Examine how extraterritorial (secondary) sanctions by major powers test the principle of strategic autonomy in India's foreign policy.

Secondary sanctions penalise third countries for lawful dealings with a sanctioning power's adversary. The pending U.S. Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 [1] illustrates how such measures convert India's sovereign choices into priced risks, testing — but not negating — strategic autonomy.

Anatomy of the pressure

• Extraterritorial laws project domestic statute beyond borders: the Bill would empower tariffs of up to 100% ad valorem on the top-five importers of Russian crude or natural gas, while extending Iran-related sanctions authority [1].
• The precedent is established: CAATSA (2017) exposed India's S-400 acquisition to potential penalties, turning a defence procurement decision into a prolonged diplomatic negotiation [2].

Where autonomy is squeezed

• Energy security: India imports nearly 88% of its crude [3]; discounted Russian barrels served affordability, so abandoning them under threat would mean ceding a core procurement decision.
• Trade dependence: the U.S. is India's largest merchandise export destination (~18% of exports) [4], making labour-intensive sectors hostage to a conflict India is not party to.
• Normative: unilateral coercive measures bypass multilateral authorisation, weakening the rules-based trading order India consistently defends.
• Diplomatic balancing: simultaneous engagement through the Quad with Washington and BRICS/SCO with Moscow and Beijing narrows the space for silence.

How autonomy has been defended

• India has maintained that energy decisions are "predicated on national priorities" and the needs of its 1.4 billion people [5].
• Diversification — crude now sourced from about 40 countries, including the U.S. — converts dependence into bargaining power [3].
• Issue-based alignment, waiver diplomacy and bilateral trade talks replace confrontation.

Thus secondary sanctions test autonomy not as a binary of defiance or compliance, but as a measure of India's capacity to absorb costs while keeping options open. Deepening import diversification, rupee-based trade settlement, renewable and strategic-reserve capacity, and coalitions with similarly placed developing economies would make autonomy structurally affordable — sustaining, in a multipolar order, India's enduring preference for independent judgement in foreign policy.