How do extraterritorial sanctions by major powers challenge the sovereignty and economic interests of third countries like India? Illustrate with recent examples.

Extraterritorial or "secondary" sanctions penalise third-country entities for trade that is lawful under their own laws and unauthorised by the UN Security Council. For India, they convert a conflict it is not party to — the Ukraine war — into a direct constraint on its energy sourcing and export access.

Challenge to sovereignty and policy autonomy

• Foreign law governing Indian choices: the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026 (passed by the U.S. Senate, still before the House) authorises tariffs of up to 100% on countries that continue purchasing Russian oil and gas 30 days after enactment and rank among the top five buyers — a class that includes India [1].
• Rights replaced by discretion: the U.S. order of 7 February 2026 withdrew the additional 25% duty on Indian goods in exchange for India's pledge to halt Russian oil imports, but allows reimposition if the Secretary of Commerce determines imports have resumed [2]. A sovereign import decision becomes reviewable by a foreign official.
• Precedent: under CAATSA, 2017 [3], India's protection over the S-400 deal flowed from a presidential waiver, not from exclusion — relief by grace, not by right.

Challenge to economic interests

• Energy security: Russia became the largest single source of India's crude imports in recent years [4]; substituting it on a political timetable means lost discounts and higher freight.
• Asymmetric leverage: pressure tracks dependence on the U.S. market rather than volume of Russian purchases, so India — a partner — absorbs more pain than larger buyers with countervailing capacity.
• Trade uncertainty: tariff threats overhang the India-U.S. trade framework announced in February 2026 [5], while unilateral tariffs bypass WTO disciplines.

India's response must be structural, not reactive: embed de-escalation in binding bilateral trade text rather than executive goodwill, press for a statutory waiver clause on the CAATSA model, diversify the crude basket including U.S. energy, and champion rule-based, UN-authorised sanctions. Strategic autonomy is best defended by widening options, not by narrowing partnerships.