Judicial legislation through Article 142 is a necessary corrective, but a poor substitute for proactive parliamentary harmonisation. Examine this tension with examples.

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order necessary for "complete justice" in a pending matter [2]. Where statutes fall out of step with one another, this power becomes law-making by default — indispensable as an emergency remedy, yet institutionally second-best.

Article 142 as a necessary corrective

• The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in force 1 July 2024) treats throwing acid and administering acid as distinct offences under Sections 124–125 [1]. The RPwD Act, 2016 Schedule, however, still recognised only persons "disfigured due to violent assaults such as throwing of acid" [3] — leaving forced-ingestion survivors, whose injuries are internal, without disability certificates.
• In Shaheen Malik v. Union of India (March 2026), the Court treated its order as a deemed amendment to the Schedule, retrospective from 2016, and directed the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to notify a formal amendment [4]. This instantly restored access to certification, compensation and the 4% job reservation the Act guarantees [3].
• The pattern is old: the Vishaka guidelines (1997) governed workplace sexual harassment for sixteen years until Parliament enacted the POSH Act, 2013 [5].

Why it remains a poor substitute

• Separation of powers: amending a statutory Schedule is a legislative-executive function; a judicial order carries no committee scrutiny, debate or stakeholder consultation.
• Implementation deficit: courts command no budget or machinery. State medical boards must still be retrained to assess internal injuries, inviting uneven compliance.
• Reactive and case-bound: relief depended on one survivor's petition; comparable mismatches left by the IPC-to-BNS transition remain unlitigated and therefore unremedied.
• Parliament had already delegated power to the Central Government to expand the disability list — an unused tool, indicating executive inertia rather than legal incapacity.

Article 142 is best understood as a bridge, not a building. A standing statutory-harmonisation audit whenever a parent code is replaced, coupled with time-bound executive notification, would let Parliament reclaim its primary role — leaving the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction to secure dignity and equality, as Articles 14 and 21 and India's UNCRPD commitments demand.