 19 freedom to dissent through self-suffering. Recent judicial orders in the Dallewal and Wangchuk fasts show courts fashioning a duty of care that saves the faster without silencing the protest.

Constitutional basis - Article 21 imposes an affirmative duty, not merely a negative restraint. Hearing the Sonam Wangchuk fast at Jantar Mantar (July 2026), the Delhi High Court held that "life of every citizen is precious" and ordered daily clinical monitoring and necessary treatment by government doctors [1]. - The doctrine of parens patriae underpins this: in the farmer leader Jagjit Singh Dallewal case, the Supreme Court called it the "bounden duty" of the Union and Punjab to provide immediate, adequate medical aid [2]. - Crucially, a hunger strike is not an offence; the Court expressly refused to be seen as pressuring Dallewal to break his fast, keeping the duty of care distinct from suppression of dissent [2].

Ethical basis - Beneficence and non-abandonment: administrators cannot treat a faster's deterioration as self-inflicted and walk away; a court-appointed expert panel repeatedly counselled Dallewal to accept aid [4]. - Autonomy counterweighs paternalism — Common Cause (2018) recognised bodily self-determination, including refusal of treatment, within Article 21 [3]. - Compassion with restraint is the ethical mean: care that persuades, not coerces.

Should force-feeding be permissible? - Ordinarily no — it is intrusive, degrading, and defeats the protest's moral force. - Narrowly yes, as the Supreme Court's own carve-out suggests: aid without breaking the fast, "unless it becomes imperative to save his life" [2] — i.e., once the person loses decision-making capacity, with a medical board's certification and judicial oversight [1].

The state must therefore be a vigilant guardian, not a coercive one — negotiating the grievance early, monitoring health continuously, and reserving intervention for the moment consent itself becomes impossible. Such calibrated care upholds both the sanctity of life and the dignity of dissent that Articles 21 and 19 jointly protect.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Delhi High Court order on daily medical monitoring of Sonam Wangchuk (LiveLaw, July 2026) — "life of every citizen is precious"; daily clinical monitoring and necessary medical intervention 2. Supreme Court proceedings on Dallewal's fast (LiveLaw) — "bounden duty" of Union and Punjab; medical aid without forcing the fast to be broken unless imperative to save life 3. Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) — case record, Supreme Court Observer — bodily autonomy and refusal of treatment as part of Article 21 4. SC-appointed panel meets Dallewal, seeks medical aid (Business Standard, Jan 2025) — expert panel counselling the faster to accept medical assistance