International sanctions have emerged as a key instrument of coercive diplomacy short of armed conflict. Examine their effectiveness with reference to recent EU sanctions on Israeli settlers and Russian entities.

Q. International sanctions have emerged as a key instrument of coercive diplomacy short of armed conflict. Examine their effectiveness with reference to recent EU sanctions on Israeli settlers and Russian entities. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Coercive diplomacy seeks behavioural change through cost imposition short of war. The EU's listing of extremist Israeli settler entities [1] and its layered restrictive measures on Russia show that sanctions signal and punish effectively, yet seldom coerce on their own.

Where sanctions prove effective - Norm enforcement: asset freezes and travel bans on Amana, the Nachala movement and HaShomer Yosh give operational teeth to UNSC Resolution 2334 (2016), which called settlements a "flagrant violation" of international law [1][2] - Attrition of war capacity: successive packages on Russian energy revenues, banking (de-SWIFTing), dual-use technology and shipping raise the material cost of aggression [4] - Precision and reversibility: listings target individuals and entities rather than whole populations, and periodic renewal (roughly 2,600 Russia-related listings) keeps them usable as bargaining leverage [4] - Coalition signalling: agreement among 27 states converts political disapproval into binding legal obligation

Where they fall short - Limited behavioural change: despite twenty successive rounds against Russia the war persists [5]; in the West Bank, settlement activity has continued to accelerate [3] - Political dilution: the EU stopped at targeted listings, declining wider trade measures — economic interest caps value-based foreign policy - Procedural bottleneck: the unanimity rule in EU foreign policy (Article 29 TEU) allows a single member state to stall collective action for years - Circumvention: third-country re-exports, shadow fleets and crypto channels compel repeated anti-circumvention rounds [5]

Implications for India India's principled support for a two-state solution [6] coexists with deep defence and technology ties with Israel and energy links with Russia, making secondary-sanction exposure and strategic autonomy live concerns.

Sanctions are therefore best understood as instruments of sustained pressure and norm-building rather than instant coercion. Their effectiveness rises when multilateral, rigorously enforced, and paired with credible diplomatic incentives and clear exit conditions. Used this way — within the UN Charter framework and alongside negotiation — they can narrow the space between silence and war, which is precisely the space India's balanced diplomacy occupies.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Extremist Israeli settlers: EU lists four entities and three individuals — Council of the EU, 28 May 2026 — Amana, Nachala, HaShomer Yosh listings; asset freeze and travel ban 2. Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law — UN Meetings Coverage, SC/12657 (2016) — UNSC Resolution 2334 and its "flagrant violation" finding 3. Israeli settlement activity accelerates in the West Bank, Security Council told — UN News — continued acceleration of settlement expansion 4. Timeline — EU sanctions against Russia, Council of the EU — sectoral energy/finance/technology measures; scale and renewal of listings 5. 20th round of EU sanctions on Russia — Council of the EU, 23 April 2026 — repeated packages and anti-circumvention measures 6. India–Palestine Bilateral Relations, Ministry of External Affairs — India's two-state solution position