Examine how the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities has shaped developing countries' negotiating stance at the WTO, with reference to the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement.

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), an environmental-law principle, holds that states share a common duty to protect global commons but bear unequal obligations reflecting historical contribution and capacity. Its migration into WTO rule-making is best illustrated by the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, adopted at MC12, Geneva (June 2022) [1].

Why CBDR anchored the developing-country stance

• Historical responsibility: India argued that members providing large subsidies historically and engaging in large-scale industrial fishing must accept deeper obligations, invoking CBDR-RC and the polluter-pays principle [2].
• Livelihood, not profit: subsidies in developing economies sustain food security and the livelihoods of artisanal and small-scale fishers, unlike distant-water fleet support [2].
• Capacity asymmetry: weaker monitoring, control and surveillance systems make immediate compliance costly for low-income members.

How it shaped negotiating demands

• Insistence on meaningful Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) rather than token flexibility, including an extended transition for developing members [2].
• Resistance to disciplines framed purely on current subsidy volumes, which would penalise late developers.
• Linking any deal on overcapacity and overfishing to differentiated timelines — a key reason the "second wave" of disciplines remained unfinished at MC13, Abu Dhabi [2].

Outcomes and limits

• The Agreement bans subsidies to IUU fishing and to fishing of overfished stocks, while embedding S&DT transition flexibilities for developing and least-developed members [1].
• It entered into force on 15 September 2025 after two-thirds of members deposited instruments of acceptance [3]; India joined in July 2026 as the 123rd member, stating its domestic framework already safeguards traditional fishers [4].
• Yet CBDR remains contested at the WTO, which is built on non-discrimination rather than differentiation, and flexibilities are transitional rather than permanent.

CBDR thus converted a purely trade-liberalisation negotiation into an equity-and-sustainability bargain, giving developing countries a defensible middle path between conservation and livelihood. Carrying this calibrated differentiation into the pending overcapacity disciplines, backed by better fisheries data and the WTO's fisheries funding mechanism, would align global trade rules with SDG 14 without disarming the small-scale fisher.